



IPI's Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Series Presents:

“Helping Stabilize the Middle East: The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)”

**Featuring Major General Robert Mood
*Head of Mission and Chief of Staff of UNTSO***

Moderator:
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Warren Hoge:

Good afternoon. I'm Warren Hoge, IPI's Vice President for External Relations and I'm happy to welcome you to this SRSG Series of the International Peace Institute, which we have in light of our guest today recast as the Head of Mission Series.

It's a pleasure to welcome our speaker, Major General Robert Mood, the head of Mission, and Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, known to all of you as UNTSO, who next month will be ending his two-year term in office. He was appointed in January, 2009. As you may know, UNTSO was the first ever peacekeeping operation established by the United Nations in May, 1948 by UN Resolution #50 to assist the United Nations mediator and the Truce Commission in supervising the observance of the truce in Palestine. Over its six decades of existence, UNTSO has performed various tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council, including: the supervision of the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 between Israel and its Arab neighbors; the observation of the ceasefire in the Suez Canal area; and the Golan Heights following the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967; and more recently, the assistance to UNIFIL, the UN Interim Force in South Lebanon to fulfill its mandate.

Let me just say that IPI shares in this early UN peacekeeping history since we were created in 1970 as the International Peace Academy charged with peacekeepers. And our first president, Indian Major General Indar Jit Rikhye, was a veteran of that first military observer mission in Sinai.

General Robert Mood's full biography is printed on the program, so I won't give you all the details of his extensive and distinguished military career. But I want to mention that he served in Lebanon with UNIFIL in 1989 to 1990, and deployed twice to Kosovo with KFOR, first in 1999 as battalion commander, and most recently in 2002 as Chief of the Joint Implementation Commission. From 2005 until his appointment as head of UNTSO in January 2009, he served as Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Army. So General Mood, a warm welcome to you, and the floor is yours.

Major General Mood: Well, thank you very much for that kind introduction. I fully realize that the knowledge about the Middle East, and maybe also my mission, is more extensive in this room than anything I could hope to achieve during two years. So with that as a point of reference, I will simply offer to say some views, some reflections of 32 years. And I will focus in my initial remarks on the role of UNTSO fairly directly, although, towards the end, I would also like to offer some reflections after what I usually call 33 years as a soldier, and quite a lot of it working internationally, on peacekeeping, international engagement in general.

Now to begin with, I want to make the point that it is a privilege to serve as a UN peacekeeper. It's also an honor to address you all. It is also a specific honor to lead the first UN peacekeeping operation created by the Security Council in 1949, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Our mission, working in the interface between military means and political means, struggles over complex cultural, religious, historic, and perceptual fort lines in Egypt, as well Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Our work is mainly twofold: on the one hand, we continue to serve on the behalf of the members states, withdrawals and military disengagements between Israel, Lebanon and Syria; on the other hand, through regional dialog with our host countries to assist in our modest way all the efforts of the five countries towards regional peace. And when I say "in our modest way"—it is obvious to all of you, but let me say it anyway—there are other players in the Middle East linked to the Department of Political Affairs in the UN, you have special envoys, you have the Quartet, you have a lot of players, directly engaged in the diplomatic/political arena. My mission is a peacekeeping operation by definition, but we have a dialog with the five countries in the mission area. So when I offer some reflections, I fully recognize that there are others in the region closer to the core political dialog than myself, who can then give you the correct answers to all of this.

One might ask, does UNTSO still deliver on the commitment made by the Security Council in 1949? I would like to offer four thoughts related to such a question. First, we continue to provide the international community with a regional presence and perspective on the Middle East that are not limited to local withdrawal and disengagement areas. Second, we continue to enjoy the consent and appreciation wherever we operate from our headquarters in Jerusalem to Amman, Beirut, Damascus and Cairo. Third, once the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force the Golan have accomplished their mandates, UNTSO provides an available mechanism for transition while also supporting the parties in their subsequent implementation of a comprehensive regional peace in the Middle East. Finally, in partial observation, the escalation of incident and an objective regional perspective, as far as we are contributing to that—and I argue we are—delivered at a fraction of the cost of larger operations.

