

Lessons from E10 Engagement on the Security Council

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS



Cover Photo: Members of delegations discuss as the Security Council prepares to vote during the meeting on the Situation in the Middle East (Syria), September 19, 2019. UN Photo/Kim Haughton.

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IPI Publications

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Suggested Citation:

Arthur Boutellis, "Lessons from E10 Engagement on the Security Council," International Peace Institute, November 2022.

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
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication was made possible with the support of the Republic of Korea. The author is grateful to Emmanuelle Cousin for her support with the research, to IPI colleagues Jenna Russo and Daniel Forti, and to Loraine Sievers and Hasmik Egian as well as various member states for their feedback on earlier versions. The research benefited from discussions at an October 20, 2022, expert roundtable at IPI held under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution.



CONTENTS

Abbreviations	iii
Executive Summary	v
Introduction.....	1
Preparing to Serve as an Elected Member: No Time to Waste.....	2
The Timely Assembling and Preparing of the Team.....	2
Preparing to Chair Subsidiary Bodies	3
Serving as an Elected Member: Mastering Working Methods and Seizing Opportunities.....	5
From Working Methods to New Practices	5
Sharing, Taking, and Holding the Pen	5
Championing Thematic Issues.....	9
Working with the P5	11
Ensuring One’s Legacy as an Elected Member.....	13
Conclusion.....	17
Annex.....	19

ABBREVIATIONS

A3	Three African elected members of the UN Security Council
A3+1	Three African elected members and one Caribbean elected member of the UN Security Council
AUPSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
E10	Ten elected members of the UN Security Council
IWG	Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions
P2	China and Russia
P3	France, the UK, and the US
P5	Five permanent members of the UN Security Council
SCAD	Security Council Affairs Division
SVG	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UNAMA	UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNITAR	UN Institute for Training and Research
VTC	Video conferencing
WPS	Women, peace, and security

Executive Summary

In recent years, the ten elected members of the Security Council, now commonly referred to as the E10, have come to play a more prominent role. Although there were previous periods when elected members were active and took initiative, the space for such contributions began to shrink in the mid-2000s. The emergence of the E10 as a construct and a more cohesive coalition on the Security Council is thus recent. Through cooperation and strategic alliances, there is a sense that the E10 have been able to influence the work of the Council, including its working methods, thematic issues, and some country-specific files. The E10's recent engagement on the Council, both individually and collectively, offers lessons for how elected members can most effectively prepare for their term, serve on the Council, and ensure their legacy.

Preparation is generally a key determinant of a successful Council term. Member states' core teams, including permanent representatives, political coordinators, legal experts, speech writers, country experts, and thematic experts, ideally arrive in New York as soon as possible following the June election to start building key relationships with peers and to organize and take advantage of training offers. Elected members must also prepare to chair subsidiary bodies, as selecting the chairs of these bodies is one of the first decisions elected members have to make.

For elected members to be taken seriously, it is important that they arrive on the Council with a strategy adapted to the Council's dynamics and the current composition of the E10 and that they articulate, communicate, and stick to clear priorities and positions. It is therefore particularly important that they invest in mastering the methods through which Council members or blocs make decisions, as well as other non-decision outcomes such as press statements and press elements.

While France, the UK, and the US continue to dominate penholding, elected members have come to play a bigger role in drafting Council outcomes over the past few years. Some permanent members have started to share the pen with elected members. Some elected members have also taken the pen on specific files and then "passed the baton" to new incoming elected members. The E10 have also advocated that all penholders follow best

practices for negotiations, including engaging in wider consultations, being more receptive to proposals from others, and giving adequate time for consideration.

Thematic issues are another area where the E10 have been at the forefront and have had an impact on the Security Council's agenda if they act cohesively. To have an impact on a thematic issue, it is essential for an elected member to have expertise, credibility, and a campaign plan and to carefully consider what outcome is realistic and will make a lasting contribution.

While there are close partnerships and regular coordination between some elected and permanent members, elected members seeking to substantially influence Council decision making need to work smartly to influence permanent members and withstand pressure from them. This requires missions in New York to have strong political backing from their capitals. It can also be advantageous for multiple elected members to cooperate and stand together as co-sponsors of a resolution.

As elected members seek to ensure their legacy on the Council, it is essential for them to keep in mind that a legacy is built over time and that the "how" sometimes matters as much as the "what." Elected members can leave a legacy by consistently insisting on certain issues, pushing or defending language, passing the baton on certain issues to successor members, contributing to working methods, making strong and well-timed speeches, and establishing symbolic practices.

While the E10 as a group have reached a level of maturity, their ability to coordinate across a diverse group whose effectiveness depends on several internal and external factors may have reached a natural limit. The E10's composition, individual members' level of commitment to collective E10 initiatives, and the group's leadership all impact the E10's ability to influence the work of the Council. While the E10 have been collectively successful at promoting certain issues and files and at making the Council more transparent, individual members have and will continue to have different views on many issues on the agenda. They will also continue to face structural inequalities when it comes to penholding and chairing subsidiary bodies.

Introduction

In recent years, the ten elected members of the Security Council have come to play a more prominent role. These members are now commonly referred to as the “elected members” or “E10”—instead of “non-permanent members,” as referred to in the UN Charter—to shift the emphasis from the transitory nature of their two-year tenure to the fact that they are mandated by the wider membership of the General Assembly to serve on the Council.

Although there were previous periods when elected members were active and took initiative, notably during the Cold War and in the early 1990s, the space for such contributions began to shrink in the mid-2000s, in part due to the emergence of a more rigid “penholder” system.¹ The emergence of the E10 as a construct and a more cohesive coalition on the Security Council is thus recent.² The adoption in September 2018 of the “Ten Elements for Enhanced E10 Coordination and Joint Action” (initiated by Peru when it served as E10 coordinator in June) and the dialogue between the current E10 and the incoming elected members (the “E10–I5 Dialogue,” initiated in November 2018 in Pretoria and co-hosted by South Africa and Sweden) are considered a turning point.³ The dialogue, which has since been held annually, and the “Ten Elements” paper built on Sweden’s initiative in 2017 to hold monthly coordination meetings among the E10 at the level of permanent representative and political coordinator

Through greater cooperation and strategic alliances, the E10 have reached a level of maturity and are there to stay.

with a monthly rotating E10 coordinator role.⁴

While these recent developments were largely borne out of the divisive dynamics among the Security Council’s five permanent members (P5), notably over Syria, they were also impelled by the E10; many credit Australia, Luxembourg, Guatemala, and Argentina for providing the initial impetus in 2012–2013.⁵ The 2014 resolution on cross-border humanitarian aid in Syria, co-penned by Australia and Luxembourg and joined by Jordan, remains a major collective achievement of the E10 that has been sustained by current members “passing the baton” to their successors.⁶

Despite elected members’ different levels of commitment to collective E10 initiatives, and although the P5 have greater capacity, permanence, and veto power, there is a

sense that the E10 have been able to influence the work of the Council, including its working methods, thematic issues, and some country-specific files. Secretary-General António Guterres, who already had monthly luncheons with P5 ambassadors and with the entire Security Council, now meets E10 ambassadors for a monthly luncheon and has himself referred to the E10 as the “sixth veto power.” This refers to the fact that any decision of the Security Council requires an affirmative vote of at least nine members, which means that the E10 can vote as a bloc and thereby block a resolution if at least seven of them, and sometimes even fewer, unite in opposition to a resolution.⁷ This suggests that, through greater

1 The non-aligned Council members (NAM), in particular, were so active in drafting Council products during the Cold War that a specially designated “NAM Caucus Room” was built for them off the Council’s Quiet Room in 1978.

2 Security Council Report, “In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10,” September 28, 2018.

3 The workshop was aimed at sharing experiences and ideas among the elected members of the UN Security Council to improve coordination of the Council’s work. Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa, “South Africa Prepares for a Two-Year Term at the Security Council,” press release, November 13, 2018. See also: Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws, “With Adoption of Three Key Documents, Momentum Accelerates for Enhanced E10 Impact,” in “Update Website of The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 4th Edition,” December 10, 2018, available at <https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-3-section-3i>.

4 The inaugural E10–I5 Dialogue was hosted in Pretoria by South Africa and Sweden in 2018. The second dialogue was held in Brussels, co-hosted by Belgium, Kuwait, and Tunisia in 2019. The third dialogue was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic and was co-hosted by Norway, South Africa, and Vietnam in 2020. The fourth dialogue was held in Connecticut (originally intended to be held in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines but relocated due to COVID-19 restrictions) and was co-hosted by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Norway in 2021. The fifth annual dialogue Council took place in Oslo in 2022. Permanent Mission of Norway to the United Nations, “E10 Members in Oslo to Strengthen Unity in the Security Council,” September 12, 2022.

5 Argentina was chair of the Council’s Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) in 2013 and the following year.

6 Richard Gowan, “Australia in the UN Security Council,” Lowy Institute, June 10, 2014; Jeremy Farrall et al., “Elected Member Influence in the United Nations Security Council,” *Leiden Journal of International Law* 33, no. 1 (March 2020).

7 As per the Council’s voting system, “Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members,” with no distinction between the votes of permanent members and other members (i.e., there is no veto). “Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members” (i.e., a permanent member can exercise its veto power) “provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.” Presidential statements and press statements require consensus among the fifteen members of the Security Council. UN Security Council, “Voting System,” available at <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/voting-system>.

cooperation and strategic alliances, the E10 have reached a level of maturity and are there to stay.

