



Beyond the Headlines

Featuring
Mark Malloch Brown

Author of the book
***The Unfinished Global Revolution:
The Pursuit of a New International Politics***

A conversation moderated by
WARREN HOGE
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Transcript

Warren Hoge:

I think we'll start the program if I can get your attention. I'm sorry we don't have enough seats for you all, but such is the popularity of Mark Malloch Brown.

Good evening, I'm Warren Hoge, IPI's vice president for external relations, and I'm happy to welcome you to this Beyond the Headlines event featuring Mark Malloch Brown and his new book, *The Unfinished Global Revolution: The Pursuit of a New International Politics*.

As many of you know, Mark Malloch Brown is a world class international affairs intellectual, a literate former journalist, a champion of international development, a one time reformist head of the United Nations' largest agency, the UNDP, chief of staff and UN Deputy Secretary-General under Kofi Annan, cabinet minister in the British Government of Prime Minister Gordon Brown, member of the House of Lords, and a vigorous and articulate advocate of the causes he believes in. Now you know there must be a "but" in this paragraph.

But I first knew him as a pest. It was the mid 1980s, and I was the foreign editor of *The New York Times*. Mark was then working as a political consultant in New York representing Corazon Aquino at a moment when people were frantically positioning her to run for the presidency of the Philippines as the best way they saw to unseat Ferdinand Marcos.

I had just returned with my boss, the great editor Abe Rosenthal, from a trip to Manila, where we had conducted an interview with Mrs. Aquino that showed her to be a pleasant woman, but one largely uninformed about the problems facing her country. Shortly after we published that story, Mark interviewed for the job with Mrs. Aquino, and in the book, he says that Mrs. Aquino “did allow, I might be able to do something about *The New York Times*.”

So suddenly, I had this assertive Brit with the sonorous double barreled name on my phone, in my office, and even during some weekends, in my living room. In short, a pest, but a very beguiling one.

Mark knew journalism well because it was his first profession. The world of journalism lost Mark early on, however, when he had to write the advance version of the lead article for *The Economist* on the 1979 election of Margaret Thatcher. Now that sounds pretty good for a young guy starting out, except this was in the days of early deadlines and union rules, and that meant that there were two advance articles by separate authors on the outcome: one with Mrs. Thatcher as the winner, and the other with her as the loser. Only one would get published, and guess which one Mark got to write?

In fact, the real reason Mark abandoned journalism reveals his early bent for active involvement in world affairs that was to take him so far in life. He'd just been offered the chance to go to the Thai-Cambodian border for the office of the UN High Commission on Refugees. His first instinct was to get his editors to let him cover it as a story, but when they demurred, he decided to pick up and go take on the refugee crisis job himself.

Though that meant he left the life of observing foreign affairs for becoming a participant in them, he happily never stopped observing, which makes this book such an illuminating and informative read. Incidentally, we have it on sale at the door. Many of you have bought it already, and Mark would be happy to sign copies as he has been doing when we finish the program here.

From my reading of the book, Mark's absorption in the world beyond the British boarding school one in which he was raised seems to have begun with a trip to Africa made in 1971 when, as an 18-year-old, driving with his best friend, he went all the way from Cape Town to Cairo. He returned to Britain with a youthful conviction that the people of Africa, and by extension, of the developing world, deserved better governance than they were getting and more understanding abroad of what kind of assistance they needed.

He nurtured these early attitudes about international aid, economic competitiveness, and liberal social policy in the study of history,

economics, and politics at Cambridge, and later, as a graduate student at the University of Michigan.

Those convictions were put to a test by an early acquaintance with the United Nations, and one of his first impressions--it's in the book--was that the building housing the institution of his dreams was "noticeably threadbare." This was in 1977, my friends, fully 33 years before the renovation now underway across the street began!

It was also the dawning of efforts by a new majority to shift the debate in the General Assembly from concerns of Northern security to those of Southern development. Mark writes that he was left at the time with a feeling that economic class warfare between countries of the South and the North was here to stay. He writes, "The UN I saw had been crushed by competing government demands, it lived permanently under the shadow of Security Council vetoes, it was run by civil servants far from the real lives of real people in the field, and it was kept on a financial shoestring. Process reigned."

He also records his first impression of debates between UN delegates. "Even though they spoke in any one of the UN's five official languages, they always used a universal idiom that combined acronyms, pet ideologies, conviction, and obfuscation in a thick, wooden monotone that transcended conventional language." I will leave it to you to judge how far along we have moved from those days.

His one great break at that time was that he was just down the hall from Brian Urquhart, the man who, to this day, speaks about the UN more knowingly, more candidly, and more possessively than anyone else.

So eventually, in 1999, after he did a very meaningful stint at the World Bank with Jim Wolfensohn, we got Mark back here. What he learned around the UN from then on is a core subject to this book, and he will shortly tell you about that, but in winding up this introduction, I would simply like to mention one aspect I had a minor role in.

Mark is unabashedly pro-American. With that Michigan degree I mentioned, a scintillating American wife, who I'm sorry is not here tonight, and four American born children and 21 years of having lived in this country--I checked with Mark this morning by email to make sure those figures were all right, and he emailed me back saying, "There are no birther problems in the Malloch Brown family!"

Yet one of the biggest hurdles as a UN official for Mark was the poor state of relations with the United States, culminating in a speech he made in June 2006 as Deputy Secretary-General, in which he assailed the Bush administration for withholding support from the UN while using it "almost by stealth as a diplomatic tool." At the same time, he charged the administration encouraged the UN's harshest critics, like Rush Limbaugh and Fox News--he cited them both in his speech--and otherwise worked to discredit the place.

The New York Times was the only paper to report that speech, and the following day, then-U.S. Ambassador John Bolton showed up in a red-faced rage before us UN reporters at the Security Council cameras and demanded that Kofi Annan repudiate "personally and publicly" Mark's

remarks. And then in the only instance of John Bolton calling admiring attention to anything I wrote, he held the paper up and said, "Even The New York Times says it was a highly unusual instance of a United Nations official singling out an individual country for criticism."

The Secretary-General brushed off Ambassador Bolton's demand, and instead proclaimed his faith in Mark and said he agreed with the complaint.

That December, Ambassador Bolton, unable to obtain the necessary U.S. Senate endorsement to remain at his post, disclosed that he was stepping down. My first instinct was to seek out Mark to get his reaction, and some reporters and I caught up with him walking up the corridor outside the Security Council with his aides. We shouted questions about how he felt about the announcement, and Mark, still in full stride, looked back over his shoulder and shouted, "No comment, he said with a smile!"