As borders are discussed between Israel's neighbor and the future Palestinian state, UNTSO continues to be as current today as when the so-called "Green Line" was drawn. As said, we came into being only three years after the

establishment of the United Nations in the wake of World War II, the passage of the UN Partition Plan for Palestine by the General Assembly and the Proclamation of the State of Israel on the 14th of May, 1948 would follow the proclamation between the newly-created state and its Arab neighbors. These events are, among the Arabs, referred to as “the Naked” due to Palestinians that felt compelled to flee or forced to flee. The right of return for the refugees and their descendents are at the core of current Palestinian and Arab demands on Israel, who cannot comply since they feel this will change the demographic composition of Israel and make it very difficult to maintain the Jewish majority. While this issue seems of very high symbolic importance to the Palestinians, the right to visit and compensation are viewed as more likely outcomes amongst the Arab interlocutors than mass migration back to Israel proper.

The Security Council acted swiftly and adopted two resolutions, 50 and 54, calling for truces to be observed by unarmed international officers lead by mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, also the first Special Representative of the Secretary-General. And that mechanism became the first and longest-running peacekeeping operation of the United Nations. The work initiated by this mediator culminated in the signature of four separate armistices between Israel and each of its immediate neighbors, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, in 1949, facilitated by Ralph Bunche, later winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Upon their formal signing, the Security Council acted again, and in its Resolution 73 called upon UNTSO to assist the parties with the implementation and supervision of the armistices. Since then the mission of UNTSO encompasses five countries where it exercises the implacable immunities and privileges required for the implementation of the mandate, including the critical freedom of movement for military observer and staff. And we enjoy a constructive host-nation relationship with all five nations. Israel and Egypt signed the peace treaty in 1979, as did Israel and Jordan in 1994. Their peace is cold but much preferred to the alternative. Trade, tourism and economic cooperation have not expanded in line with the potential among the countries, while border and security cooperation is very pragmatic. The sophistication of this cooperation is such that it continues unaffected from rather harsh political statements in the media related to regional and local issues that mainly serve domestic purposes.

With peace between Israel and these two neighbors, we say that half of the job of UNTSO of half the mandate has been accomplished. Yet, Egypt and Jordan continue to assist on the full authority and responsibility of UNTSO related to its original mandate, as does the legal Arab states. For they see the mission as an impartial witness to all events since 1948, and a strategic choice for possible future implementation. They also consider UNTSO's existence to express the commitment of the United Nations to adjust comprehensive peace with the armistice lines as the authoritative point of reference.

Egypt also values the specific presence of a peacekeeping operation in Egypt as a UN footprint that could enable further UN activities on their soil when opportunities arise, particularly in the areas of support. Israel remains formally at a state of war with Lebanon and Syria. We have since 1974 and 1978 had two interim UN mission established within the larger mission area of UNTSO: United Nations Disengagement Observance Force at the Golan, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. UNDOF observes the Israeli-Syrian disengagement, while UNIFIL observes Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and assists the Lebanese government in exercising its authority south of Litani River. All these three peacekeeping operations are established under Chapter 6, though very different in nature: disengagement, withdrawal, and supervision.