But the effectiveness of the E10 and E10–P5 dynamics will also continue to depend on the E10’s composition, cohesiveness, and leadership, as well as opportunities that arise. Depending on the issues at stake, Council members can be as effective working with individual P5 members as working within the E10. And with two regional powers, India and Brazil, aspiring to permanent membership in the Council and the invasion of Ukraine by one of the P5, 2022 has challenged the E10’s cohesion. Nonetheless, the response rate and quality of interviews conducted for this study are testimony to the level of interest in the E10 not only among former, current, and future elected members but also among the P5.

Several articles and a few books have already been written on the experiences of elected members of the Security Council.⁸ However, most of these are either about the individual experiences of specific elected members written from the perspective of a (former) diplomat or researcher working in or for that country or primers focused on the procedural aspects of the Council most relevant to the E10.⁹ The present paper presents a broader policy perspective on lessons from both individual elected members and from the E10 as a group based on interviews with past and current representatives of the E10 as well as of the P5.¹⁰ It concludes with reflections on the future of the E10 in a fragmented Security Council.

Preparing to Serve as an Elected Member: No Time to Waste

Elected members do not have a uniform approach to preparing to serve on the Security Council. While some can anticipate long in advance because their seat is guaranteed by their regional designation system or they have a “clean slate,” others must engage in a time- and resource-intensive competitive election that can, however, be useful in forcing member states to define and defend their priorities and to assemble their team early. Some countries also have greater financial and human resources than others to dedicate to both campaigning and serving. Regardless, preparation is generally a key determinant of a successful Council term.¹¹

The Timely Assembling and Preparing of the Team

A permanent representative and a political coordinator with the right personalities, a solid grasp of the issues, and strong interpersonal skills are generally considered to be key determinants not only of a successful campaign but also of having an impact while serving on the Council. Strong legal experts and speech writers, as well as country and thematic experts, sanctions experts, and a sanctions coordinator, are also assets. This “core team” ideally arrives in New York as soon as possible following the June election or even before. This is essential both to start building key relationships

8 See, for instance: Vahid Nick Pay and Przemław Postolski, “Power and Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council: The Influence of Elected Members,” *International Spectator* 57, no. 2 (2022), which addresses the experience of Poland (2018–2019) and South Africa (2019–2020); Gustavo de Carvalho and Priyal Singh, “Lessons from South Africa’s Term to the UN Security Council,” Wilson Center, July 28, 2021; Malte Brosig, “Effective Multilateralism in Difficult Times? Evaluating Germany’s and South Africa’s Term at the UN Security Council, 2019–2020,” 2021. Some of the most recent books include former Dutch Ambassador Karel van Oosterom’s *With an Orange Tie: A Year on the Security Council* (Independently published, 2020); Gustavo Meza-Cuadra et al.’s *Peru in the Security Council (2018–2019): Constructive Diplomacy in Times of Polarization: Reflections of the Peruvian Team*; and Alcide Djédjé and Alexandra Novosseloff’s *La Côte d’Ivoire au conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies (1960–2019)* (L’Harmattan, 2022).

9 Loraine Sievers runs a dedicated website (<https://www.scprocedure.org>) regularly updating and building on a book she co-authored with Sam Daws: *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Also see: William Ossoff, Naz Modirzadeh, and Dustin Lewis, “Preparing for a Twenty-Four-Month Sprint: A Primer for Prospective and New Elected Members of the United Nations Security Council,” 2020. Ireland and the UAE developed the *E10 Handbook: A Practical Guide for Elected Security Council Members* in 2022 for private distribution to elected members.

10 Fifteen member states—current and past elected members as well as permanent members of the Security Council—were consulted for this research, mostly at the political coordinator or deputy political coordinator level, as well as diplomats from the African Union and the European Union and leading Council experts from think tanks and academia.

11 That said, two member states that were very late-entry candidates for Security Council terms have performed to a high standard during their tenures: Jordan was elected last-minute on December 6, 2013, after Saudi Arabia unexpectedly declined to take up the seat to which it had been elected, and Panama was elected on November 7, 2006, as a last-minute compromise candidate after repeated voting in the General Assembly failed to elect either Guatemala or Venezuela.

with peers in other permanent missions in New York (of current and incoming elected members as well as of the P5) and to start organizing and take advantage of training offers.

With many training opportunities and limited time between the June election and the beginning of a Council term the following January, experts can distribute these trainings among themselves. The Council has requested that the UN Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD) maintain a register of all trainings offered.¹² SCAD, in coordination with the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and Security Council Report, offers formal trainings to delegations of the five incoming elected members with a focus on working methods, as well as an annual “Hitting the Ground Running” workshop.¹³ In addition, some of the P5 have been offering training to incoming members and inviting them to their capitals for discussions. Additional media and public-speaking training could also be beneficial, as well as having a communication expert with a clear media strategy for “the outside world.”¹⁴ Ad hoc staff-sharing arrangements have allowed some incoming members to gain experience from “on-the-job” training with a current elected member. Some incoming elected members have also occasionally hosted or hired staff from an outgoing elected member to benefit from their institutional knowledge.

The “observation phase” enables the Security Council’s team of incoming members to designate various members of their delegations to observe closed meetings.¹⁵ Some elected members (including Ireland, Estonia, Germany, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates) have used this phase to

organize “dry runs” during which their mission tests internal processes and experts can work on draft products, enter into simulated negotiations, and receive feedback. Such dry runs, generally organized in November, typically last up to a month. They can be a good opportunity to test coordination both within a permanent mission and between New York team members and their colleagues in the capital and to decide when and how to include the capital in a decision. For instance, the Netherlands used a “traffic-light” system to determine whether decisions could be made by the permanent mission, required inputs from both the mission and the capital, or had to be made by the capital. In general, relations between a permanent mission in New York and its capital, including the capital’s confidence in the permanent mission and a direct line between the ambassador and foreign minister, can allow the ambassador to push more ambitious positions and language in the Council without having to go back and forth with the capital.

Preparation is generally a key determinant of a successful Council term.

Preparing to Chair Subsidiary Bodies

Selecting the chairs of subsidiary bodies or organs including sanctions committees, counterterrorism committees, and working groups (on children and armed conflict, peacekeeping, etc.) is one of the first decisions elected members have to make, both individually and collectively.¹⁶ The Council’s subsidiary bodies are currently chaired exclusively by elected members, though permanent members France, Russia, and the United Kingdom have a practice of serving as some vice-chairs.¹⁷ While permanent representatives usually chair these

¹² UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2021/645, July 12, 2021. After notes are agreed through the IWG, it is a formality that they are issued during that month’s presidency; they are not seen as that presidency’s product.

¹³ In 2003, the government of Finland, observing how little time and how few resources newly elected members had to prepare for their terms, organized the inaugural “Hitting the Ground Running” workshop in conjunction with SCAD, the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs at an offsite conference center. This workshop, which has since become an annual event, is now co-organized by SCAD and Security Council Report. On UNITAR, see: UNITAR, “UNITAR Delivers Norway Security Council Training,” September 29, 2020.

¹⁴ Van Oosterom, *With an Orange Tie*.

¹⁵ Following their election, and as part of the induction process, the incoming elected members are invited to participate as observers in Security Council consultations as of October 1st before taking their seats on January 1st. UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2017/507, August 30, 2017, para. 140. Presidential Note S/2019/993 extended observation during the same time period, as appropriate, to negotiating sessions on Council outcomes and also provided that incoming members would receive all Council communications from August 1st.

¹⁶ However, the target date of October 1st set out in UN Doc. S/2017/507 for selecting chairs has not yet been met, and in both 2020 and 2021, difficult negotiations have lasted into January.

¹⁷ To date, China and the United States have not served as vice chairs.

committees, a designated expert often presides over working sessions to lower the burden on them.

Before 2016, the P5 simply allocated the chairs of subsidiary organs on their own, but the process is now co-facilitated by the coordinator of the P5 (appointed quarterly) and the chair of the Security Council's Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG).¹⁸ Established in June 1993, this subsidiary body debates and facilitates decisions on the working methods of the Security Council, making the chair of the IWG a key interlocutor for elected members.¹⁹

In 2018, elected members advocated for fair burden-sharing and equal distribution of work in the selection of the chair and demanded that any elected member chair no more than two subsidiary bodies.²⁰ In a presidential note adopted in 2019, the Security Council reaffirmed that the informal consultation process for the selection of the chairs should be balanced, transparent, efficient, and inclusive and should take into account the need for shared responsibility and fair distribution of work for the selection of the chairs among all members of the Council, bearing in mind their capacities and resources.²¹

In selecting the chairs, the E10 may face two negotiations: negotiations among the incoming elected members and negotiations between the E10 and the P5. Even if the incoming and current elected members agree on a division of labor ahead of time, the P5 may push back against their decisions, sometimes forcefully. In some cases, this forces incoming members to consider their second or third choices or risk having no subsidiary body to chair, which can be difficult to explain to their capitals if they oversold them on the possibility of

chairing a certain committee.

In a few cases, elected members deliberately decline to chair committees, as Brazil did in 2022 after it failed to secure the IWG chairmanship, which Albania was also lobbying for. Split chairmanships are also possible. For example, following Tunisia's two-year term chairing the Counter-Terrorism Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001), it was agreed that India would serve as chair for a single year in 2022 and that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would then also serve as chair for a single year in 2023.²² Other elected members, such as South Africa and some Latin American countries, have opted to chair thematic working groups but choose not to chair sanctions committees as a matter of national policy and due to the heavy burden it imposes.