Mark, welcome back to America, welcome back to the UN!

Mark Malloch Brown:

Well, it seems to me that Warren has developed a very special kind of meeting here, which is, he gives the speech, and then the author just thanks him! I'm inclined to just stop here and turn straight to questions because, Warren, thank you, that was fantastic.

And I was also going to start with your reporting of my speech, which actually, Warren's achievement was even greater because there were various journalists at the speech who didn't think it merited reporting, and it was Warren who didn't come to the speech, but we dutifully sent him a copy across his fax machine, who did report it, and I think there is no doubt Warren's news sense was better than those who didn't.

He's only actually wrong in one regard, in that I was by that point enough sort of socialized into the ways of the UN that actually, the term, I think George Bush or the Bush administration didn't actually appear in the speech. It was one of those brilliantly sort of loaded UN things where he's clearly talking about America, but where's the word? So Rush Limbaugh and Fox were there, but it has to be said that I tried to preserve the decorum of these occasions, and it was, to me, a striking thing that five months later, when Kofi was on the verge of retirement, his last major speech in the US was at the Truman library where he repeated the arguments that, being Kofi, with a much gentler, lighter touch, making his point with a gentle needle, rather than the sledgehammer that I'd employed.

But it was, it was the end of a period of great frustration, I think, for him and myself and for many others, because, actually, those last years of his time as Secretary-General was, I suspect, would have been a great opportunity for reform of the institution if it had not been for the fact that the United States, for all sorts of strange, peculiar reasons, just sort of put itself outside the mainstream debate and effort here.

But let me turn to the book and just say that this actually isn't, despite its cover, and despite what Warren has said, it's not just a UN memoir, it's intended to be a global one.

It starts with a nice middle class English kid growing up in a failing Britain of the '50s and '60s, and then watching Margaret Thatcher transform the country, and learning as a young political journalist, covering her briefings when she was in opposition, of the sheer power of political will in leadership. I'm not agreeing with many of the policies she promoted, but being awed by the force of her ideas and of her leadership, and it was something.

In this book, you'll see that I kind of carry with me, to talent spotting as head of UNDP, it gave me a fondness for people like President Kagame of Rwanda, or Meles of Ethiopia, or their counterparts in other parts of the world who, while coming from a very different political perspective to Margaret Thatcher, who I think, if she heard this comparison would be staring, deeply uncomfortably, but it just gave me a sense of the importance of strong, decisive, directed leadership of leaders who are just single minded about taking their countries in a direction which is going to improve the lot of people over a period of time. a

And if you did grow up in a postwar Britain, as I did, there was a sense of the impermanence of country status, of the rise and fall of nations at a hugely accelerated rate, of Britain's decline from the apparent triumph of 1945, and then it coming back after 1979. But this was also a period, 1965, when Ghana was richer than South Korea, where we've just seen this dramatic, quick turns in the fortunes of nations, which is, as I say, a big part of the book.

But in the same way that it's a memoir which tries to sort of share a global experience of my life as a political consultant, as a journalist, as well as my life at the UN and the World Bank, and as a British minister. It's also a manifesto, but again, not for UN reform, but for global governance reform, of which the UN is a powerful and important subsection, and it's not also just about how global institutions must be made to work, it's the story that almost any one of us in this room could work, could have written about living in cities like New York and London, and seeing that in many ways, they have become more important as a political unit than the countries we live in.

And certainly seeing, from my involvement in consulting and financial services earlier in my life that, you know, nowadays, when you talk to young MBA graduates, they're more likely to tell you that they're going to go to London, New York, or Hong Kong, than they are to tell you that they want to live in America or Britain or in China. We've moved to this world where cities are becoming incredibly important--and I'm going to come back to that later, because it is a sort of important part of this sort of thesis of the book, if you like. But having said all that, it is, of course, ultimately still a UN book, and that reflects the fact that the best years of my career have been spent in this organization.

I am clear that the job I enjoyed more than any other to this point in my life, at least, was as administrator of UNDP, an absolutely spectacular organization, which I just loved leading, and working with many of the people in this room in so doing. And so to the extent it's a UN book, its audience is people like me who are at the beginnings of their career and were considering, as I was then, do I dare plunge into the United Nations? Is it going to give me any kind of vocational return, or is it going to be a career of deep frustration and difficulty? This, I hope, is a

book which will lift up the spirits of twenty-somethings and make them realize that this is an extraordinary organization to be part of, and that you can, in difficult, different ways, make an astonishing difference, but it's also a book which I hope will encourage people to go and work for banks internationally, or for NGOs internationally, or for multinationals or foundations, because above all else, it's about the exciting idea that we are citizens of one world now, and the more we can experience that and immerse ourselves in it, the greater value, perhaps, we can secure in our lives and our careers, not just for ourselves, but for the families that have the advantage of sharing that life with us, despite all its inconveniences, frequent school moves, and all the rest of it.

But I want to just sort of say that I begin the UN part of this book with the history, so to speak. I go back, not just to Brian Urquhart, an extraordinary inspirational figure in the UN, and to one or two others like him, who, to me, made me understand that you could do great things. It might take you to break the rules occasionally or often, but I felt that Brian, who invented modern peacekeeping, invented it really in Egypt, and had learned the great art form of breaking the rules, but somehow always managing to cite a precedent which convinced member states you hadn't, and this is, if you like, the great diplomatic skill of multilateralism.

But I go back to 1945 for another reason, which is to describe a UN which, I felt is, in a sense, a history which has been seized by two sides to a modern argument, by conservatives and liberals. By conservatives who dismiss that UN founding as a kind of remake of the League of Nations, suffering from the same naïve optimism about how nations might cooperate, and by liberals who, for their own reason, similarly wanted to paint those events of 1945 as somehow a flash point of idealism, which was then overtaken by the Cold War. When my reading of that history--and I went and spent a couple of months at Yale after I finished at the UN sort of reading up on it again, from the perspective of having sort of lived the modern UN, was a very different one of very pragmatic leaders, particularly Roosevelt and Truman, but others as well in the US and across the allies, who understood very, very clearly that the UN was the most pragmatic of political institutions in their vision for it, an organization where, from the American point of view, America is seeing that the world was about to dump onto its shoulders the total responsibility as global peace policeman, global banker, saw in the UN an opportunity to leverage that, and essentially create a burden sharing multilateral system.