Several wars have been fought between '48 and 2010, but the most significant one related to the current situation is the 1967 Six Day War in which Israel occupied Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan. The following occupation, lasting for more than 40 years, in my view, is a growing mentality challenge for Israel, a continuous humiliation for the Palestinians and Syrians, a credibility issue for other Arab countries, and an engine for extremists in the wider region. In 2005 Israel unilaterally disengaged from Gaza and dismantled settlements while the Golan, East Jerusalem and West Bank remain in their occupation. Due to end with a negotiated peace agreement between Syria and Israel and the creation of a Palestinian state within internationally-recognized borders. Lack of positive progress after unilateral disengagement has, as Israel sees it, reduced the viability of this alternative for the still-occupied areas and derived the insistence on a demilitarized Palestinian state. The armistice line, or the Green Line, is the formal point of reference pointing towards internationally-recognized borders in the region. The so-called 1967 lines refer to forward positions of military units on the day and has not, unlike the armistice demarcation line, been drawn on maps. Progressing from a withdrawal line to a border between Lebanon and Israel, defining the beginning of occupied Golan and a point of reference for the future border between Syria and Israel, transforming the administrative boundary between the West Bank and Jordan, to a border between states, the defining occupied East Jerusalem versus West Jerusalem, referring the baseline for land swaps between a Palestinian state and Israel as well as defining the legality of barrier around the West Bank are current and possible future roles of the ADL if, if, the five countries, the effected countries, and the UN find it relevant roles to be played. The UNTSO Mandate is regional, yet it does not include the Israeli/Palestinian track for the PLO from 1964, and now the Palestinian Authority, 1994, were not parties to the '49 Armistice, obviously. The track remains nonetheless a key issue and the Arab states argue that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most urgent one to address since a solution, in their view, will remove the main reasons for hostilities as well as the main reason for extremism, and excuses for external meddling in Middle East affairs.

Today the current strategic framework of UNTSO focuses on three distinct roles, or operational dimension: one, providing unarmed observers to, first, commandeer UNDOF and UNIFIL; two, engaging in the dialog with the host-nations related to our mandate, with liaison officers in Beirut, Damascus and Cairo; three, maintaining readiness to continue the separation and assistance to the parties of the Israel-Lebanon and Israel-Syria armistices after UNDOF and/or UNIFIL have fulfilled their interim functions. In addition to that, we maintain safety and security operations, provide extensive administrative support to Israel, West Bank and Gaza, country key members, and host the temporary office of the United Nations Special Coordinator at our headquarters compound in Jerusalem. UNTSO also supports the security arrangements for the Quartet office in Jerusalem.

With that, let me leave UNTSO specifically and close with some more general reflections before we go into a period of dialog. I want to argue that the military tool as such is traditionally, obviously, designed to destroy and defeat a military enemy. However, my experience is that the violence released in military operations stimulates violence and unpredictability, and it facilitates opportunistic action. Paraphrasing Sir Rupert Smith from his brilliant book *The Utility of Force*, military means tend not to achieve the anticipated political aim. Iraq and Afghanistan may serve as current examples to be discussed. There are many means in the political tool books: the military is only one. It is overrated and it's used too often. Because it is so easily available to demonstrate political determination. The economic, administrative, juridical, political, humanitarian

tools are equally, if not more than equally important, in particular, in peace operations or crisis response operations. Dialog is always a better option. Hence, military means should not be employed before all other possible options from the political toolbox are exhausted. And we have concluded that any other option than military force is worse, including waiting. Obviously, military action is sometimes necessary and unavoidable. But unless we synchronize it with relevant civilian efforts and a comprehensive and integrated approach, employment of military means may easily do more harm than good.

Summarized, you could state some of these observations and reflections as follows: the end state of military operations is almost always a different place or a different condition than end research. Secondly, military means stimulate extremism; civilians killed is an effective recruiting mechanism. And that has to be taken into account before the military operation is launched. And, obvious to all of us but difficult to translate into actions on the ground, you cannot solve problems in one culture with solutions from another. You cannot solve problems in one culture with solutions from another. That might be one of the reasons for the convergence of several factors in the Middle East as we speak. Perceptions are increasingly more important than reality. Dialog is always a viable option. And lasting peace is created through the hearts, brains and stomachs of children who can best be reached through local women.

Today, I'm honored to serve Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria the Head of Mission of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. With that reference, let me argue that classic peacekeeping served its political purpose better than intervention, or so-called peacemaking. The three peacekeeping operations in the Middle East are there not to impose peace, but to deliver time for political solutions to mature and to support the respective governments. We are guests in our host-nations, and we work for them. It should be no secret by now that even if I am a soldier and even if military means sometimes are necessary, I submit that military means have very clear limitations and rarely produce the desired political outcome.