Mindful of this burden, elected members have become more assertive in the process of assigning the chairs of subsidiary bodies, especially those requiring the most work, such as the sanctions committees on the Islamic State and al-Qaida and on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.²³ Chairing these bodies can quickly overburden smaller permanent missions and requires the support of at least two dedicated experts. Although these roles make an important and recognized contribution to the functioning of the Council, many elected members have found that being chair does not necessarily give them visibility or influence, especially since there has been no structured link between the chair of a subsidiary body and the penholder on the same agenda item.²⁴ Chairing certain subsidiary bodies can also place an elected member in the difficult position of trying to keep the body's work on course in the face of sharply divided positions among the P5.

18 Ian Martin, "Elected Members Today: Overcoming the Handicaps," in *Elected Members of the Security Council: Lame Ducks or Key Players?* Nico J. Schrijver and Niels M. Blokker, eds. (Boston, MA: Brill Nijhoff, 2020); UN Doc. S/2017/507, para. 113; and Koro Bessho, statement to the 7766th meeting of the UN Security Council, New York, UN Doc. S/PV.7766, August 31, 2016.

19 UN Security Council, "Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions," September 11, 2018.

20 UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 13 November 2018 from the Representatives of Belgium, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Germany, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, South Africa and Sweden to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2018/1024, November 15, 2018.

21 UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2019/991, December 27, 2019.

22 See footnotes to UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2021/2, January 7, 2021; and UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2022/2, January 13, 2022.

23 The full titles are Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities; and Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006).

24 Security Council Report, "2022 Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Penholders."

Serving as an Elected Member: Mastering Working Methods and Seizing Opportunities

For elected members to be taken seriously, it is important that they arrive on the Council with a strategy adapted to the Council's dynamics and the current composition of the E10 and that they articulate, communicate, and stick to clear priorities and positions. Consistency in applying values-based positions can carry weight. A lesson many elected members take away from their time on the Council is that, regardless of how prepared they think they are, "as soon as you actually start serving on the Council, you are under a steamroller," and "by the time you really understand procedures and have built relations, one year has passed already." It is therefore particularly important that they invest in mastering the methods through which Council members or blocs make decisions (e.g., resolutions, presidential statements, notes by the president, letters by the president), as well as other non-decision outcomes such as press statements and press elements. It is also important that they get support from SCAD or friendly member states as needed.

For elected members to be taken seriously, it is important that they arrive on the Council with a strategy adapted to the Council's dynamics and the current composition of the E10.

the Council would just be nibbling at the edges."²⁵ Even though the E10 have not always been unified on working methods, they are making concerted efforts to push for reforms in working methods to render the Council's work more transparent, inclusive, and accountable.²⁶ As one interviewee put it, "This makes E10 members rebels, notably regarding noncodified practices."²⁷ Conversely, the P5 have generally been reluctant to record the Council's working methods, arguing that these practices should remain flexible and adaptable.

The E10 and P5 continue to debate the balance between transparency and efficiency—whether to prioritize public meetings or closed consultations where discussions can be more frank but may also be seen as opaque. The P5 often suspect elected members of sharing information and draft documents with "their friends" outside of the Council, while the E10 sometimes note the privileged relationship between some P5 and certain media. And the proliferation of social media has also rendered interactive consultations more challenging due to fears of leaks and tweets from all sides.

Sharing, Taking, and Holding the Pen

Penholding has been defined by the Security Council as "the informal arrangement whereby one or more Council members (as 'penholder(s)') initiate and chair the informal drafting process."²⁸ Penholding remains contentious given both the perception and reality of the influence it gives a Council member over the issue under consideration. In addition to leading negotiations and the drafting of outcomes and therefore having the opportunity to shape language and drive action, penholders also get to speak first during the Council's formal and informal meetings. Note 507 states that any member can be a penholder since it

From Working Methods to New Practices

The working methods of the UN Security Council are an area where elected members have taken the lead (see Boxes 1 and 2). As Karin Landgren puts it, "What we are really talking about in working methods is power relationships, so it is an important area for change. It is reform by another name," even if elected members are conscious that "changing the working methods without reforming

25 Karin Landgren, remarks at event on "The Impact of Elected Members on the Security Council's Agenda: Germany's Sixth Tenure in 2019–20" at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, December 3, 2020, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kh6TyEQPs>; Isis Gonsalves, "Small, Young, and Female: Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on the United Nations Security Council from the Perspective of the Political Coordinator," *Global Governance* 28, no. 3 (September 19, 2022).

26 Martin, "Elected Members Today."

27 Interview with political coordinator from an elected member state, June 24, 2022.

28 UN Doc. S/2017/507, para. 78.

Box 1. Maintaining Council transparency despite exceptional working methods due to COVID-19

The day after the World Health Organization declared a global COVID-19 pandemic on March 11, 2020, Security Council members stopped in-person meetings. They only resumed (virtual) meetings on March 24th after figuring out the use of video teleconferencing (VTC) under China's presidency. Yet under such exceptional circumstances, members were divided over working methods and procedural matters (not least how to adopt decisions through a written procedure). These arrangements also led to criticism from civil society organizations and member states alike due to reduced transparency.²⁹

In this context, two elected members, the Dominican Republic and Estonia, played a critical role during their respective presidencies. In April, the Dominican Republic drafted a set of guidelines and successfully introduced temporary measures such as publishing the informal plan and live webcast for "open VTCs" (versus "closed VTCs," which were not published but elements of which could be released to the press) starting on April 21st. It also expanded the possibility of inviting other member states, members of the Secretariat, or individuals to submit written statements to open VTCs.³⁰ Estonia reinforced and expanded upon the modalities developed during the two preceding presidencies, including the nomenclature for the formats of VTCs held during COVID-19 restrictions and other technical details.³¹

Box 2. E10 unity during the open debate on working methods

The annual open debate on the Security Council's working methods organized by the chair of the IWG is an important moment for the E10. From 2019 to 2022, the E10 managed to deliver a joint statement at each annual open debate. In 2022, however, in addition to the E10 joint statement, two of its members, India and Brazil, made a separate supplementary statement raising the issue of Security Council reform.³² This highlights the difficulty for the E10 to remain a cohesive group when it includes regional powers, especially if these members have the ambition to hold permanent seats on the Security Council.³³

is an informal arrangement. Yet since around 2004, the P3 (France, the UK, and the US) have held the pen on most thematic and country-specific issues. While the P3 continue to dominate the process, elected members who seek to draft Council outcomes have made some gains over the past few years.³⁴

It is important to note that holding the pen is only one of the E10's demands. In parallel, the E10 have been advocating that all penholders follow best

practices for negotiations, including engaging in wider consultations, being more receptive to proposals from others, and giving adequate time for consideration. It should also be noted that while the E10 may support diversifying the penholders, not all elected members aspire to "hold the pen" themselves.

Some permanent members have started sharing the pen with select elected members, sometimes the chair of a relevant subsidiary body. In 2019–2020,

29 Joint CSO Letter to UN Security Council on Participation and Transparency, April 17, 2020, available at <https://watchlist.org/wp-content/uploads/joint-cso-letter-to-unsco-on-participation-transparency.pdf>; UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 30 March 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2020/252, March 31, 2020.

30 UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 2 April 2020 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the Members of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2020/273, April 6, 2020; Security Council Report, "In Hindsight: Security Council Working Methods in the Time of COVID-19," May 2020.

31 UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 7 May 2020 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Permanent Representatives of the Members of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2020/372, May 7, 2020.

32 UN, "Speakers Call for Sanctions Regimes Reforms, Restraining Veto Use, Changing System of Drafting Resolutions, as Security Council Considers Working Methods," press release, UN Doc. SC/14950, June 28, 2022.

33 The G4 nations, comprising Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, are four countries that support each other's bids for permanent seats on the UN Security Council.

34 For the list of penholders and chairs of subsidiary bodies, see: Security Council Report, "2022 Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies and Penholders." See also: Sievers and Daws, "Background on the 'Penholder' Practice for Drafting Outcome Documents (with Table)," August 5, 2022, available at <https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-5-section-6b>; and "A Historical Overview of the 'Penholder' Practice for Drafting Council Outcome Documents (2022 Update)," August 5, 2022, available at <https://www.scprocedure.org/chapter-5-section-6i>.

the UK shared the pen with Germany on the Libya sanctions and Darfur. Beginning in 2021, Mexico has successfully inserted itself as a co-penholder with the US on Haiti and, after some inconsistency, as a co-penholder with the UK on Colombia. Mexico is also co-penholder with France on the Mali sanctions.

Such pen-sharing can make texts more inclusive, more credible, and higher-quality and may offer the P3 reputational benefits vis-à-vis the E10 or the broader membership and public. However, the P3 may sometimes be cautious to share the pen because of the complexity and length this adds to a negotiation. This may explain why permanent members have turned down some requests from elected members, such as France not wanting to share the pen with Germany on Mali in 2019 but offering to co-pen on the G5 Sahel instead, which Germany turned down.³⁵ It also requires more work to coordinate and get feedback from capitals when there are more than two or three co-penholders, which risks reducing the time for wider engagement within or outside of the Council.

While the P3 continue to hold the pen on most files, certain issues have customarily been reserved for penholding by elected members. These have included Syria's humanitarian situation, Afghanistan, Guinea-Bissau, and, previously, Timor-Leste. Some elected members have also

made “grabbing the pen and holding on to it” part of their strategy on the Council.³⁶ In 2018–2019, Côte d'Ivoire, together with Belgium, held the pen on West Africa and the Sahel, and it was subsequently taken over by other elected members, including Niger, then Ghana and Ireland. Ultimately, however, simply taking the pen is not enough. As Estonia's permanent representative Sven Jürgenson put it, “Anybody can grab a pen, [but] in order to be successful, you have to be accepted as such.”³⁷ This requires both knowledge of the file and political backing (see Box 3).