And so my feeling very strongly from reading up again on that history was that that pragmatic, realist vision had gotten lost in the historical revisionism that had followed, and the reason I sort of labor that point both in the book and now is that I think there are a new group of countries who have a very, very similar, if you like, problem to the United States in 1945, countries who are coming up the power chain, if you like, countries such as China and India and Brazil and South Africa and others, who suddenly find that they are expected to play a global role, not the unique and single global role that seemed to be coming America's way in 1945, but nevertheless, one disproportionate to the energies and resources they want to apply globally, because, as Roosevelt and Truman felt at that time, that there were a lot of domestic problems in America to address.

So these new countries and new leaders, very old countries, but new in this role, similarly feel, hell, we've got a lot of poverty at home, we've got a lot of development challenges still to meet, and so I suspect and hope we'll similarly look for a multilateral burden-sharing to sort of leverage up their role in global affairs and meet their responsibilities without the kind of unilateral demand falling on their shoulders that we had seen before, and if you combined that with other countries, such as my own, whose influence in the UN today is ahead of where they stand bilaterally alone, it seems to me you've got a curious coalition perspective, coalition out there, of rising—and, dare I say it, falling, or at least not growing—powers, who offer a real opportunity for a kind of political new foundation to a renewed and revitalized UN, and I regret it's not happened yet, but I, as you'll see in these pages, remain optimistic that it will.

But let me come back to my time at the UN, which started as a young intern after graduate school here, and as Warren said, occupied my... we were occupied by issues like the new international economic order, which I see as one of the great missed opportunities of the UN. I actually think that this issue of commodity price stability still dogs the global economy much as it did then, but it's also a story of the spies in the offices next door to me where I was working as a young UN official, being the only person young enough on the 38th floor at that time to walk up 38 floors when we had a power cut in New York, and somebody had to get the Secretary-General's cables, to my next sort of bout in the UN of humanitarianism. And of the Thai-Cambodian border, and of coming back to tell Brian Urquhart that while the political UN surely couldn't work in the Cold War era, that somehow, the humanitarian bit was, it was cut the space to work, and maybe this was really where the UN's future belonged as a kind of intergovernmental Red Cross providing a neutral humanitarianism.

And I remember Brian's skepticism then, and I cite in the book, three decades later is now Deputy Secretary-General, having to listen to Jan Egeland giving me a similar lecture about how UN humanitarianism should become independent of the politics of the UN and separated and put into a kind of carefully preserved frame, separated from the political side of the UN in the field. But then myself becoming convinced that actually, a humanitarianism of support to refugees in camps, of band aids after terrible humanitarian disaster was not sufficient, that we had to develop a capability to preempt these disasters.

And therefore, becoming one of those who argued for the responsibility to protect, being a floor manager during that difficult General Assembly in 2005 where we sort of got it in by the skin of our teeth in a highly emasculated form as part of what was voted on. And coming back to New York now after, depending on your point of view, what's been a high water mark for the responsibility to protect, of recent weeks with the Libyan resolutions, 1970 and 73, and also now the events in Cote d'Ivoire of the last few days, and wondering whether finally this more robust humanitarianism, which remains politically neutral in the terms of not taking sides politically, but which is willing to kind of take on in a preemptive way threats to civilians before they materialize, whether or not there is a future for that, and in that sense, continuing to see the humanitarian bit of the UN as one of the most successful areas of development in the decades I've been involved.

But then to human rights, where I have felt there has been much more mixed record, and my account as my first spell as a young intern at the UN of watching the hopelessness of the UN dealing at that stage with investigations of any kind of human rights disasters, watching a gradual strengthening of its willingness to take on difficult issues, but seeing that really, even within the formal mechanisms, intergovernmental mechanisms, the huge constraints, and how even to this day, it really remains much more the Human Rights Watch and organizations in the non-governmental sector, who really, really kind of push on these issues, and recounting my own experience.

And this was under your predecessor, of the human development reports, and the huge difficulty that then-permanent representative of Egypt gave me over these reports. And I should immediately add, not only Egypt, but all, pretty much all the members of the Arab league at that time. But you know, here, if ever there could have been a warning signal, UNDP publishes these reports written, and lead author was Egyptian, whole author team were Arab, it was done by Rima Khalaf Hunaidi, the assistant secretary-general and bureau director for the Arab states in UNDP, so a completely sort of Arab-led effort, and the critique it developed of the lack of political rights, the lack of a secular education in many parts of the Arab world, statistics like the lack of translation of texts into the Arab language out of other languages being fewer each year than was translated into Greek, a country a fraction of the size to the huge sort of competitive disadvantage of societies that did not give full rights to women.

It was a pretty blunt account of the difficulties of the region, and it was pretty obvious that one day there would be a reckoning, because within the first few weeks of publication of the first report, a million copies have been downloaded in Arabic, making it not just the best UN bestseller ever, but you know, indicating just a huge demand and interest for this kind of change in the region. And the report was, many pats on the back from Western leaders, but of course, in the region, a lot of criticism from the leaderships, and frankly, you know, a few great friends of the report, like Amr Moussa, standing up for it in the Arab league at a time, with a few other, with some various countries as well, but you know, a lot of difficulty politically, putting out those reports, and reminding me, or making it clear to me the limits of the UN, or even UNDP, speaking truth to power in the area of human rights, and wondering whether ever the UN as a system will entirely overcome that constraint.

And to my third area, if you like, of UN activity, the development one, and the account of my coming from the World Bank to UNDP, coming as someone who believed passionately in economic reform, but precisely because I had worked in an institution with huge financial resources, but very limited legitimacy in the eyes of developing countries. And seeing the huge power of UNDP, this extraordinary confidence and trust it enjoyed with developing countries, and yet fearing that in a sense, it was sitting on that capital, that it was guilty of telling developing countries what they wanted to hear rather than challenging them to reform in a way that global best practice might suggest to them would be kind of smart things to do, and remembering my sort of Margaret Thatcher malaise, Kagame kind of thing, of realizing that leaders who did get it, gripped

change, set about it recognizing that change was a twenty-year project, could transform their countries in a dramatic, dramatic way.

And so for me, the UNDP years were an absolutely fascinating thing, both inside the organization as we sought to become that kind of challenging edgy advisor to developing countries, but also in terms of seeing the change occurring within countries, and then recognizing, above all else, that this change was in so many parts of the world being empowered and legitimized by this dramatic move towards democratic government in so many of the countries where we were working.

But to the final area of the UN that I just wanted to mention, which was the sort of peacekeeping and political, and once I was chief of staff, and then deputy secretary-general on the other side of the street, discovering this astonishing little room, the situation center, which everyday would produce to our highest chief of staff or then DSG, problems for which there was no solution. Each morning, the files would come in, killings in Darfur, forest fires in Indonesia, attacks on the mission in the DRC. I would always count that every day, there are about a dozen problems, and just realizing this extraordinary disconnect between the demands and expectations of the system that these files came to us because people felt that the Secretary-General can solve these problems, and the huge limitation of means, resources, political authority to actually do so.