On this issue and related to perceptions, specifically in the Middle East, I want to share with you a story from 1997. I was traveling in the Balkans while we had a company in Sarajevo. Many of you probably was there on the ground and had been there on other occasions. At one point, we stopped at the line between the Republika Srpska and the Federation. And at that time, you will remember, the sanctions was accepted by the Federation and support was flowing in while the Republika Srpska didn't accept under... let's say the nation building, the situation on that side was much more complicated. And as we stopped almost directly on the line when we could see 200 meters in that direction and 300 meters in that direction, it was almost a black and white picture. But on both places, there were kids playing in the street. And these kids could see each other. And one child saw typical American, suburban area with green lawns and all that in place, and this one saw exactly the opposite. It couldn't help to strike it. And we discussed it a lot whether we actually, with what we had done, we, the international community, had established the seed of future conflict because we did not take into account the perceptions among the local population and among the coming generations.

Brave leaders, dialog, education and culture are more powerful than any military; knowledge and respect is the essence of dialog and a solid bridge across differing perceptions. During my travels to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, South Lebanon and the Golan, I have met coming generations that

are hungry for dialog and knowledge. They can and should be the agents of peace. Thank you.

Hoge:

Thank you General Mood. I'd like to ask you a couple of questions myself and then throw it open to the floor. I want to take up your point about classic peacekeeping and the importance of it. Classic peacekeeping has changed so much since UNTSO was created and has since—indeed, this institute, once called an academy—was created. Two of the most recent changes—and I wanted to ask you if they were reflected in the work that UNTSO does—one is the newly-emerging responsibility for protection of civilians. Is that something that UNTSO was charged with doing? And that would not have been a part of its original mandate. And the second question, in a similar way, is, does peacebuilding, the move from peacekeeping into peacebuilding, which has affected peacekeeping so much, has that affected the work that UNTSO does?

Mood:

On the change of classical peacekeeping, let me first make the point that what I've experienced and what I think would be willing to argue is that if you, in a generic conflict situation, insert a small, unarmed observer mission with the consent of other parties, the responsibility for the problems, the challenges, and the responsibility for the solution stay with the parties. Such a force is an incentive for addressing the issues among the parties. If you insert a 25,000-strong military division plus, with all the means, all the capabilities, all the rest of it, the dynamic on the ground changes in direction of responsibility for the situation, responsibility for solutions, responsibility for progress, is projected on to that mission, that organization, that unit, allowing the players, the parties to distance themselves a little bit, and sometimes, as we very well know, manipulate the forces on the ground for their own agendas. As far as I know, the protection of civilians was not a specific part of the UNTSO mandate from 1949; it has rather been a function of the observing and the assistance of the mission. The change from peacekeeping to peacebuilding has affected UNTSO in the way that our observer groups today are working very closely together with UNIFIL and UNDOF in South Lebanon on the Golan and working with specific issues having to do with civil military interaction within the limitations created by the situation on the ground. I would say that neither of these two functions, protection of civilians and peacebuilding, is something that has influenced mandate implementation of UNTSO to a large extent.

Hoge:

Another development, of course—I heard you say several times the five countries that you had to answer to. And the interesting aspect of the fact that two of them are still at war with Israel, two of them have made peace with Israel. I wanted to ask you, though, about non-state actors who now figure prominently in the Middle East. How do you establish communication with them?

Mood:

That's a very interesting question. And this is where I believe that UNTSO has a very distinct, as a complementary value. Because when I have dinner—and do that also myself—with family in a Shia village in South Lebanon, I don't ask who those I have dinner with represent. Our policy is that we talk to anyone who wants to talk to us on the ground. And we don't ask their affiliation. That said we obviously do not have meetings with the non-state actors in line with the UN policy. But we have a wide dialog with the population at large. And they come from different parts of the society, and they have different loyalties. I believe that that picture across the population and across the loyalties of the population is very important. For example one of the stories that I've met several times is the way a Shia population in a village in South Lebanon in 2006 was welcomed into an Israeli village into the houses, into the churches, and helped, as neighbors, during the war in 2006 without any regard to religion or any other context. And

the friendship and the loyalty between these two groups that, in international media, by the standard attitude, would be bitter enemies is totally wrong. They are friends, they are good neighbors, and they have the same concerns: food on the table, healthcare for my kids, education for my kids, the government in Beirut needs to start caring about us and the infrastructure in our villages, not only their own business in Beirut. That's the way it is black-and-white formulated by the people you meet on the ground, whether right or wrong.