Humanitarian issues have been an important avenue for the E10 to carve themselves a penholding role. Most notably, the 2014 resolution on cross-border humanitarian aid in Syria, co-penned by Australia and Luxembourg and joined by Jordan, remains a major collective achievement of the E10. This achievement has been sustained in the years since through current members “passing the baton” to incoming members (see Box 4).³⁸

The resolution on Syria durably affected Council dynamics and catalyzed similar efforts. Two years later, in a model cross-regional effort in May 2016, five elected members from five continents—Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Uruguay—successfully negotiated Resolution 2286 condemning attacks against medical facilities and personnel in conflict situations. In March 2018,

Box 3. Lessons from Ireland's attempts to take the pen on Ethiopia

Ireland drafted outcomes on Tigray, Ethiopia, in 2021, using the dire humanitarian situation as an avenue to discuss the conflict. One of the lessons Ireland learned is that elected members need to be pragmatic, courageous, and ready to step forward where they can show leadership on an issue that aligns with their principals and priorities within the Council. For Ireland, ensuring humanitarian access to those who need it has been a signature issue within the Council.

However, taking the pen on a file also requires knowledge of the file and political courage, with strong backing from the capital, to manage pressure from the P5, the affected and regional states, and, on occasion, even fellow elected members. In this case, Ireland knew the Ethiopia file in detail and was good at navigating the Council's working methods but was nonetheless challenged by the African and Caribbean Council members (A3+1) because of their view that Ethiopia was not formally a Security Council file.

35 Stéphanie Fillion, “Security Council Presidency: Two Old Friends, France and Germany, Now Share an Office,” *PassBlue*, March 4, 2019.

36 Interview with Council member, June 29, 2022.

37 Sven Jürgenson, remarks at event on “The Impact of Elected Members on the Security Council's Agenda: Germany's Sixth Tenure in 2019-20” at the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, December 3, 2020, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kh6TyEOQPs>.

38 Gowan, “Australia in the UN”; Farrall et al., “Elected Member Influence.”

Box 4. Holding—and passing—the pen on cross-border humanitarian aid in Syria

The 2014 Security Council resolution allowing the delivery of international humanitarian aid to northern Syria through four border crossings without explicit consent from the Syrian government was groundbreaking. The penholders on the humanitarian track on Syria were Australia and Luxembourg, which had spearheaded the adoption of a Security Council presidential statement on October 2, 2013, and they were joined by Jordan, a state neighboring Syria, in 2014. These penholders sought to build bridges among the divided P5 and put a draft resolution on cross-border and cross-line humanitarian access in Syria to a vote on July 14, 2014.³⁹ The draft was finalized following five weeks of intense negotiations between the penholders and the P5, followed by a further two rounds of negotiations in the full Council on July 7th and 10th and a final meeting on July 11th to work out remaining issues.⁴⁰

After their terms on the Council, these members effectively “passed the baton” to incoming elected members. In the subsequent years, the baton passed between Sweden, Japan, Kuwait, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and Norway, and in 2022, the E10 issued a joint statement on Syria when Kenya was serving as coordinator. In this case, the resolutions drafted by elected members have consistently been able to pass despite up to four abstentions among the P5.

another group of elected members—Bolivia, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, and Sweden—managed to get a presidential statement on the humanitarian situation in Yemen adopted after convincing the UK, as penholder on Yemen, to request a briefing on humanitarian developments by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.⁴¹ Albania, representing the Eastern European regional group, has co-lead with the US on the political and conflict aspects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, while France and Mexico have assumed the lead on Ukraine-related humanitarian issues. Having co-leads on these issues helps broaden regional representation.

Even if they do not hold or co-hold the pen, elected members can be influential and even make themselves indispensable to the penholder, especially on files in their region of the world. This is particularly true for the African elected members (A3), which historically have rarely taken the pen and rely more on signature events and special sessions (see Box 5 on the A3). Kenya, which served

on the Council in 2021–2022, has sometimes been referred to as the “de facto penholder” for files in East Africa, meaning that the formal penholder has worked closely with Kenya on first drafts, in recognition of its influence in, understanding of, and contribution to the region. Although elected members have little ability to individually determine the outcome of a decision, the penholder may seek legitimacy in the form of unanimity and regional support, which increases the influence of elected members.⁴²

The 2014 resolution on cross-border humanitarian aid in Syria remains a major collective achievement of the E10; it has durably affected Council dynamics and catalyzed similar efforts.

An issue related to penholding has been the recent resurgence of elected members leading Council visits to countries in “their region,” broadly defined, even without holding the pen on these situations, as when Bolivia and Kazakhstan led visits to Haiti and Afghanistan, respectively.⁴³ On more complex missions, it has also become customary for the penholders to be joined by one or more elected members as co-leads of the mission or to lead specific legs of the mission.

39 An earlier resolution, Resolution 2139, adopted on February 22, 2014, demanded that all parties “cease and desist from all violations of international humanitarian law” and “stresse[d] the need to end impunity.”

40 Security Council Report, “Syria: Monday Vote on Draft Resolution on Cross-Border and Cross-Line Humanitarian Access,” July 13, 2014.

41 Security Council Report, “Yemen: Briefing on the Humanitarian Situation,” September 20, 2018.

42 Jess Gifkins, “Beyond the Veto: Roles in UN Security Council Decision-Making,” *Global Governance* 27, no. 1 (2021).

43 Security Council Report, “The Penholder System,” December 21, 2018.

Box 5. The growing unity of the A3

The three elected African members of the Security Council have increasingly structured their cooperation and coordinated with the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the AU Commission. This makes the A3 an important component of Africa's peace and security architecture, giving unique, practical shape to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter's expectations of UN cooperation with regional organizations. When informed by AUPSC decisions, unified A3 positions carry great legitimacy, credibility, and leverage and can guide and influence Council outcomes. The A3 have issued joint statements and negotiated positions on Council outcome documents and conducted joint press stakeouts.

For example, in June 2019, the A3 broke a deadlock within the Council and shaped its press statements on Sudan after the AUPSC suspended the Sudanese government.⁴⁴ More recently, the A3's impact was most visible in the ruinous conflict in northern Ethiopia. In this instance, the A3 helped shape an AU-mediated cessation of hostilities, with one of its members, Kenya, also taking a frontline role in the mediation effort throughout its term on the Council.

Divisions among the Council's permanent members due to geopolitical shifts, together with growing A3 unity, has meant that, in practice, the group's influence and leverage have grown. However, this unity has to keep being renewed and depends on the A3's resistance to external pressures. This means that the African members elected to the Council need not only to be influential individually on certain files but also to have the standing and capabilities to sustain the A3's leverage.

Box 6. The E10 and the youth, peace, and security agenda

The youth, peace, and security (YPS) agenda has gained momentum in recent years. UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015), which is the first international policy framework that recognizes the positive role young people play in preventing and resolving conflict, countering violent extremism, and building peace, was adopted under the leadership of Jordan. It opened the way for the 2018 independent progress study on youth, peace, and security and UN Security Council Resolution 2419 (2018), adopted this time under the leadership of two other elected members of the Council, Peru and Sweden. A third resolution, Resolution 2535 (2020), was adopted during the presidency of Germany but this time with permanent member France and the Dominican Republic as co-pens. This latest resolution introduces regular reporting on youth, peace, and security and requests the secretary-general to submit a biennial report to the Security Council.

Championing Thematic Issues

Thematic issues are another area where the E10 have been at the forefront and have had an impact on the Security Council's agenda if they act cohesively, despite strong pushback from the P5 on certain issues. Other than the above-mentioned humanitarian and conflict-related food insecurity issues, as well as working methods, themes elected members (and permanent members alike) have long championed include children and armed

conflict (which France initiated); conflict prevention and resolution in Africa; peacebuilding; cooperation with regional organizations (of which China was an earlier initiator); peacekeeping operations; women, peace, and security (WPS); youth, peace, and security (see Box 6); climate and security (see Box 7); and, most recently, cybersecurity (see Box 13).⁴⁵ The UK has also played an early lead role on climate and security and continues to be the penholder for peacekeeping and WPS. However, in the current geopolitical context and

⁴⁴ Gustavo de Carvalho and Daniel Forti, "How Can African States Become More Influential in the UN Security Council?" *IPI Global Observatory*, March 12, 2020.

⁴⁵ The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict was first chaired by France from its 2005 inception through 2008, but since Mexico took over as chair in 2009, the E10 have thereafter held this position. On the E10 and women, peace, and security, see: Patty Chang, Louise Olsson, and Angela Muvumba Sellström, "Advancing Women, Peace, and Security in the UN Security Council: Critical Choices for Elected Member States," *IPI Global Observatory*, October 7, 2021.

Box 7. The E10 and climate and security

Since it was first discussed in the Council under the UK presidency in April 2007, the issue of climate and security has come back on the Council's agenda regularly, including in an open debate organized by Germany in July 2011 and a series of related Arria-formula meetings from 2013 to 2017. Since 2018, climate and security has been discussed frequently, including in debates organized by the Netherlands, Sweden, and the Dominican Republic. During its Council presidency in July 2020, Germany, together with nine other Council members, organized a high-level debate on climate change and security and announced the creation of the Informal Expert Group on Climate and Security. Over the course of 2021, related open debates were organized by the UK, the US, and Ireland.