And I think the great success of the Annan years were the huge increase in peacekeeping, a five fold increase in peacekeeping, an extraordinary leap in the amount of mediation and political troubleshooting that was done around the world, but realizing that despite an inspirational Secretary-General, there was a limit to how much we could do for all the reasons that I don't need to run through here. And the book, of course, talks about the difficult final years at the UN, my time and the Secretary-General's, a push for reform of the huge shadow overhanging us of the Oil for Food investigation, of the difficulties that posed in terms of successful change.

And I conclude a little ruefully, as I must say, I suspected even at the time, that it takes a really good crisis to be able to change things, as President Obama's last chief of staff observed rather famously, never waste a crisis. Well, we thought that Oil for Food exposed sufficient weaknesses of UN management that it would give us the support of the system to really drive through major management restructuring of how the UN worked, but instead, of course, it led to a very difficult period of deep opposition between those who feared that Oil for Food was a kind of, almost a Western coup against the organization, and some in the West who felt, on the other hand, that the scandal exposed such deep-seeded failings that reform was not realistic or possible.

I think, for those of you who, like me, shared these UN years, there's perhaps a lot in the book that you'll enjoy in terms of touching briefly on experiences we all shared. But as I said, it's a book which tries to sort of focus on a bigger picture, which is a little bit of a theory, but I'm careful not to sort of overdevelop it, because I suppose it's that history of an English education, journalism, and just too many years of doing this, that I'm sort of cautious about being too much the predictor in the book.

I sort of went into writing this book with two clear rules in my mind that I must not break. One, I must not write another boring book about globalization. In my Yale research, I found there were 9,000 books and articles with the title "globalization" in it, which is pretty good for a word which is only twenty years old, and so I was anxious to not fall into that dull rut and trap. But equally, the other rut that I, or trap that I feared was that I start predicting which countries are going to rise and which are going to fall. And here, I say, I've been around long enough that I've watched the slough of books and articles predicting the final victory of the USSR over the United States. Similarly, I've remembered the rise of Japan, the slough of books here about how the Rockefeller Center and Pebble Beach golf course had fallen into Japan's hands, how long before they bought the lease on the White House?

And so I'm a bit sort of wary and skeptical of these predictions of the rise of particular countries, and instead argue that my Margaret Thatcher childhood is the right lesson, that countries rise and fall, and that the degree of demographic and social change in the world is going to accelerate that process, and where countries lapse into bad leadership, and they lose their competitive edge, the fall will be dramatic, as may the recovery be. And that therefore, we need institutions that accommodate rises and falls of countries, and which accepts that that is the most dangerous moment in the fates of nations is that these rises and falls trigger wars. After all, that, in a sense, is what the 20th century in Europe was about, large countries demanding more space, demanding more economic assets. And I argue that, as you look at Asia's century now, it embarks on it with many of the kind of territorial disputes and inequalities that Europe embarked on its century 100 years ago, and therefore, the prospect of this necessarily being a peaceful and easy century of everybody getting into a kind of politically, apolitical middle class prosperity together, it seems to me is a very improbable one.

And so above all else, we need global arrangements which accommodate and deal with all of this, so I make two declarations of, if you like, theory in this. One is that we've got to sort ourselves, our governance out around four basic principles where issues are no longer national and have migrated to the global level, we need strong institutions to deal with them, UN or otherwise. That doesn't mean we're moving to a world beyond nation states, and if anything, I think that the nation state is looking healthier than it has in quite a while, because the backlash against globalization makes people want to hold onto what they can hold onto at the national level.

But it also makes them, at a third level, want to decide more locally, and the great trend towards democracy that I describe in my years as a political advisor and consultant, means that you can see that politically in the future, we will want to act globally, nationally, and locally, and we want to act through a fourth leg to the stool as well, which is a strong civil society. And this book, if it has one moment, if it has one weakness, I'm completely dewey-eyed about civil society, which won't surprise those who worked with me. Seeing it as by far the most significant change agent as the sector which has adjusted to global change much faster than either business or certainly governments have done.

And so the second theory, if you like, of the book, is that all this sort of political change and evolution around the system and the rise and fall of

nation states has to be contained within a world which will be defined by three great drivers, if you like. One is growth and change. The global economy, I suspect, its growth in the longer term is going to accelerate, and with it, the change. Not all positive change as inequalities cause, as I've said, new tensions.

The second is globalization, which reduces, really, to just one thing: integration. We are all neighbors in a way that has never been the case before, and we share each other's... the impact of each other's decisions about how we use our environment, be it, be it forests, water, or whatever, and hence to the third factor who's going to drive this limits, water, in fact, of all renewable, I mean, non-renewable energy and commodity sources, this is a very different political environment, shaped by the fact that it will be a much more competitive one than we've seen in the past, as we run up against the ceiling and limits of what we have in terms of resources.

So let me just sort of finish these remarks by saying that this, as I said, is a book that's memoir and manifesto, and a little bit of quick history as well. It's written by someone who loves the United Nations, but is an absolutely a clearer, maybe, and more steely-eyed about its weaknesses, and many have not lived through it in the way that so many of us here have done, but which also recognizes that if the UN doesn't sort of shape up and step up to it, there are other ways of organizing global cooperation.

And as a minister for Gordon Brown, I saw this as one of those who helped shape the G20 as it stepped up to being heads of government forum. I sat with Gordon Brown last week, actually, and we were reflecting on that period, and realizing that when there is a crisis, extraordinary things are possible, and seeing this G20, which really came almost from nowhere as a rather sort of ordinary meeting and performer meeting of finance ministers into a formidable global forum, and watching already as the crises receded, the UN-ization of the G20, by which I mean that it's descending into process and into relatively ineffectual decision making and has already slipped from the pedestal that it was originally on. And so therefore, realizing that unless we all get a grip on this and start demonstrating the will and the pooling of our sovereign powers, if you like, to kind of fix some of this global agenda, we really, you know, won't just bypass the UN, but risk ending up with a completely imperfect set of arrangements for managing a global economy.

Which would leave us, as I sort of conclude about in the book, really, as being, as living in a world which was more integrated than ever before, because I think those economic processes of globalization are irreversible, but at the same time that it's more integrated, less governed than ever before, because issues have escaped national control have gone into this great vague nowhere where there is no formal set of arrangements to manage this new global agenda. Thank you.