Hoge:

I wanted to ask you just two last questions that had to do with the United Nations and forces like your own that are out there in the theater. One of them is, I mentioned that we began as an academy that literally trained peacekeepers in this building, uniformed people being trained into becoming peacekeepers. This was before the UN could do it itself largely because of Cold War rivalries and tensions. But we remain a research institute with a big focus on peacekeeping. And in things we publish and studies we undertake and comments in this room, over and over again, we're told how important it is that mandates be clearly written and that people in the field, like you, are getting clear directions from New York. Now when General Mood first walked in, I said to him, "You have finished your two-year term, haven't you?" And he said, "Well, actually I only finish in the middle of February." So I still wanted to ask you if the communication between headquarters here, between the Security Council, between the people that write your mandates and the forces in the field that you are in charge of, is it good, could it be better?

Mood:

Let me bring it out into a bigger context as well, because when we gather all the force commanders of the missions—I think it's 18 or is it 19 now? I don't remember whether it's 18 or 19. When we gather all the force commanders, the never-ending story is one you know very well. It is the mandate, and the mandate that is not specific enough the way it's seen from the field, a mandate that is not matched with the proper rules of engagement, and capabilities that does not match neither the rules of the engagement or the capabilities. So there's frustration from the commanders on the ground that they want to do so much more with the capabilities. Capabilities are not there. When it comes to UNTSO, it is not that visible. Because we have, since 1949, been somewhere between 400 and 150 unarmed observers, well-experienced officers, mid-level. So our key asset are simply unarmed observers in military and with boots. And in addition, we have radios and cars. So we don't have this capability gap having to do with tanks and fire power and intelligence systems, information systems and all these things.

But there's another dimension to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, and that is if the Security Council and the General Assembly, but in particular, in the Security Council obviously, if they want to see the determination related to the original mandate of a peacekeeping operation that had lasted 62 years progress and evolve and deliver results, obviously, there is a need for continued political support and attention. I will submit to you that I have been positively surprised by two years now in UN service. I've served together with another force commander in UN service who came from a brigade commander position in Afghanistan. And I'll tell you that many are surprised when he argued, and I'm sure he wouldn't mind if I quoted him, he argues, "I have more authority and I've got more resources in this job as a force commander under the UN than I had when I was a brigade commander in Afghanistan under ICEF." And, of course, the stereotype is very often the opposite, that the NATO context is so much better in terms of capabilities and rules of engagement and guidance and all of that. History was different. So maybe it's a situation dependent relationship that is not necessarily fitting the stereotypes we have of, let's say, weaknesses in

UN peacekeeping operations or peacebuilding operations, and streamline military effectiveness in NATO operations.

Hoge: Finally, something you hear a lot about in the UN is striving for coherence. All these different UN agencies and groups out there somehow working in a way that's constructive and together. Tomorrow in this room, we will hold an event on a theory called Delivering As One, which has to do with that same sort of idea. When you first began your talk, you described all the different UN units in the immediate vicinity when you arrived there. And it sounded awfully crowded to me. And my question is, don't you get in each other's way? Or have you achieved a way where all these different UN units, with their different mandates, different responsibilities, are operating cooperatively, or once again, could it be better than it is?

Mood: Well, to start where you left off, obviously, it could be better. And it can always be better. And obviously when you are in a situation like that, there is a strong need for coordination. The coordination I've experienced with force commander UNIFIL, force commander UNDOF, and the UNTSO mission, extending to the United Nations Special Coordinator in Jerusalem and the United Nations Special Coordinator in Lebanon, and if you add then to the country team, I think—I don't know the specific number of ASGs operating in the Middle East, but it's not a small figure. The coordination among the military force commanders I've experienced is very, very good. I've also experienced good coordination with the political envoys I mentioned. But indeed the power, the strength of a synchronized approach to UN work in a region like the Middle East, the potential is huge. And we can utilize it better than we do today.

