



## IPI's Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Series Presents:

### “Ending the Conflict in Darfur: Time for a Renewed Effort”

**Featuring Dr. Ibrahim A. Gambari**  
*Joint Special Representative for the African Union and the United Nations  
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)*

**When:**

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**Where:**

International Peace Institute  
Trygve Lie Center for Peace, Security & Development

*Transcript edited by IPI*

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## TRANSCRIPT

Speaker: **H.E. Dr. Ibrahim A. Gambari**, *Joint Special Representative for the African Union and the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)*

Chair: **Mr. Warren Hoge**, *Vice President for External Relations, International Peace Institute*

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**Warren Hoge:**

Good afternoon. I'm Warren Hoge, IPI's Vice President for External Relations, and I'm delighted to welcome you to this latest event in IPI's SRSG series. Our guest today is Dr. Ibrahim A. Gambari, the Joint Special Representative for the African Union and the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, known as UNAMID. He will be speaking on “Ending the Conflict in Darfur, Time for a Renewed Effort.”

Ibrahim Gambari's appearance here is another high point in this series which IPI is pleased to put on in the interest of furthering a dialogue between the UN community in New York and key UN leaders with critical experience on the ground and in the field operating in a reality that can be distant from headquarters. Earlier this month, we had Ellen Margarethe Løj, the SRSG of Liberia, and next week we are hosting Ad Melkert, the SRSG for Iraq.

Now, I'm happy to say that I've known Ibrahim Gambari ever since I first arrived in Turtle Bay in December of 2003 to cover the UN for *The New York Times*. Many of our frequent conversations dating back to those days evolved around Ibrahim's oft-stated contention that the *Times* was not publishing stories about him with the frequency and prominence he deserved. Well, if I was, as he often joked, trying to suppress news of Ibrahim Gambari, this overwhelming turnout

today is proof of how unsuccessful I was.

In fact, it would be hard to neglect Ibrahim Gambari's many contributions to the UN, to the UN community, and before that to his own country, Nigeria. The range of jobs he has held is awesome. And among them are some of the UN world's most challenging and diplomatically delicate assignments like his present one or his post as special advisor to the Secretary-General on the International Compact with Iraq or his well-known--and may I add, highly publicized in *The New York Times*--mission as the UN's special envoy to Myanmar.

These are jobs that would grind most people down, but I've always known Ibrahim to be an undauntedly buoyant and exuberant presence. And remember this personable and refreshingly jocular man is also a distinguished scholar with a PhD from Columbia. Finally, Ibrahim is a good friend of IPI and we are honored to have him serve on our international advisory council.

UNAMID, which is one of the largest peacekeeping operations in history, was established in July 2007 and has as its core mandate the protection of civilians. It is also tasked with contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an exclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.

This January, the international community was cheered by the success of the referendum that was held in south Sudan. It was a centerpiece of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended 22 years of civil war between the north and the south.

But in the west, in Darfur, sporadic fighting has persisted, continuing a conflict that has estimated to have killed 300,000 civilians and displaced 2.5 million more. One of the very first stories I covered on my arrival here in December 2003 was the briefing by then-Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland, calling the humanitarian crisis in Darfur to the attention of the Security Council. Since then, the UN, along with the African Union, has become deeply involved in Darfur, and there have been moments of encouragement but just as many of despair.

Today, the hope is that this post-referendum environment might present a new opportunity, a "renewed effort" as the title of Ibrahim's talk today calls it, to try to produce a durable solution to the ongoing conflict. International diplomatic efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis have in recent years centered on negotiations in Doha between the government and armed groups in an attempt to broker a ceasefire and peace agreement.

Now, there is a Darfur-based initiative called the Darfur political process. And there is no one better able to tell us about it than Ibrahim Gambari. So Ibrahim, welcome back to New York, where you can see you were missed by many, many people. The floor is yours.

**Ibrahim Gambari:**

Thank you very much, my dear friend Warren Hoge. What he didn't tell you is when I complained about his neglect of me in *The New York Times* compared to my predecessor, he actually made good on it and came to chasing me to say Ibrahim, luckily not only are you in *The New York Times*, I even managed to put your picture there. So that's one up on my predecessor.

I also like to really recognize Ann Phillips, who's a fellow member of the board, advisory board, of IPI. And we always manage to send all kinds of notes between us during these meetings. I don't think you want to see those notes.

Your excellences, dear colleagues, and friends. I am genuinely pleased and

honored to be here today, as I know here in this audience are colleagues who have either been engaged in or currently embarking on the torturous road of leading peacekeeping operations in conflict zones in different parts of the world. Incidentally, also another correction to--I love to correct Warren--we are not one of the largest peacekeeping missions in the world, we are the largest international peacekeeping mission in the world. And when fully deployed--and we'll be almost there in another few months--we'll be at 31,000 military, police and civilian, and also the most expensive, at about 1.7 billion US dollars a year.