Hoge:

Thank you very much. I just want to ask you a couple questions of my own, then we'll go to the floor, and I feel I owe equal time to Maged Abdelaziz, so, who we positioned right here in the front. I mean, what a wonderful photo for you! I didn't even know when I gave him the front

row seat that you would be lashing out at him the entire time! Anyway, Maged, you will get your shot back at him!

Actually, you will see on this piece of paper, Mark, that you pretty much answered the question, the first question I had was, from your role in the British government, what about the G20 vs. the UN, so anyway, you've taken care of that, and let me ask you two things from the book that I didn't hear you say right now.

One of them is tantalizing to me because you mentioned at one point in the book that the two new sort of homes of leadership are cities, and you talked about cities, and the other you said was NGOs. Could you develop that a little bit more?

Malloch Brown:

Sure. Well, look. You know, I'm a sort of NGO nut, and look at them as having been a hugely, hugely significant force in so many of the issues which we declare success, have been successes at the UN. I mean, if you look at land mines--it was veterans' groups and peace groups allied themselves with Canada and got the land mine issue done. It was a similar coalition of NGOs working with Norway, which has been very successful more recently on certain of these cluster mine munitions and other issues of that kind. It is, if you take the Indonesian rain forests, one of the great climate change hotspots, at the same time that there's been barely any movement in the formal UN based climate change negotiations, you saw a group of NGOs, a couple of banks, McKinsey, the consultants, George Soros, the President of Indonesia, but not his government, all combining to put together this package to save the Indonesian rain forests, and then tremendous support from the Millennium Challenge Corporation different in the UK and others.

But this all began with NGO and foundation leadership, and so I see on just... and I could go on, the Global Fund, another one where AIDS activists, development NGOs, were critical in driving this way ahead of any official intergovernmental ambition in this area. So I think the NGOs are a huge part, and I described in the book how, as a Vice President at the World Bank, I suddenly to my horror found OXFAM had opened an office in Washington whose sole purpose seemed to be to torment me every day about why we'd not done enough on debt relief or whatever, and finding an inspired new president of the World Bank, Jim Wolfensohn, allowing me and himself, indeed being the lead in this, to make peace and common cause around debt relief with OXFAM and other NGOs.

And so, and I also described in the book how my particular tormentor on all this subsequently became Gordon Brown's advisor on many of these issues at the time I was his minister on the same issues, and so my whole point really is about how, a) people with a real kind of political agenda for change, now as often as not, you find them in an NGO, not necessarily in national politics, or in their country's mission to the UN, or even in the UN itself, and that these bright young political operatives then move on from their NGO into the UN, or into their own government, so they become a huge sort of supplier of change agents to the system, and the greatest kindergarten for developing global change agents, I would argue, so I think they are a critical part of this sort of emerging informal tapestry of global issue management.

Hoge:

And then the last thing I wanted to ask you about, it's inevitable, of course, is Security Council reform. You specifically, in the book at one point, say--and in the book at this point, you say you are raising questions rather than trying to answer them--you talk about Security Council reform, and you say we must remove the blocks that keep situations like Myanmar or Zimbabwe from coming to the attention of the Security Council. I think that's something that's on all our minds, how can we do that?

Malloch Brown:

Well, you know, I've always felt that the reform of Security Council procedures is actually absolutely up there as being as important as reform of membership, and that one has to have a much clearer procedure where, I mean, it just becomes impossible to use these curious procedural rules to keep these kinds of issues out of the Council, and I felt that the way that you got these procedures changed was by tying it to the change in membership.

I have to say on the change in membership, I must say, I've sort of blown a bit hot and cold on what the best solution to this is, and I think now a combination of believing that you can only do, the art of the possible is looking for the sort of perfect solution, but also consistent with my point about my Margaret Thatcher lesson that countries rise and fall, I've become much less wedded to the idea of more permanent members than I was here, and I know this will please some and offend others, but I'm only a simple author, so it doesn't really matter anyway now. But the reason for that, even if you go back to the height of the battle about the new permanent members, you wouldn't necessarily now, a few short years later, see it in quite the same way as you did then.

There have already been relative changes in terms of how one assesses countries, and just to take the one, perhaps, closest to home, is Europe. It's already a stretch to believe there would be three permanent European seats. I think now it looks absurd, actually. It's just clearer than ever that that would be a dramatic overrepresentation of Europe, but I equally... some of the remarks I made about Asia, which is that I think Asia is the coming region, but I think there will be lots of ups and downs, this will not be a straightforward path over the coming decades, so it's not entirely clear to me that countries should have a permanent forever seat in the same way that, the fault of 1945 was it locked in a particular situation that prevailed then.

I'm less and less convinced that you should lock in a situation of 2011 for the next 50 years. You need a more flexible evolutionary change which will allow the Council to remain broadly representative of a changing world. So a combination of a kind of, a modesty about predicting the permanent rise of countries combined with wanting to find a solution which is possible, not perfect, is moving me towards believing that long-term memberships may be the best way of solving this, but the final observation is the G20 happened because we were about to go over a financial precipice. I sincerely hope it won't take a similar security crisis to finally knock some sense into the argument of Security Council reform.

Hoge:

Excellent. We'll go to the floor for questions. In the back. Pim. Could I ask you to stand? I think that would be easier. The room is crowded.

Pim:

Thank you. Pim Valdre from IPI. You spoke about the enormous political energy that went into the 2005 World Summit and the UN reform agenda that followed, and one of the key questions were the issue of management and Secretariat reform, which was something that, out of many issues, completely fell off the reform agenda as it evolved. I was wondering if you could describe a little bit how you see the appetite these days to strengthen the management of the secretariat and whether that is something that is even conceivable to move forward on.

And my second question goes to, you spoke about the dramatic changes after the Iraq and the Oil for Food program, and I was wondering what role you see for the Office of the Internal Oversight Services in terms of making sure that the UN is keeping track on its work. Thank you.

Malloch Brown:

Well, you know, both very important points. I mean, on the first, I can promise you the management reform didn't fall off my agenda, because literally, my last hours as Deputy Secretary-General were devoted to this, I mean, as they had been right through. Because I think, I felt that with a Secretary-General and a Deputy Secretary-General who, between us, had notched up a lot of UN years, and a lot of them in the field, if we, if Kofi was to leave one legacy, it should be to solve some of these really outstanding management reform issues. And you may remember that we therefore put a package forward for reforming the field conditions of service, which to me, was *the* most important thing we were fighting to do during that last year and a half, because there was no more dramatic transformation than that we'd reached a point where there were more UN colleagues, Secretariat colleagues, serving in the field missions than there were in New York and Geneva.