Hoge: Very good. Thank you. I look to see some hands from the room and call on you. The Deputy Permanent Representative of Iraq, please. And if you would identify yourself for the sake of the recording, I'd be grateful. Thank you.

Ahmed Mohammed: Thank you very much. My name is Ahmed Mohammed. I'm the Deputy Permanent of Iraq. I would like to appreciate IPI and our guest, General Mood, for this lovely presentation, which is very important. Actually, I have a little comment and one question for a general if you allow me. As everybody knows, the United Nations Charter, when adopted, in Article 47, it should be there as it will be on the way, the United Nations or their own forces, in order to keep international peace and security. But I know that will not happen because some legal problems. So about the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, my question is, I know there is sometimes we need to review the mandate of these forces and to get what happened for circumstances of the lesson that happened in history, like in Europe and former Yugoslavia, or even in the Middle East. So my question is, from legal aspect, according to the mandate of the peacekeeping forces, and from the military aspect, in case when these forces have seen or witness massacre or any violation from any state party, or from power of occupation, what is the reaction of the forces of the United Nations forces from the two aspects, legal mandate or from military aspect. As I know, as does everybody, there's a rule of engage in this issue. And General, have you witnessed something like that in your career? Thank you very much.

Mood: There are several mechanisms, and you probably also know them. But, anyway, let me highlight a couple. The first and the obvious mechanism is obviously that as a peacekeeping operation, we all report directly to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. So whatever we observe, whatever we see, whatever assessment is there is reported to UN Headquarters. And then it's for the mechanisms in UN Headquarters to address the specific issues in

whichever way, whichever form they find relevant. But there's another mechanism that I maybe would highlight on the local level as an example, and that is tripartite meetings where you have local between the those involved in the ground, meetings, where you address specific issues with technicalities, with pictures, with reports, with investigations, and you share it among the two parties and the peacekeeping operation. We have discussions on what does this mean, what are the implications? You try to reach an agreement. If not, issues are lifted to UN Headquarters. And that's a very strong mechanism, because that also creates trust, engagement and ownership among the local parties on the ground. Similar mechanisms like this are in play related to the situation in South Lebanon and on the ground. On your specific question, whether I've witnessed instances of the character that you mentioned during my two years in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the answer is no.

Hoge: John Hirsch.

John Hirsch: John Hirsch, IPI. First of all, let me say that I do think that UNTSO and these missions have played really important roles in the Middle East over all the years for 60-some-odd years. I wanted to ask you about, particularly with regard to South Lebanon, the capacity of UNTSO or UNIFIL to prevent another conflict. We had another speaker here, less than two weeks ago, who virtually predicted that there would be another war between Hezbollah if you wish, and the Israel government given the hostility of Hezbollah to Israel, its declared hostility, and the concern of Israel for its security. And as we all know, there was the war in 2006/2007 when UNIFIL was present. It was unable to prevent it. And in fact, UNIFIL was unable to get Israel to leave the southern border region until Israel finally decided to do so of its own accord. So I think it'd be useful, appreciate, if you could comment on, first of all, do you see the prospects between Lebanon and Israel now, particularly, a new government with a Hezbollah man as the prime minister apparently? And secondly, your capacity to prevent another conflict as distinct from watching it?

Mood: That's a familiar point I think for anyone who has been working the Middle East, and UNIFIL in particular. On the prospects, I want to once again reiterate that I do believe Michael Williams, probably also Robert Serry is a better position than what I am to give you qualified analysis on that. However, my observations are that since I was in Beirut on the 18th and 19th of January at the day when [Prosecutor Daniel A.] Bellemare handed over his preliminary recommendations to [Judge Daniel] Francine, the situation in Beirut was much calmer than what we were lead to believe by international media when I watched it in news that Hezbollah to call Beirut in the morning hours on that Tuesday. I was traveling in Beirut that morning and it was not very dramatic at all.