Ireland and Niger, as co-penholders, had been working on a draft resolution on climate and security, and support for such a resolution was expressed by several Council members during the September 2021 open debate. In December 2021, the draft resolution, which would have called for the UN to systematically integrate climate-related security risks into its work on conflict prevention, conflict management, and peacebuilding, was put to a vote in the Council by then-Council president Niger and Ireland. The draft was co-sponsored by 113 UN member states. In a recorded vote of twelve in favor to two against (India and Russia) with one abstention (China), the resolution was blocked by Russia's veto. Nonetheless, it is generally acknowledged that the issue will continue to be discussed in the Council despite not yet being formally on the agenda.⁴⁶

given strong pushback from the P2 (China and Russia), some NGOs warn that any effort to advance resolutions on WPS or human rights risks moving the needle backward rather than forward.

To have an impact on a thematic issue, it is essential for an elected member to have expertise, credibility, and a campaign plan and to carefully consider what outcome is realistic and will make a lasting contribution. Senegal, when organizing an Arria-formula meeting on water, peace, and security in April 2016, was able to promote best practice in water cooperation in its own region through the Senegal River Development Organization.⁴⁷ This meeting paved the way for Senegal to convene a formal meeting on water, peace, and security during its November 2016 Council presidency. Bolivia led Resolution 2365 (2017) on mine action, the first omnibus Council resolution on this theme.⁴⁸ Estonia's efforts on cybersecurity are another example (see Box 13), as is Mexico's organization of a ministerial-level open debate on small arms and light weapons during its November 2021 presidency, which was followed by the adoption of Resolution 2616 (2021) the following month.⁴⁹

While few elected members manage to bring a new

issue onto the Council's long-term agenda within their two-year term, many have "taken the baton" from outgoing elected members. However, promoting thematic issues only goes so far. To be influential, elected members have to make sure thematic language also makes its way into country-specific files. The Netherlands, Niger, Ireland, Kenya, and Norway, for instance, have tried to get climate and security language into resolutions on peace operations in the the past few years. Despite the absence of Council consensus on making the issue a formal agenda item, Kenya and Norway hosted four meetings on climate and security in 2022, including a meeting at the permanent representative level in February 2022, an expert and academic briefing to the current and incoming elected members, and two expert-level discussions ahead of peace operations mandate renewals for Iraq and Mali.

Elected members generally have the most influence over the agenda during their monthly presidency. They therefore tend to invest a lot of energy in preparing for and delivering during their one or two Council presidencies. The E10 may hope to achieve recognition for noteworthy thematic meetings, influential briefers, and significant outcomes.

⁴⁶ Climate Security Expert Network, "Climate Security at the UNSC: A Short History."

⁴⁷ Security Council Report, "Arria-formula Meeting on Water, Peace and Security," April 21, 2016.

⁴⁸ Security Council Report, "Vote on Mine Action Draft Resolution," June 29, 2017.

⁴⁹ UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "Security Council Resolves to Consider During Mandate Renewals Role of Peace Operations in Curbing Illicit Weapons Flow, Adopting Resolution 2616 (2021) by Recorded Vote," press release, UN Doc. SC/14751, December 22, 2021.

However, when an elected member focuses on securing the adoption of a draft of its own initiative during its presidency, this is not always a winning strategy. The risk is that elected members accept any compromise in the text or agree to last-minute concessions just to secure an outcome during their presidency, especially when they bring a minister from their capital for their signature event. And even the absence of unanimity for an outcome adopted during a presidency can be perceived as a disappointment. Given such difficulties, some elected members have opted to continue negotiations on a draft in view of later adoption, even though initially it was intended to be adopted during their presidency. Alternatively, some elected members have opted instead to produce a national summary, with recommendations, as an outcome that cannot be impeded by other Council members.

To have an impact on a thematic issue, it is essential for an elected member to have expertise, credibility, and a campaign plan.

Informal Arria-formula meetings, which can be any format and where a greater variety of briefers can be invited to speak, can be a useful agenda-setting tool for elected members to raise new issues, including some, like climate and security and cybersecurity, that the P5 may not want to discuss in more formal Council meetings. These meetings are theoretically easier to organize, but in practice they can be as much work as a formal Council meeting, requiring vetting and securing qualified briefers, preparing a concept note, and lobbying for attendance by the wider UN membership. And because Arria-formula meetings are not Council events but rather organized by individual Council members, SCAD is not involved in their organization. Moreover, such informal meetings, along with less operative outcomes such as presidential statements, can help build momentum toward a resolution. However, some Council members caution that Arria-formula meetings have

“become overused, and people are starting to get sick of these.” The fact that some permanent members have “weaponized” this format in pursuit of their agenda on Syria’s chemical weapons and Ukraine has also undermined the format.

Working with the P5

There are close partnerships and regular coordination between some elected members and permanent members. However, elected members seeking to substantially influence Council decision

making—whether by themselves, as part of a coalition of elected members, or with individual permanent members—need to work smartly to influence permanent members. As one interviewee cautioned, they should not “confuse docility with effectiveness; you need to be principled but also to step on toes a bit to be respected by P5s” but should also “pick your battles” carefully.⁵³ Few elected members favor “making deals” to advance their national interest through bilateral and transactional relations with the P5, including at the level of capitals. In general, strong backing from the capital is essential for a permanent representative to be able to move quickly and be influential. This political backing is particularly important when “grabbing the pen” or “breaking silence” to withstand pressure from permanent members that may not hesitate to escalate the lobbying and sometimes circumvent the permanent representative and “go directly to capital.”⁵⁴

It can also be advantageous for multiple elected members to cooperate and stand together as co-sponsors of a resolution to more effectively withstand pressure from one or more permanent members.⁵⁵ In December 2016, Egypt planned to

50 Although the president of the Council also gets speaking time and visibility when delivering press statements, the text itself is adopted by consensus (as for presidential statements).

51 Named after Venezuelan Ambassador Diego Arria, Arria-formula meetings occur outside of the Council’s main room and are informal. They notably allow for the invitation of a broader range of civil society briefers than is sometimes feasible at formal Council meetings or informal interactive dialogues. See: Ossoff, Modirzadeh, and Lewis, “Preparing for a Twenty-Four-Month Sprint.”

52 Interview with political coordinator from an elected member state, July 1, 2022.

53 Interview with Council member, June 22, 2022.

54 The “silence procedure” is a common practice that has not been articulated in writing whereby a draft is circulated by email with a deadline for raising objections, in the absence of which the penholder or penholders may decide to consider their draft final and proceed to prepare for an adoption meeting while recognizing “that any Council member may request extension of and/or break silence if further consideration is required,” as set out in S/2017/507, para. 82. Security Council Report, “Security Council Working Methods,” May 29, 2021.

55 Ossoff, Modirzadeh, and Lewis, “Preparing for a Twenty-Four-Month Sprint.”

put to vote a draft resolution negotiated through the Arab Group denouncing Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, which Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela co-sponsored. When the incoming administration of Donald Trump pressured the Egyptian president, Egypt withdrew its blue draft resolution pursuant to Rule 35. This rule, however, also entitled the four co-sponsors to present the same draft as their own text, which they did.⁵⁶ On December 23rd, Resolution 2334 was adopted, with fourteen votes in favor and the US (in the final days of the administration of Barack Obama) abstaining rather than vetoing it.⁵⁷

While elected members each have their own priorities and playing a bridging role among the divided P5 may be a tall order, the positioning of the E10 is changing. The tendency of elected members to align with one permanent member they are particularly close to has been diminishing with the emergence of a stronger E10 identity. This E10 unity remains issue-specific, however, with certain elected members coming in with strong national interest on certain files and issues. For example, on the human rights situations in individual countries, like-minded members among both the P5 and the E10 have maintained a steady position.

That said, some permanent members still expect elected members to be “with them or against them.” Given this strong pressure to take a side, it is particularly difficult to defend a middle ground. A few elected members have nonetheless been able to occasionally do some shuttle diplomacy between the P3 and P2 on certain issues and have presented useful compromise documents when negotiations among the P5 are blocked (see Boxes 9 and 10).

Overall, however, these efforts have rarely succeeded. For example, in April 2017, following a chemical weapons attack in Khan Shaykhun in Syria, the P5 were unable to agree on a response, with the P3 and Russia producing separate draft resolutions. The E10 then produced their own draft resolution, which made it more difficult for the P3 and Russia to proceed with a vote on their own draft resolutions. However, US air strikes on the Shayrat Airbase outside Homs derailed the attempt by the E10 to bridge the divide among the P5. The P3 then circulated a draft resolution largely based on their previous text though incorporating one element from the E10 draft, but Russia vetoed this resolution.⁵⁸ In February 2018, Sweden and Kuwait presented a Council resolution calling for a thirty-day cease-fire in Syria, which was unanimously adopted.⁵⁹

Box 8. Mexico and Norway’s efforts to produce a presidential statement on Ukraine

Attempts to bridge P5 positions and reach compromise may require weakening language. For example, the first and only Council product since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been a presidential statement. Norway and Mexico chose an approach that could bring the Council together behind lending its support to the secretary-general’s good offices after his first trip to Moscow and Kyiv following Russia’s invasion. By making the presidential statement about supporting the secretary-general’s diplomatic efforts, and not about describing the situation in Ukraine, Norway and Mexico were able to bring all Council members together. The text ultimately did not include explicit support to the “good offices” but rather “support for the efforts of the secretary-general in the search for a peaceful solution.”⁶⁰ Nonetheless, the secretary-general welcomed the statement as the first time the Security Council had “spoken with one voice for peace in Ukraine.” The statement was adopted at the same time as the UN was negotiating the release of civilians from the Azovstal steel plant and was followed by UN support to the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Mexico and Norway also tabled a draft presidential statement welcoming the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July and led the E10’s effort to back the initiative, but consensus on the text proved impossible following the Russian bombing of the port of Odesa the day after the deal was signed.⁶¹

56 Security Council Report, “Vote on Resolution on Israeli Settlements,” December 23, 2016; Sievers and Daws, “Draft Resolution on Israeli Settlements Brought to a Vote under Rule 35(2),” June 12, 2017, available at <https://www.scpcedure.org/chapter-5-section-6e>.