But we still had a rulebook written for conditions in New York and Geneva, and the lack of a career structure in the field of long-term contracts, the lack of grappling with the rights of families to be in the field, or if not, to deal properly with arrangements to allow people proper periods of leave--all of this struck me as an absolutely critical issue that the Secretary-General, as an ex-head of peacekeeping, and I, as an ex-head of UNDP profoundly understood.

And frankly, what I was trying to do was lift the conditions of field service for the Secretariat to something parallel to those for UNDP, or for the other funds and programs, and it was a source of huge, huge frustration to me that we could not get this through, and the reason we couldn't get it through was not. I mean, there was plenty of political fights over it, and the whole issue got deeply politicized, but we're completely on a losing end, because on this one, in addition to the politics, there was a normal Western complaint about cost.

And so, to the second half of your question, you know, do I think the appetite for reform, what is it now? I suspect it's worse! Because I do think the UN may not have fully worked out to the degree of the public spending crisis across so much of the traditional donor countries, at least. Wherever you are, whether you're America who's postponed until now the issue of fiscal deficit reduction, or whether you're a country like the UK, which is now at the other extreme, and is cutting now, the prospective impact on UN contributions over the next 4-5 years is dramatic. And so I really worry that having missed that window for reform, there will be huge difficulty, and I secondly worry that at a time

where the need for a stronger UN is greater than ever. That in truth, the next five years are going to be years of dramatic budget cutting, of learning to do more with less, something the UN is not new to, and I think it's going to be a really, really tricky, tricky period.

Now on the second issue of, it was Oil for Food, and OIOS, sorry, of course. Look, I was on the panel that chose the last head of OIOS, and we chose her because we knew she would be utterly impossible and independent, and that is what a head of OIOS must be. She, as I remember saying to her, as we recruited her, I said, you know, I actually cannot believe there could ever be an Inspector General that would be fired by the Swedish Government! They absolutely don't do that! The Swedes love to turn the other cheek and be told, oh my God, yes, you're right! We should have managed – you know it, right? I mean, it's –

Hoge: Mark, she's Swedish.

Malloch Brown: Yeah, I gathered! But you would agree, she's very, you have to be, whatever is the female equivalent of a real son of a bitch, to have kind of got fired by your government, and then to voluntarily become Inspector General in Kosovo! Kosovo! Where she was pursuing all kinds of corruption in different procurement activities by the new government there, so we chose here completely with our eyes open, because we felt, coming out of Oil for Food, that we had to restore credibility to this function in the UN, and so, and I think the UN's just got to learn to live with an independent, head of OIOS, because it's critical to the overall trust and integrity of the organization as a whole.

Hoge: Maged Abdulazziz. I wanted you to stand, because you're the only big beast in the room equal to this one!

Maged Abdulazziz: No, he's bigger than me! But we're close friends, and thank you, Mark, for all the remarks. Maybe, you didn't lecture me. I disagree. We had our points of agreement and our points of disagreement. We agree together on the spending, on fighting the spending cap on the Secretary-General in 2006, and that's why both of us were insulted in Bolton's book, and then were attacked, and we agreed also on, when many things you did in the UNDP, except the issue of the Arab Development Report, which the point of this agreement was not what was written in the report, but was that you did not publish the responses of the governments to what was in the report. But time has passed, and some of these events have proven to be true, and many revolutions are happening in our part of the world, so I'm not going to dispute the substance at this stage.

One other remark related to the RtoP. Yes, we worked together on this RtoP paragraphs in 2005 that was just when I arrived here, and the resolution Security Council 1970-1973 can never be qualified as RtoP. Why? Because it is built on the request of the Arab League. It is not that the Security Council decided to go for entirely, to send forces or to authorize a mission that would be an exercise by the Security Council of its authority, it has waited long and long and long, waited for the African Union to come with a request, it didn't come, waited for the Arab League to come with a request, and then when the Arab League came with a request for a no-fly zone only, then the resolution is full of land, sea, and

air attacks and all kind of military missions and others, so it does not classically classify on RtoP, and it is a coalition of the willing.

At the final analysis, there is no peacekeeping mission, and that brings me to the issue of the credibility of the United Nations, and the ability of the United Nations to absorb new realities and to absorb new leadership, as you just mentioned, and there are others coming in the way, and then the United Nations, in its current stance, cannot absorb new powers. It cannot reform the Security Council, it cannot expand it, it cannot even work on the working methods, it cannot, and that is, and it cannot, it cannot not have any place for the new economic power, and that's why they went out to G8, G20, and there are other places which are competing with the United Nations, and which are limited in membership and much hated by the developing countries who do not like them, because they are not represented there.

But for Africa, which has only one African country in there so the question here, and also the question of lack of implementation of commitments. There have been many commitments, and under the Africa plan of action and only 22% of the commitment in 2005 or 2006 has been implemented up until now. So we are in need for, what is your view for the United Nations to regain the confidence and to be back as a center for new powers and a center for merging all the powers together, instead of dividing everything into coalition of the willing here, the G20 there, the G8 here, and this group there, this group there, so there is a fragmentation process happening, and it's going to affect the United Nations very sharply. Thank you.

Malloch Brown:

Well look, Maged, I have to tell you that you're going to be quite surprised, but I share your anxieties about these resolutions, actually. I come at it from a different point. I come at it from a huge believer in RtoP, but I think the worst thing that can happen to RtoP is when it is exploited for regime change. It is a very, very clear doctrine of protecting civilians.

Now I actually believe that when Qaddafi so blatantly threatened the citizens of Benghazi, the world had no choice but to act, and I think it was fantastic that the Arab League gave the lead endorsement for this, but I equally think there must be no advantage taken to allow a mission creep to a mission which is beyond that and has a military purpose that goes beyond that, because then next time we face one of these situations, abstentions in the Council will become vetoes. So as a strong believer in RtoP, and someone who, I think... and I don't think RtoP requires it to be a Security Council action, I think all the better when it comes as a proposal from the Arab League, except it isn't taken up by the Council, but the risk... I mean, if you talk about sort of restoring the legitimacy and trust of the UN, it's got to act within transparent doctrines which are accepted, and I believe RtoP is on its way to acceptance, but if success rushes to its supporters' heads, and it goes too far and really leads to that kind of mission whose purposes go beyond, so I'm in this rather strange position.

I actually think, and I'm not suggesting this is necessarily practical, but there be another Security Council resolution, which says we've stabilized the humanitarian situation, we will keep the no-fly in place to make sure that civilians are not attacked, but we now need to move on to deal with

the threat to international peace and security that Libya will now pose given the situation of its government.