Leading on from that, what we believe we have seen is that when Hezbollah has mainly three dimensions: a resistance dimension, a social dimension, and a political dimension. During my period, we have seen a development in direction of the political dimension as the main effort to use military language. And the prospects of engagement of that dimension being such that the probability of adhering to military means, for example, as a diversion related to the tribunal is not very likely and is not seen to serve the interests of the organization neither by its supporters. What we see on the ground is also that, as far as we can judge, there are no preparations for employment of military means. This goes both for South Lebanon and for the Golan. So for what it's worth, in my view, my observation, we believe the Lebanese. And, once again, we'll find a political solution to a political crisis. The ability of UNIFIL to prevent conflict, as you know, we are Chapter 6, we are there to create time to allow for political solutions to

mature. Leading on from that is fairly obvious that if Israel wants to go to war with Lebanon, UNIFIL/UNTSO does not have the military capabilities to take a fight in that context. On the other hand, what I hear also when I discuss with my interlocutors among the IDF is that they appreciate and they see that the deterrent element of UNIFIL and the excellent work that the UNIFIL troops are doing, conducting on the ground every day, is stabilizing the situation in the south. So in that context, it indeed plays an important role in every day to be part of the de-escalation of incidents that could escalate into something bigger.

Hoge: Do you ever find yourself wishing that you were Chapter 7, not Chapter 6?

Mood: I'm a military guy, and I've traveled also Darfur. And I spent 2005 to 2009 working on Afghanistan issues. Obviously, you sometimes long for the big bat. But if you wanted to have a big bat in the Middle East and challenge the military forces that are there on the ground, it would have to be a very, very big. And I don't see neither a Security Council nor a General Assembly being close to argue for that kind of peacekeeping.

Hoge: Okay. Any other questions? Please, on the aisle there? And then--

Andre Listov: I'm Andre Listov from the Mission of the Russian Federation. My question is about the borderline of 1967. Well, a recent leak has just shown that the parties were not quite sure about this line. Is this line really distinct? Or maybe there's some gaps or blank points within the line? Thank you.

Mood: Well, thank you. The way I read the reference to these lines is that the... let me use the withdrawal line between Lebanon and Israel as an example. There, the distance in centimeters between the withdrawal line, the so-called Blue Line, and the armistice demarcation line, and you can also go further back to other lines, is not large at all in terms of centimeters. But in terms of formalities, it's very big. The difference between the withdrawal line and an internationally-recognized border is a very large step in terms of formalities. The difference between the armistice line and the '67 lines, the way I understand it, is that the '67 lines are defined by the forward position of military troops at the day. And they would have to be redefined, so to speak, where they were; while the armistice lines are there on the map. Obviously, I would say from an Israeli point of view, it's openly stated going back to the '49 line, is seen as not very attractive. And my point with saying that it could be a useful point of reference, is that it's not a dogmatic statement that the '49 lines is a recipe for any state or any future international border in the area. But it's easier to start with a point of reference when you're discussing the future than to start with fairly blank papers.

Hoge: Gentleman, the third row from the back?

Howard Stoffer: Thank you. Howard Stoffer from the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office. You mentioned UNDOF and UNIFIL. Of course, there's the MFO in the Sinai. And in the context of the efforts by the Fifth Committee in recent years to try to save resources on the UN side, I was just wondering what the size of your budget is now and the number of forces under your command, and how that's changed, say, in the last decade or so? I see I'm getting a Norwegian nod from you.