And I was at the ABACQ only yesterday, and I just managed to escape by very narrowly, because they want us to justify why I should have 1.7 billion in this environment of tight financial squeeze. But those who have been engaged in peacekeeping know that this is a very difficult and challenging calling, but is also one that is very gratifying, because very few people get a chance in a lifetime to be choosing to be part of this select group of people who have the honor and privilege to lead peacekeeping operations.

A common element of leading peacekeeping operations is the fact that each operation comprises numerous highly-complex and interconnected activities conducted in unique and dynamic circumstances in which countries and the societies will deem them... endeavor to transit from tragic conflict to durable peace. Yet, despite many challenges, peacekeeping missions constitute an important tool in the international community's range of responses to conflict and wars and to humanitarian crisis. While it is a privilege to lead one peacekeeping mission, SRSG, or, in my unique case, I have the distinction of being the only Joint Special Representative in the world, because I'm jointly appointed by Mr. Jean Ping and... Mr. Ban Ki-moon. Which means it's difficult for one or the other to fire me alone. Which I use to full advantage, by the way.

**Hoge:**

...It's also important that you remember both their names.

**Gambari:**

Absolutely. So... and we're also called the Hybrid Mission because, again, the uniqueness of my mission is that we're both United Nations and the Africa Union and some people mischievously call me a Hybrid Special Representative.

Traditionally, of course, peacekeeping has provided an important means through which ceasefire agreements, separation of forces, and warring party's compliance with peace agreements are monitored. Increasingly, however, since the advent of multidimensional operations, peacekeeping missions have also been tasked with, among others, protecting civilians, supporting the implementation of peace agreements and laying the foundation for durable peace in areas of human rights, rule of law and good governance. UNAMID, the African Union/United Nation Hybrid operation in Darfur, under my leadership, is one such multidimensional peacekeeping mission. Its primary mandate is to protect civilians, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the needy, and also support the peace process to resolve the Darfur crisis.

However, not only is UNAMID charged with the already challenging task of implementing such a complex mandate in a remote landlocked region, which is the size of France, with very little infrastructure, very few supply routes, little preexisting infrastructure, is also required to do so in an environment in which hostilities have not yet ended. And a political solution to the crisis has so far proven elusive.

In a real sense, therefore, we, UNAMID--we're a peacekeeping mission with no peace agreement to implement, with no peace to keep. Fortunately, as many of you are aware, and as Warren had mentioned, I never run away from challenges. That's why my friends think I'm actually a masochist. But nonetheless, I believe that, despite the challenges, the opportunities are there to try to make a difference to the wellbeing of the people of Darfur. And therefore my priority

number one is to help bring peace to the region as a matter of priority--just to stop the fighting, which has gone for too long, and where the people of Darfur have suffered too deeply and for too long. And that is why I believe that the prospects and challenges for renewed peace process in Darfur in a post-Sudan referendum environment is very, very critical and we must take advantage of that. Again if, since we are put under the Chatham House Rules, that nothing I say can be quoted. I was in Washington recently...

**Hoge:**

Actually, Ibrahim, we are not under Chatham House Rules.

**Gambari:**

Then I have to be careful. But anyway, this can go. I was asked in Washington recently what grade--as my other half as professor--what grade would I give the Obama administration in terms of their handling of Sudan. I said well if I may be allowed the privilege I would say in terms of the north-South issue referendum I think Obama administration can be given an A, but when it comes to Darfur I would give them an Incomplete. But, therefore, we must look at really what are the prospects for renewing the peace process in Darfur and to bring this fighting to an end.

They--let me look at a domestic political situation first. The referendum on the status of south Sudan was a seismic political event, one that has had far reaching consequences for both the north and the south. One of the perhaps unintended--but nevertheless very welcome--consequences has been the creation of the new opportunities for peace in Darfur. Here it is worth recognizing that the secession of south Sudan will effectively result in the creation of two new nations in Africa, not one. People tend to think it's one; we are going to have two new nations. For after the south secedes, the political economic and social landscapes of both the north and south Sudan will be irrevocably altered. So we have a new south Sudan but you have to also realize we are having - we are going to have to have a new north Sudan. This is motivating the ruling National Congress Party in the north to review its policies and adopt new approaches to dealing with instability in the peripheral regions such that there are now new prospect for renewed and reinvigorated Darfur peace process.

The central government is now more highly developed to reach peace in Darfur by in the first instance financial consideration. By stabilizing the situation in Darfur the government of Sudan can make savings in military spending and, more importantly, potentially, end years of international isolation and build reentry into the international trade and financial system. This is a strong and motivating factor for the government. Because of the need to compensate for the decrease in revenue from oil that will accompany separation come July.