And I actually think you could, that Egypt and many others would sign up to a political strategy, and the diplomatic strategy to address this, which did not, which clearly drew the line any further external military engagement in the situation. So I think it's really important to behave in a disciplined, transparent way consistent with, if you like, the doctrine.

And hence to the second point about the confidence or legitimacy of the system as the whole and the sprouting up of the G20. I have to tell you a little bit, Qaddafi's G20 story, which I briefly touch on in the book, but because the book might be picked up by children, including my own, I had to slightly edit the story, but in this adults only room, I will.

Here I am, new minister in Britain, told by my Prime Minister, that I have to go and recruit, and it'd be my idea that we needed further African representation at the G20, and despite the fact it had only one formal member, I was able to get your then finance minister in as, in his role as G20, as interim chair, as chair of the interim committee at the IMF, but I also got another country in, and the standard arrangement was that in the same way that we were inviting the chair of ASEAN that we would invite the chair of the AU, so Gordon Brown looked at me, and he said, who is the chair of the AU? And I said – I didn't hear that. What did you say? Well, it's Col. Qaddafi, Gordon. And he turned to me, and in his sternest Scottish voice, which I won't seek to imitate, said, if you go to the AU and find a solution that someone else represents the AU, because if that man erects his fucking tent in Hyde Park, don't bother to come back to London!

So fortunately, fortunately, a long-standing network of friends like Jean Ping and Abdoulie Janneh, an old UNDP colleague running ECA, meant that we were able to kind of construct a theory that it should be the head of the economic side of the AU, NEPAD, and therefore, should be Prime Minister Meles, but as I say, but I mean, the more serious point, you're right, Africa's underrepresented in the G20, a lot of parts of the world are underrepresented, but it does comprise 85% of global GDP, definite improvement on the forty-something percent, or 50% that the G8 represents. But--and I think this is a key point--it mustn't again get beyond itself. It is a formal grouping of countries with no treaty basis. It must find ways to take its policies, if it wishes to, through the UN or through the World Bank and the IMF through legitimate institutions, which must remain the channel for this. And as I say, the G20's success is, I think, a success of crisis, and it's a pity, or in some ways, that the UN has not had a similar crisis to get people serious about renewing its authority and addressing these issues of representation in a more serious way, and I think we all have to collectively look at ourselves and say, how do we create that willingness to come together and make these changes?

Hoge: On the aisle.

Udo Janz: Thank you. I will be brief. A small anecdote –

Hoge: Can I ask you to introduce yourself, just for the sake of the recording?

Janz:

I will. Udo from UNHCR, I'm the director of the UNHCR office here in New York.

A small anecdote, which I hope is significant, and a question for your views, Mark. Mark and I go back a long way to the Thai chapter, if you like, in his book already, and I've seen Mark transcending the humanitarian, the development, and the banking world, but one thing that I remember was true in Bangkok in the early '80s, and at the end of the '90s, you had your shoes on the table when you thought you were alone then, and you had it in the bank, too, when I visited you as a senior vice president of the bank, so some things have stayed with you. I thought, as a chef de cabinet, this was a very difficult and different job from this unseemingly title of the administrator, and we have seen tonight that the title of that job really doesn't do justice to the caliber behind it.

But I remember you came to Srebrenica to deliver the 10th anniversary speech on behalf of Kofi Annan, which I thought must have been the most difficult audience you ever faced in your professional career, and the fact that you came out alive from delivering that speech shows that the individual still can make a difference, depending on the situation where you're exposed to and depending on the leadership that the individuals possess. You certainly did proud to the UN at the time, and the fact that your speech had such a resounding, really, response from the Srebrenica victims speaks for itself, I think. Mara Mogata, as you know, made it one of her causes to try and bridge the gap as one of my colleagues in UNHCR who issued a paper with the title "Mind the Gap," tried to argue, we have not come very far in bridging that humanitarian action that you referred to with the development efforts of the UN and others. Is there, in hindsight, and with the exposure that you had within the UN and without, a lesson learned here on how one can preach? This is not an offense to Jordan, who leads the BCPR in the UNDP, so I'm not saying there are no efforts being made, but I believe that the gap is as wide as ever today, and we need to do more to bridge it ultimately. Thank you.

Malloch Brown:

Well, Udo, thank you. I have to say that I talk about this extraordinary day in Srebrenica where giving that speech and feeling I was just another white guy in a suit apologizing to these widows and families who were around the hillside in this natural amphitheater with these mini little boxes which were the remains of their loved ones, which had been painstakingly reassembled out of various mass graves by a group that had learned the science of reassembling bodies from its work with Vietnam, the remains of those killed in Vietnam, and here are these little green boxes, sort of half-size things reflecting the partial recovery of the remains of people, and that it had been all these years later, and many of them had come back to Srebrenica for the first time to kind of reawaken the ghosts after the years of exile, and a sense of the sheer hopelessness of it, and the sense that words could never make up for it, and going that evening back to Sarajevo and spending it with Samantha Power, in some ways, along with Susan Rice, the intellectual force behind the United States coming in favor of the no-fly resolution.

And I'm sure for Samantha, the memories of Sarajevo where she was a *Washington Post* journalist in Srebrenica, seeing Benghazi, it was a very powerful memory and revival of what had been a kind of searing moment for many of us, and I think, I remember thinking, listening to her that night

over a beer, and her describing how the UN had really been asleep at the wheel. It was, sort of... Srebrenica sort of went off air. Suddenly the communications were not really working, and I remembered myself how 24 hours could go by, and you forgot to ask what was happening in Darfur, and just realizing that, not only do we have to get this doctrine through an operationalized responsibility to protect, we had to build a UN culture of responsiveness that will just make sure that if we ever saw something like this gathering pace again, we kind of were on our toes as a system to do it. And I actually made everybody on the 38th floor after that wear one of these green things--which is a Darfur related thing.

A phrase actually from Samantha's book, which was allegedly attributed, or at least I think George Bush said on reading Samantha's book of, which would be "not on my watch," would this happen again, and making everybody on the 38th floor wear it, saying, because this could happen to us, too. We could get so stuck in our ways that we just won't see that there's a Srebrenica happening out there, and this is... because there are two stories of Srebrenica, there was a story of terrible choices the Dutch peacekeepers had to make there, but there's a story of the line of civilian command from Sarajevo to New York, and then how, at every stage, it broke down and failed to see what was happening, and so for me, it was just, it was as close as everything to the sort of, the story which revived everything I learned 30 years ago in Thailand and elsewhere and had seen in Rwanda as UNDP administrator, this need to just kind of have a political alertness to these situations and never say afterwards, we were too late.