57 UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, “Israel’s Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International Law, Security Council Reaffirms,” UN Doc. SC/12657, December 23, 2016.

58 UN Security Council, *France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: Draft Resolution*, UN Doc. S/2017/315, April 12, 2017; Security Council Report, “In Hindsight: Emergence of the E10.”

59 UN News, “UN Security Council Agrees 30-Day Ceasefire in Syria,” February 24, 2018.

60 UN Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/PRST/2022/3, May 6, 2022; Mark Leon Goldberg, “How the United Nations Is Responding to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine—Richard Gowan,” *UN Dispatch*, May 12, 2022.

61 International Crisis Group, “Who Are the Winners in the Black Sea Grain Deal?” August 3, 2022.

Box 9. Finding common ground with China on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea

Norway and Ghana initiated a text and informal consultations on piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea in late 2021 and early 2022. Despite placing the draft resolution in blue on January 27, 2022, they decided not to put it to a vote due to China's threat to veto language relating to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This postponement allowed further negotiations with China, which did not want to have to veto a resolution concerning Africa, leading to some amendments to the draft in blue. On May 31st, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2634 (2022), the first resolution on the topic in a decade.⁶² Thirty-seven member states co-sponsored the resolution, including Council members Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Norway, and the US, on the eve of the ten-year anniversary of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in 2023.⁶³ The resolution requested a report from the secretary-general by end of October 2022, to be followed by a Security Council briefing during Ghana's Council presidency in

Box 10. Bridging the P2 and P3 on Afghanistan

The renewal of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March 2022 had promised to be particularly challenging, taking place only a month after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and seven months after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban. The penholder, Norway, working with all Council members (including China and Russia), nonetheless managed to get Resolution 2626 (2022) adopted, with fourteen members voting in favor and Russia abstaining.⁶⁴ Norway used its experience and networks from its long-term engagement in Afghanistan to build trust among Council members and to facilitate conversations with and input into the mandate renewal process from Afghan and international civil society. The resolution strengthened the political and human rights components of UNAMA's mandate in a period characterized by great volatility in the country and increasing divisions between the P3 and P2. Norway did not consider the bridging role it played on Resolution 2626 to preclude its later organization of a joint E10 stakeout on girls' education in Afghanistan on September 27th (on behalf of the current and incoming elected members).

Ensuring One's Legacy as an Elected Member

Different elected and permanent members have very different notions of what amounts to a successful term on the Security Council for an elected member. While the focus naturally tends to be on outcome documents and signature events, it is essential to keep in mind that a legacy is also built over time and that the "how" sometimes matters as much as the "what." Being remembered as having been a "constructive member" of the Council is important, and an elected member can build such a legacy by consistently insisting on certain issues and pushing or defending language. Success, however, remains subjective and can be engineered to some extent, especially by elected members with

greater resources to promote their own legacy through events, reports, and books. Conversely, there is little written on the experiences and legacy of elected members such as Bolivia or Kuwait.

There is a worrying trend of some elected members treating their two-year tenure as a "competitive sport," measured especially by the number of meetings and Council products during their monthly presidency. The number of open debates or other signature events, the number of briefers and Rule 37 participants, and the number of co-sponsors or votes in support of a product risk carrying greater significance than the issues discussed, the impact of the Council's actions on the ground, or the credibility of the Council.

"Passing the baton" on certain issues to successor

62 The previous resolutions on the topic, Resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), preceded the 2013 Yaoundé Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.

63 Security Council Report, "Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea: Vote on a Draft Resolution," May 30, 2022.

64 Security Council Report, "Afghanistan: Vote on Draft Resolution on UNAMA's Mandate," March 17, 2022.

members so they can carry on an initiative is also an important element of an elected member's legacy. Although the expression "passing the baton" has previously been used in the context of sanctions regimes, it has also increasingly been used for both country-specific and thematic issues, as discussed above (e.g., on Syria, Afghanistan, cybersecurity, and climate and security).⁶⁵ Practical ways to prepare for "passing the baton" include, for instance, co-hosting an Arria-formula meeting with incoming members and working with incoming members directly to pass on institutional knowledge.

Being remembered as having been a "constructive member" of the Council is important, and an elected member can build such a legacy by consistently insisting on certain issues and pushing or defending language.

In practice, most elected members are remembered for one or two issues, if at all. Ethiopia's 2016–2017 Council term is remembered for Resolution 2378 (2017), which requests the secretary-general to provide a comprehensive annual briefing on peacekeeping reform, thereby guaranteeing that the issue lives on. Similarly, Ireland will likely be remembered for Resolution 2594 (2021) on UN peace operations transitions, as well as for having attempted to take the pen on Tigray (see Box 3).⁶⁶

Tunisia will likely be remembered for its valiant efforts to table a text on COVID-19 despite (or because of) difficult dynamics between China and the US and while the General Assembly was adopting its own parallel resolutions on the issue (see Box 11).

Because of their importance to elected members, working methods are another area where legacy can be built. Japan, the state most frequently elected to the Council, is recognized for having consistently contributed to making the Council's working methods understandable and accessible to all interested parties when chairing the IWG. More recently, Kuwait (2018–2019) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (2020–2021) have also left a mark when chairing the IWG (see Box 12).

A good example of building a legacy without a formal outcome document is the decision by cop-holders Ireland and Niger to bring the first document on climate and security to a vote under Niger's presidency of the Council in December 2021. Even though the document was ultimately

Box 11. Tunisia's legacy on COVID-19

Tunisia's efforts to gather the Council to discuss COVID-19 in early 2020 originated in instructions received by the permanent mission from the capital. Tunisia initially faced the opposition of the P5, which argued that COVID-19 was not a security issue. But expectations for Council action grew, and some elected members started asking for a draft text. When Tunisia consulted the P5 on a possible text, it realized France was already working on its own resolution, which it offered to include Tunisia as a co-sponsor on, but Tunisia wanted to be co-author instead. Tunisia then started worked with the E10 to get their weight behind its own draft text. It eventually received support from nine of the E10 (all except South Africa). Germany and Estonia had also tried to draft a text but had received strong pushback from the P5.⁶⁷

In the end, Tunisia and France decided to merge their texts and, after weeks of relentless negotiations (notably to accommodate the US's objection to the mention of the World Health Organization) and the dropping of controversial references, on July 1, 2020, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2532. The resolution employed neutral language focused on the potential of the pandemic to cause disruption and the need to provide humanitarian relief, including through peacekeeping operations.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Jeremy Farrall and Christopher Michaelsen, "Managing the Ebb and Flow of Sanctions Reform: An Important Role for Non-Permanent Members," in *Elected Members of the Security Council: Lame Ducks or Key Players?* Nico J. Schrijver and Niels M. Blokker, eds. (Boston, MA: Brill Nijhoff, 2020).

⁶⁶ Security Council Report, "UN Peace Operation Transitions: Vote on Draft Resolution," September 8, 2021.

⁶⁷ Christoph Heusgen, remarks at event on "The Impact of Elected Members on the Security Council's Agenda: Germany's Sixth Tenure in 2019-20," December 3, 2020, available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4kh6TyEOQP>.

⁶⁸ Stefania Negri, "United Nations Security Council Resolution 2532," *International Legal Materials* 60, no. 1 (February 2021).

Box 12. Leaving a mark on the IWG: Japan, Kuwait, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Albania

Japan has chaired the IWG three times, and it was under its first chairpersonship in 2006 that the original Note 507 was produced.⁶⁹ When Japan returned to the Council in 2009, it led the IWG again and embarked on revising the note to reflect changes in Council practice, such as its interaction with the Peacebuilding Commission and refining the Council's meeting formats.⁷⁰ When Japan again returned to the Council in 2016, it chaired the IWG again and initiated a practice of periodic meetings to discuss several aspects of the Council's working methods with a view to elaborating a new version of Note 507, which is currently in use.⁷¹

When Kuwait chaired the IWG in 2018–2019, the Council adopted eight supplemental presidential notes on matters such as Council mission to the field, wrap-up sessions, and the annual report. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SVG) also left a mark while chairing the IWG in 2020–2021. SVG convened meetings every six to eight weeks, ultimately leading to the adoption of five presidential notes, including on multilingualism and the roles of Council presidents and political coordinators in promoting implementation of the Council's working methods. SVG also tried to continue the work of Kuwait on the issue of co-penholdership but failed to get the necessary consensus. In 2022, the representative of SVG, in her national capacity, also published Note 507 Plus, which contains an index of all the areas covered to date by the fourteen current working methods notes.⁷²

Albania had a challenging start as chair of the IWG in the context of the Ukraine invasion, with two Council members reluctant to engage in drafting the first notes presented by Albania. To date, Albania has managed to get the agreement of all members on two initiatives: (1) the establishment of a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of Note 507 and (2) the compilation of an annual report on the work of the IWG. Meanwhile, it has opened the door for the inclusion of the WPS agenda in the work of the Council. In October 2022, it also organized a retreat in Albania focusing on working methods.

vetoed by Russia, many consider this initiative to have been an important statement, giving momentum to the 2022 climate leads, Kenya and Norway, and their eventual successors in 2023, likely to be Gabon and incoming member Switzerland.⁷³

A strong and well-timed speech can also become part of an elected member's legacy. Kenya's 2021–2022 term will be most remembered for its permanent representative Martin Kimani's four-minute viral speech a few days before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which framed Russia's threats against Ukraine in terms of Africa's own experience with recovering from European colonialism.⁷⁴ However, speeches from elected members are not always well-received. That this speech on Ukraine emerged from Kenya's Pan-African and pro-

Charter interpretation of its priorities during its term suggests that elected members are most effective when they are promoting the regional and global good rather than hewing solely to national interests.