Mood: Well, thank you very much. Because that allows me the opportunity to say that it's a very, very modest mission in terms of money spent. I use about \$32 million US per year. And you can compare that with any other entity or mission in the UN system. And I don't think it's a very big number. The amount of observers on

the ground right now is 153, working in pairs, in a car driving, observing, reporting. If I may go back to my previous argument, an institute like this, and for that matter, the UN, I believe I have concluded should have a discussion about the core concepts of peacekeeping, peacebuilding reference. If you put in a small, unarmed observer mission, and you have mechanisms for dialog tactically on the ground, the incentives for taking ownership to the problem, taking ownership to the situations, finding solutions, rests with the players. And in most situations, only the players can find the good solutions, although they need some encouragement sometimes from the outside. If you put in a big military organization, like I said, of 25,000 people, division-plus with the tanks, and the airplanes and the helicopters and all the rest of it, very often the problem on the ground is projected on to that organization. And the parties use it and they manipulate it. And as I avoid the responsibility for progress and moving forward. So in that context, I would argue the case of classical peacekeeping, Chapter 6, with unarmed observers as a strong element rather than the robust, big military formations navigating the capabilities, the force commanders who aren't from the member states anyway.

Hoge: Any other questions? If not, I was about to ask a final question, but General Mood has just answered it before I asked it, which was the relevance, the importance of a small mission like his when you have so many larger missions. But let me just offer you the chance to make a final comment.

Mood: Thank you very much. I came yesterday evening. And I'm going to fly back again tomorrow evening. And I think it would be slightly unfair not to say two words about Egypt. As I think I said, UNTSO is the only peacekeeping operation present in Egypt. We have an office in Ismailia, Liaison Office, Cairo. And we do some patrolling still from Cairo and down to Taba, and up to Rafah, although it's limited. And because we don't have time for another 20-minute speech, I would simply submit that, the way I see it, the development in the Middle East should be followed very, very closely with concern. And what I've seen there in my two years in office is that the euphoria created by the new US administration coming in at the beginning of 2009, coupled with the Cairo speech, ironically enough, the euphoria and the expectations created was such that after one and half, two years, towards the end of my time when I did my regional discussion with the states in the mission recently, it has turned from euphoric optimism to disillusionment, much lower, going back to square one. And maybe in combination then with the expectations among the populations that this time, after the Cairo speech, we would really see some strong support, some strong incentives for change for the populations. And several dynamics are converging in the larger Middle East that creates a strong reason for concern. And I'd be surprised if this is not the beginning of something larger rather than just the end of a few days with unrest. Thank you.

Hoge: Can I just ask you one last question based on what you just said, your comment about the euphoria now become disenchantment to a level so the situation may be even worse now than it was before those expectations were raised. Does that mean you see this movement in Egypt eventually becoming anti-Western, which it does not seem to be yet, but it's always lurking behind it. I'll say one last thing on that: Mohamed Elbaradei yesterday in Tahrir Square actually faulted Obama for not having actually moved to persuade Mubarak to leave office. But your comments suggest that you think this will become anti-Western at some point. Am I hearing you right?

Mood: The basis for this part of my observation is that... well, let me tell you a small story again. And I won't tell you in which country it was. But it was not in the

country that is seen as the most democratic and open among my five host countries. I had a dentist job done. And I went to that dentist office several times. And there were some very nice young ladies who provided drinks upon arrival and massage after one-and-a-half hour in the dentist chair. So it was not exactly the Norwegian version of dentist office. But it was professional and good. And the point is, after some visits, I was talking and chatting with these young, well-educated females. And I asked them whether they were using social media, Twitter, YouTube, whether they were communicating with university students and friends on the other side of the globe in spite of some difficulties put into place on the Internet? And hey looked at me with surprise, and said, "Whatever block is there for us, we know exactly where to go to download the software that makes it possible to speak with any other youngster any other place in the world." And from that the optimism, the euphoria that was created in Cairo might actually, ironically, when it didn't materialize, have created a situation where the groups that we now have seen organizing themselves through the social media, they are creating a power from the inside that have the approach that well, it ain't going to happen. We have to do it ourselves. We have to do it ourselves. And then when it begins, you see other elements of society and the ordinary people following on. And it's way too early to predict exactly which way it's going to go. But the probability that it will turn anti-Western, that it will be a challenge to the flow of trade in Suez, and that it will have implications for the larger Middle East is indeed specific possibility the way I see it.

Hoge:

Well, I promise to get the address of that dentist office for all of you who want to know about. Gentlemen, let me first of all wish you well as you end this two years assignment. And thank you very much for coming and sharing your thoughts with us here at IPI.