Hoge: I have time for two more questions. A woman there, and finally, Jeffrey Laurenti at the end. Just wait for the microphone, please.

Sevil Alirzayeva: Hi, my name is Sevil Alirzayeva, I work for Department of Peacekeeping Operations. I worked for UNDP when you are my administrator. So your time with UNDP is well known as successful fundraising campaign, and I believe UNDP benefited enormously from your personal fundraising skills. But that was early 2000 when the peacekeeping cost member states \$2 billion, and now we are in 2011, and the peacekeeping cost the world \$7.3 billion, which is four times more, and we are in the aftermath of the world financial and economic crisis. So my question is, what would be your advice for a successful fundraising campaign in 2011, and my second question –

Hoge: We don't, we only have time for one question. I'm going to go to Jeff now.

Alirzayeva: Sorry. And what your international priorities, international aid priorities are these days. Thank you.

Hoge: Could you, and then we'll take your question, we'll answer them both at once.

Jeff Laurenti: Thank you. Jeff Laurenti with the Century Foundation. Mark, I'd like to ask if you could address a bit, the subtitle of your book, the pursuit of a new international politics. Here in this country's national politics. We thought two years ago, that that whole set of warped and throwback ideas that you had criticized at that conference of ours a few years ago had been put in its tomb for a very long time, and yet already, we see in

the House of Representatives now, new initiatives that are even more nightmarish of that same view. Do you see in the longer term that there is actually a prospect of a serious rooting in of a kind of global or international politics when you have one person who emblemizes, if that's the right word, represents the kind of international community being chosen, the Secretary-General, through a process that I don't think anybody is yet suggesting seriously be changed, and that gives you often faceless charisma-less Secretaries-General as often as those who are charismatic and able to chart a course, how does this new international politics idea develop and become part of the politics that all of us across our nations take part in when you have these negative and backward tendencies in some of the biggest countries even now, so soon after supposedly having learned our lessons?

Hoge:

Thanks, Jeff. Can you answer both of those?

Malloch Brown:

Yeah, and I'll do it promptly, Warren. The peacekeeping issue, I mean, one, let's be clear, at UNDP, we would have loved to have had this formula of cost sharing, of peacekeeping applied to UNDP. We had to go out and raise these funds entirely voluntarily, and I think, in a sense, maybe, because of that, we kind of learned what our punters wanted. I mean, we were, we learned how to raise money through packaging it in ways that were responsive, and you actually have just ahead of you, in front of you, if you need advice, Bruce Jenks, who is the master of UNDP fundraising, and is now retired young, and I'm sure actually, you could hire him after this to raise the funds for peacekeeping!

But I think peacekeeping is an absolute bargain, even at \$7.3 billion compared to the cost of offensive military operations around the world, and there's been so much good research done to show the costs saved or the wars avoided that equally, it has a compelling thing. But I think, frankly, I have also felt that even though the civilian portions of peacekeeping are a small bit, you know, they could be, I've always felt that there's an awful lot of reform that can happen in peacekeeping missions. There should be a lot more local staff, a lot less duplication with what's done in the funds and programs, and if you did that, then maybe you could win the support to invest a lot more in common training of troops, improved command and control, all the rest of it. Peacekeeping is untended to, underinvested in, but, and we've been very lucky there have not been more disasters in peacekeeping than those that have occurred, so it's a long, I'm not going to do justice to it, but it's a huge issue.

And on the development priorities, we've still got a few years to go to the MDGs. We're doing much better than public opinion would have us believe. We're going to meet the MDG for halving poverty, we're going to meet another of the MDGs, even in some very unlikely African countries, which, you know, conventional wisdom would think was highly unlikely, so let's not desert it until we've met it, but I think if there is one big shift, it is away from, if you like the welfarist model of the MDGs, which was to measure this social safety net, which I continue to believe is critical, and we will need its equivalent after 2015, because it's, to me, the foundation bit of a social contract for globalization in a way, but we have to add to it growth and private sector development in a much more integrated way than has yet happened in much of the thinking.

Then to Jeffrey's point about the new politics. I've talked about how in part, this is a civil society new politics, how it is a politics that is much bigger than just the UN, and I think the UN itself is a cramped small building here, but I think through social networking, we're going to see a huge expansion of the whole sort of participatory character of the UN. I think we're going to see more people involve themselves in what goes on here through this thing. Something that is barely noticed in this town, I think, like the session at this coming General Assembly on non-communicable diseases, the huge buzz out there in the health community, the importance attached to this meeting, and the need for them to find new means of communicating in that feeling, it means I think we're going to see a huge degree of transformation.

Within that, what does figure at the Secretary-General mean? It is emblematic of it. I still think organizations know, whether it's a car company or a country, tend to be, well maybe less a consumer goods company, but a bank or a country tend to be assessed, not by their products or outputs, but by their leader, and so a powerful Secretary-General is key, and I think it's almost a truism that the selection process prefers Secretaries over Generals.

But where I think it's not an impossible thing to square the circle is, I talk about leadership in the book, and I argue that in this new global multilateral environment, the old alpha male kind of leader isn't quite the powerful effective figure of the past, that what marked Kofi Annan's leadership was his consensus building skills and his team building skills, and often those can slip by the veto of the P5, because they're so anxious to avoid the alpha skills that they kind of miss the fact they've elected a quiet revolutionary, and so the fact that Kofi did make it through, and they entirely misjudged him, and I talk of others, UNHCR, there was a famous Sadruddin Aga Khan, and I cite in the book how an American State Department memo opposed his selection on the grounds that he might prefer African and Asiatic refugees to European ones, and bravo, they were right! He did! And so my feeling is that a lot of the right leaders do slip past, and some, because they were right before, and others, because they rise to it when chosen, and you know, and leave it at that.

Hoge:

You know, in my blush--inducing introduction of Mark an hour ago, I left out one thing, and it just occurred to me tonight as I was sitting and listening to him. It also gives me a chance to mention the name of somebody I care about a great deal.

In December 2004, there was a meeting. It was a quiet meeting. It was a secret meeting at the time, and it was in the house of our late lamented friend, Richard Holbrooke, and that was a meeting where a group of men and women who care deeply about the United Nations and care deeply about the leadership of Kofi Annan came together and basically plotted how to save the UN, how to point it in a direction to overcome some of the criticism--some of which was fair, some of which was not fair--and the first result of that meeting was to choose Mark Malloch Brown as the new chief of staff for Kofi Annan, and I think you've seen tonight why they made that choice, and what a wise decision it was. Thank you, Mark.