While “talk[ing] about your own issues” on the Council is generally accepted, these issues will likely not become part of a positive legacy if they only speak to a domestic audience. India insisting on discussing the predicament of Indian nationals, including students, during Council sessions on Ukraine was perceived by some members as inappropriate, while other members with nationals in Ukraine may have related better. Such efforts can, however, become part of a positive legacy if the issue is of concern to a larger group of member states and incoming elected members pick up the baton.

69 UN Doc. S/2006/507.

70 UN Security Council, *Note by the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/2010/507, July 26, 2010.

71 UN Doc. S/2017/507. See: Security Council Report, “In Hindsight: Note 507,” September 28, 2017.

72 UN Doc. S/2022/88; Security Council Report, “Security Council Working Methods.”

73 Security Council Report, “Debate on Climate and Security in Africa,” October 11, 2022.

74 Martin Kimani, speech on Ukraine at the 8979th meeting of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.8970, New York, February 25, 2022; Martin Kimani and Mark Goldberg, “Kenya's UN Ambassador Martin Kimani: Live from the Aspen Security Forum,” August 10, 2022, in *Global Dispatches* podcast, produced by Mark Goldberg, available at <https://www.globaldispatchespodcast.com/kenyas-un-ambassador-martin-kimani-live-from-the-aspen-security-forum/>.

Beyond political inputs into Council deliberations and decisions, elected members can also leave a legacy by establishing symbolic practices. An example is the symbolically important but nonpolitical flag-installation ceremony for incoming elected members on the first day of the year initiated by Kazakhstan in 2018, as well as the flag-lowering for outgoing elected members introduced by Vietnam in 2021. In 2022, the foreign ministers of current and incoming elected

members gathered for the first time on the margin of the September UN General Assembly high-level week and took a group photo, replicating a P5 practice. Conversely, Germany's permanent representative bringing along a sand timer or opening the chamber's curtains for the first time since 1964 to symbolize transparency and openness to the broader UN membership and civil society have had little lasting impact.

Box 13. Estonia's mixed record on cybersecurity

Estonia led an initiative to promote cybersecurity in the Council's discussions after experiencing crippling cyberattacks in 2007. Estonia began by holding an Arria-formula VTC on cybersecurity in 2020, which built on earlier related Arria-formula meetings since 2016 and included broad participation by the wider UN membership. It subsequently convened the first-ever Security Council high-level open debate on cybersecurity on June 29, 2021, as a signature event of its presidency.⁷⁵ Despite differences of views in the Council, the COVID-19 pandemic (which forced the Council to rely on VTC to conduct its meetings) underlined the need to ensure cybersecurity.

While cybersecurity got Estonia positive attention at the time, since its departure from the Council, the issue has not been mainstreamed or made any other notable progress. More broadly, Estonia was not able to mainstream its regional concerns about human rights in Belarus or Crimea during its term and had to resort to informal Arria-formula meetings in the face of significant opposition from other Council members. And the number of Arria-formula meetings convened by Estonia and others relating to Ukraine prior to 2022 in all likelihood prompted Russia to respond by organizing its own competing Arria-formula meetings on Ukraine.⁷⁶

Some outgoing elected members have carried their legacy outside of the Security Council by serving on and raising the profile of other UN bodies such as the Peacebuilding Commission, groups of friends, and intergovernmental expert groups or simply by continuing to champion certain issues (e.g., the Dominican Republic on food security or Niger on climate security). Some have also sustained (or increased) their extrabudgetary contributions to the Peacebuilding Fund and other parts of the UN or their contributions of peacekeepers after completing their term, including Germany, Sweden, and other European countries. In addition, think tanks and foundations have, in some cases, promoted the legacy of certain elected

members, notably from the Western European and Others Group.⁷⁷

Beyond the legacy of individual elected members, the E10's collective legacy lies in its ability to build institutional memory over time, both individually and collectively.⁷⁸ This is all the more important considering that it is extremely difficult for elected members to maintain their engagement in the Council's affairs in between terms, even for those that manage to come back on the Council regularly.⁷⁹ The successive chairs of the IWG have a big role to play in maintaining this institutional memory.

In addition, the E10 have taken a number of steps both to enhance institutional memory and to provide

⁷⁵ Security Council Report, "Cybersecurity," May 29, 2021.

⁷⁶ Richard Gowan, "Estonia in the Security Council: A History in Three Crises," International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, March 2022.

⁷⁷ The Western European and Other States Group (WEOG) is one of the UN's five regional groups and is composed of twenty-eight member states from Western Europe, Oceania, North America, and Western Asia, with the United States as an additional observer.

⁷⁸ Côte d'Ivoire's initiative to publish a book after its 2018–2019 term was partly motivated by the need to build institutional memory (the previous time it served on the Council dated back to 1990–1991).

⁷⁹ Pay and Postolski, "Power and Diplomacy."

Box 14. The A3+1 alliance

The A3+1 alliance will be part of the legacy of Saint Vincent and the Grenadine (SVG), even if it may not be carried through by subsequent elected members. During its campaign, SVG said it would be “like the fourth seat for Africa” due to its national heritage as a predominantly Black state and its Pan-African prime minister, who claims that the “Caribbean region is seen as the sixth region of the African Union.”⁸⁰ The “A3 plus SVG” or “A3+1” formula was born the day SVG’s permanent representative aligned her statement with a statement delivered by Niger on behalf of the A3 during a Council session on January 15, 2020.⁸¹ Following this event, SVG worked with the A3 behind the scenes to establish a mechanism to coordinate their future joint statements and positions. For the rest of SVG’s 2020–2021 term, it coordinated with the A3 on specific African files and even, toward the end, on a few non-African files such as Afghanistan while continuing to make separate statements on most other matters.

Importantly to SVG, the A3+1 also made joint statements and held joint positions on the situation in Haiti and Colombia (both part of the so-called “sixth region of Africa”), with SVG taking the lead on these statements. Through their aggressive engagement on the Colombian file, the A3+1 championed the inclusion of Afro-Colombian indigenous communities in all Council products, including, for the first time, in the 2022 mandate of the UN Verification Mission in Colombia.⁸² This has allowed SVG to amplify both Caribbean and African voices in the Council.⁸³ It has also brought to bear the AU Constitutive Act’s call to “invite and encourage the full participation of the African Diaspora” in building the AU.⁸⁴

guidance to successive elected members. These include the annual dialogue between current and incoming elected members (the “E10–I5 Dialogue”), which was initiated in 2018 and has continued since, hosted every year by a different elected member. Other opportunities for E10 members to meet—in and around New York and elsewhere—have also multiplied. Moreover, the “Ten Elements for Enhanced E10 Coordination and Joint Action” remains a core reference document for elected members, and, as of 2022, elected members now benefit from the E10 Handbook and a shared E10 database.⁸⁵

While the E10 have reached a level of maturity, their ability to coordinate across a diverse group whose effectiveness depends on several internal and external factors may have reached a natural limit.

agenda has been dominated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The P3 and Russia disagree vehemently over several of these crises, notably over Ukraine and Syria (on which Russia has made significant use of its veto). Yet P5 dynamics are not static (and are not always P3 versus P2), and the P5 have no interest in a completely dysfunctional UN and continue to cooperate on most other files on the Council’s agenda.⁸⁶ Moreover, collegiality and camaraderie have been the marks of the Council, especially among the E10 but also between E10 and P5 who, at the end of the day, are all accountable to the wider UN membership.

Conclusion

The UN Security Council tends to focus on the latest crisis. In 2012, the focus was on Syria. In 2020, the focus was on COVID-19. In 2022, the UN

Compared to the Syria crisis that started in 2011, the Ukraine crisis has monopolized Council members’ time and energy but has not afforded the E10 many opportunities for engagement on humanitarian or other issues. While all elected

⁸⁰ Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations, “SVG Part of Security Council Group ‘A-Three Plus One,’” March 10, 2020.

⁸¹ See: Gonsalves, “Small, Young, and Female.”

⁸² UN Security Council Resolution 2655 (October 27, 2022), UN Doc. S/RES/2655.

⁸³ Stéphanie Fillion, “The Smallest State to Ever Lead the UN Security Council: St. Vincent and the Grenadines,” *PassBlue*, November 2, 2020.

⁸⁴ Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2003, Article 3(q).

⁸⁵ The *E10 Handbook: A Practical Guide for Elected Security Council Members* was developed by Ireland and the UAE.

⁸⁶ UN News, “Russia Vetoes Security Council Resolution Condemning Attempted Annexation of Ukraine Regions,” September 30, 2022.

members recognize the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, some chose to abstain on texts condemning Russia. As with the broader UN membership, Ukraine has divided the E10 between proactive, Western-aligned states and states pursuing a strategy of nonalignment or multi-alignment.⁸⁷

While the E10 have reached a level of maturity, their ability to coordinate across a diverse group whose effectiveness depends on several internal and external factors may have reached a natural limit. The E10's composition, individual members' level of commitment to collective E10 initiatives, and the group's leadership all impact the E10's ability to influence the work of the Council. Depending on the issue before the Council, most elected members will continue to decide to what degree a common E10 position is consonant with their own national positions.

This is particularly true for regional powers aspiring to permanent membership on the Council, some of which, during recent terms, have occasionally taken positions setting themselves apart from the other elected members.⁸⁸ But the pursuit of individual objectives is not limited to these states.

On certain themes (such as climate and security), the E10 may have to accept that they may sometimes be the E9, E8, or even E7.⁸⁹ Moreover, research has shown that state resources and a strong diplomatic team, as well as the readiness and ability to seize opportunities, are more important for exercising influence on the Council than are regional-power status or frequency on the Council.⁹⁰

Beyond working methods and shared priorities such as the defense of multilateralism and the commitment to the principle of a rules-based international order, which generally find consensus across the E10, individual elected members have also increasingly seized opportunities on both thematic issues and some country-specific files.⁹¹ On these issues, the E10 have also benefited from "passing the baton." However, while the E10 have been collectively successful at promoting certain issues and files and at making the Council more transparent, individual elected members have and will continue to have different views on many issues on the agenda. They will also continue to face structural inequalities when it comes to penholding and chairing subsidiary bodies.

87 Security Council Report, "Ukraine: Vote on Draft 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution," February 27, 2022.

88 Linda Thomas-Greenfield, remarks on the future of the United Nations, San Francisco, September 8, 2022.

89 Bolivia, for instance, broke ranks on some occasions with the E10 during its 2017–2018 term.

90 Dominik Zaum and Corinne Heaven, "Contextual Factors Affecting the Influence of Non-permanent Members of the UN Security Council," September 2017, available at <https://securitycouncilanalysisnetwork.files.wordpress.com/2017/10/dominik-zaum.pdf>.

91 Adam Lupel and Lauri Mälksoo, "A Necessary Voice: Small States, International Law, and the UN Security Council," International Peace Institute, April 2019.

Annex

Table 1. Countries elected members of the Security Council by year and by regional group⁹²

Year	African	Asia-Pacific	Latin American and Caribbean	Eastern European	Western European and Others
2023	Gabon Ghana Mozambique	Japan United Arab Emirates*	Brazil Ecuador	Albania	Malta Switzerland
2022	Gabon Ghana Kenya	India United Arab Emirates*	Brazil Mexico	Albaia	Ireland Norway
2021	Kenya Niger Tunisia*	India Vietnam	Mexico Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Estonia	Ireland Norway
2020	Niger South Africa Tunisia*	Indonesia Vietnam	Dominican Republic Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Estonia	Belgium Germany
2019	Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea South Africa	Indonesia Kuwait*	Dominican Republic Peru	Poland	Belgium Germany
2018	Côte d'Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia	Kazakhstan Kuwait*	Bolivia Peru	Poland	Netherlands Sweden
2017	Egypt* Ethiopia Senegal	Japan Kazakhstan	Bolivia Uruguay	Ukraine	Italy Sweden
2016	Angola Egypt* Senegal	Japan Malaysia	Uruguay Venezuela	Ukraine	New Zealand Spain
2015	Angola Chad Nigeria	Jordan* Malaysia	Chile Venezuela	Lithuania	New Zealand Spain
2014	Chad Nigeria Rwanda	Jordan* Republic of Korea	Argentina Chile	Lithuania	Luxembourg Australia
2013	Rwanda Morocco* Togo	Republic of Korea Pakistan	Argentina Guatemala	Azerbaijan	Luxembourg Australia

*Indicates that the elected member belongs to the UN Arab Group. Under an arrangement reached by the Africa and Asia-Pacific Groups, since 1968, a candidate country belonging to the Arab Group is endorsed alternatively, every two years, by the African Group and then by the Asia-Pacific Group.

⁹² UN Security Council, "Countries Elected Members."

Table 2. Country and thematic issues chaired by elected members since 2018⁹³

Subsidiary organ	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Counter-Terrorism (1373)	Peru	Peru	Tunisia	Tunisia	India
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qaida	Kazakhstan	Indonesia	Indonesia	Norway	Norway
Iraq	Poland	Poland	Estonia	Estonia	Albania
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Kuwait	Kuwait	Niger	Niger	Gabon
Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction	Bolivia	Indonesia	Indonesia	Mexico	Mexico
Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (1566)	Peru	Peru	Niger	Niger	United Arab Emirates
Sudan	Poland	Poland	Estonia	Estonia	Ghana
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1718)	Netherlands	Germany	Germany	Norway	Norway
Libya (1970)	Sweden	Germany	Germany	India	India
Guinea-Bissau (2048)	Equatorial Guinea	Equatorial Guinea	Tunisia	Tunisia	UAE
Central African Republic (CAR) (2127)	Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire	Niger	Niger	Ghana
Yemen (2140)	Peru	Peru	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Albania
South Sudan (2206)	Poland	Poland	Vietnam	Vietnam	Gabon
Mali (2374)	Sweden	Dominican Republic	Dominican Republic	Mexico	Mexico
Somalia (751)	N/A	Belgium	Belgium	Ireland	Ireland
Somalia/Eritrea (751/1907)	Kazakhstan	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa	Ethiopia	South Africa	South Africa	Kenya	Kenya
Working Methods	Kuwait	Kuwait	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Albania
International Tribunals	Peru	Peru	Vietnam	Vietnam	Gabon
Peacekeeping Operations	Ghana	Tunisia	Tunisia	Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire
Children and Armed Conflict	Sweden	Belgium	Belgium	Norway	Norway
Lebanon (1636)	Equatorial Guinea	Equatorial Guinea	Vietnam	Vietnam	Albania
Afghanistan (1988)	Kazakhstan	Indonesia	Indonesia	India	India
Women, Peace and Security (2242)	Peru Sweden	Dominican Republic Germany	Dominican Republic Germany	Ireland Mexico	Ireland Mexico
Climate Change and Security	N/A	N/A	Inaugural meeting in November 2020	Ireland Niger	Kenya Norway

⁹³ UN Security Council, "Subsidiary Organs Chairs and Vice-Chairs Dashboard."

Table 3. Self-designated regional groups at UN headquarters⁹⁴


African (54)	Asia-Pacific (54/55) ⁹⁵	Eastern European (23)	Latin American and Caribbean (33)	Western European and Others (28/29) ⁹⁶
Algeria	Afghanistan	Albania	Antigua and Barbuda	Andorra
Angola	Bahrain	Armenia	Argentina	Australia
Benin	Bangladesh	Azerbaijan	Bahamas	Austria
Botswana	Bhutan	Belarus	Barbados	Belgium
Burkina Faso	Brunei Darussalam	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Belize	Canada
Burundi	Cambodia	Bulgaria	Bolivia	Denmark
Cameroon	China	Croatia	Brazil	Finland
Cabo Verde	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Chile	France
Central African Republic	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Estonia	Colombia	Germany
Chad	Fiji	Georgia	Costa Rica	Greece
Comoros	India	Hungary	Cuba	Iceland
Congo	Indonesia	Latvia	Dominica	Ireland
Côte d'Ivoire	Iran	Lithuania	Dominican Republic	Israel
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Iraq	Montenegro	Ecuador	Italy
Djibouti	Japan	North Macedonia	El Salvador	Liechtenstein
Egypt	Jordan	Poland	Grenada	Luxembourg
Equatorial Guinea	Kazakhstan	Republic of Moldova	Guatemala	Malta
Eritrea	Kiribati	Romania	Guyana	Monaco
Eswatini	Kuwait	Russian Federation	Haiti	Netherlands
Ethiopia	Kyrgyzstan	Serbia	Honduras	New Zealand
Gabon	Laos	Slovakia	Jamaica	Norway
Gambia	Lebanon	Slovenia	Mexico	Portugal
Ghana	Malaysia	Ukraine	Nicaragua	San Marino
Guinea	Maldives		Panama	Spain
Guinea-Bissau	Marshall Islands		Paraguay	Sweden
Kenya	Micronesia, Federated States of Mongolia		Peru	Switzerland
Lesotho	Myanmar		Saint Kitts and Nevis	Türkiye ⁹⁷
Liberia	Nauru		Saint Lucia	United Kingdom
Libya	Nepal		Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	United States (observer)
Madagascar	Oman		Suriname	
Malawi	Pakistan		Trinidad and Tobago	
Mali	Palau		Uruguay	
Mauritania	<i>Palestine</i>		Venezuela	
Mauritius	Papua New Guinea			
Morocco	Philippines			
Mozambique	Qatar			
Namibia	Republic of Korea			
Niger	Samoa			
Nigeria	Saudi Arabia			
Rwanda	Singapore			
São Tomé and Príncipe	Solomon Islands			
Senegal	Sri Lanka			
Seychelles	Syria			
Sierra Leone	Tajikistan			
Somalia	Thailand			
South Africa	Timor-Leste			
South Sudan	Tonga			
Sudan	Turkmenistan			
Togo	Tuvalu			
Tunisia	United Arab Emirates			
Uganda	Uzbekistan			
United Republic of Tanzania	Vanuatu			
Zambia	Vietnam			
Zimbabwe	Yemen			

94 This table is reproduced with minor edits from: Sievers and Daws, "Table 3: Regional Groups," July 11, 2020, available at <https://www.scpcedure.org/table-3-regional-groups>.

95 The official name is "Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States." It is considered to have fifty-five members when the total includes Palestine, which has been a member of this group since 1986. However, because Palestine has not been admitted as a UN member state, for electoral purposes the group is considered to have fifty-four members.

96 The Western European and Others Group has twenty-eight full members. The United States, an observer, is considered a member of the group for electoral purposes.

97 Türkiye is a member of the Western European and Others Group for electoral purposes but also caucuses with the Asia-Pacific Group.



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