The central government is also motivated by desire to preserve the territorial integrity of north Sudan post-secession, because already they will have lost by July 1/3 of their territory and 1/4 of the population. And because if they don't do that--they don't try to make unity attractive for the rest of Sudan, then it will rest in the hands of those who may be agitating for greater self-determination or worse for them to want to go to war with south Sudan. Although to be fair, very few Darfur opposition group have expressed a desire to secede at least not so far. As a result of these factors, the government is demonstrating a renewed focus on addressing the conflict in Darfur and instability in the region, especially in Darfur but also including south Kordofan Sun and Blue Nile. And they have to do this as a matter of urgency because July is not far. July is right around the corner. So I think this may have propelled them to adopt a new government strategy for peace in Darfur, continued engagement and legislations in Doha--they left Doha, came back, returned and they are still there as I speak, and I think a couple of days ago, President Bashir himself is going to Doha to try to see how the peace process there can gain a new momentum.

They also are pledged to review the constitution and their indications of a greater

willingness to make concessions to the people of Darfur as part of a popular consultation process, of which I will say more shortly.

Then let's look at international political situation. The prospect for renewed and invigorated approach to the Darfur peace process has also been bolstered by recent events in the international political arena. During the referendum period the international community focuses on and coordinated their efforts in Sudan to an unprecedented degree. As a result of this effort the referendum was had on time in a free and fair atmosphere and also a credible and peaceful environment, have since called upon the international regional community to sustain the level of engagement. Not to leave Sudan alone but therefore to direct the same kind of effort and energy which they placed on getting this peaceful and credible outcome referendum to turn it to Darfur.

And that is why in this connection I have heard several retreats for special envoys and other major stakeholders engaged in Darfur and Sudan issues. Including as recent as 18th of February in south Darfur whereby 18 delegations came. At this retreat, senior representatives have come to develop a shared understanding of the Darfur crisis and to identify common interests and areas of cooperation and coordination so that the international community can also help to harmonize their efforts to promote peace in Sudan, and also urge them to stay the course by redoubling their efforts to reach peace in the region, because the job in Sudan is not done simply because the referendum is completed and south Sudan is going to become a separate state.

That takes me then naturally to the Doha legislations. As I mentioned, the UNAMID is a very strange animal. It's not only hybrid mission, it's not only deployed before there's peace agreement to implement, it's also separated peacekeeping from the peacemaking. I'm in charge of peacekeeping. But somebody else, somewhere else is in charge of the peacemaking. It's unprecedented. So in Doha you have the government of Qatar providing the environment for another jointly appointed mediator called Mr. Bassolé, jointly appointed by the African Union and the UN to lead the peace process. My role is to support him, but he takes the lead.

So of course I could wait and just say well let them just finish the peace agreement and then I'll implement. But I think that would be unwise because we might give an agreement that is difficult to implement so I have to inject myself I've been there partially for about nine times trying to hold the hands of the movement, the government, the Qataris, the joint mediator to try to give a push. And the joint mediator Mr. Bassolé--and his team--has done an excellent job. But I've been doing this for about almost two and a half years now. The negotiation keeps going on initially between the government and the JEM, justice and equality movement, and another movement called the liberation and justice movement under two different leaders. At the beginning there used to be about 15 or 16 movements. They keep subdividing, like amoeba.

And before Doha, the only peace agreement on the books was a so-called DPA--not to be confused with the Department of Political Affairs--Darfur peace agreement, but signed only by one of the armed movement which is the SLA Abdul Wahid. As you know, those of you who followed this closely, they've been going on negotiating in Abuja for DPA, and it kept going on until somebody said, maybe the best way to quickly make an agreement is to remove the delegates from the five-star hotel in Abuja and put them in a two-star hotel. And it worked. They quickly reached the agreement soon afterwards. I had the merit to suggest the same to the Qataris, that maybe after two-and-a-half years we should move the armed movements to a two-star hotel. The problem is in Doha there are no two-star hotels.

**Hoge:**

They start with five.

**Gambari:**

They start with five and go up. But I think people are getting increasingly frustrated and impatient that we cannot go on like this, because all the armed movement leaders are outside of Darfur, but the people of Darfur are suffering. There are 1.8 million internally displaced people in Darfur. In a region of about 7 million, that's too high a proportion. The civil society, the women, the children who suffered the most from this war are demanding an end to protracted negotiations. We've tried, for example, to move the civil society, to transport them to Doha's so to put pressure on the armed movements.

So that's what I say we, UNAMID, transported at different times for civil society at least twice... and even now as I speak there's going to be another meeting supposedly, hopefully, on the 18th of April, when the mediators think they are very close to agreement like never before. And they're asking me to transport 500 civil society groups, and I'm a bit nervous about doing that because how am-for how they going to take from Darfur to elsewhere to go and discuss the future of their country. Okay how about newly-elected officials--you had in April 88 elected members of the national assembly. There are 144 elected assembled men in the three states of Darfur. Are we going to take all these elected people--take them to Doha again to discuss the future of their country? So it's becoming increasingly difficult. Of course, if I'm ask to do it, I have no choice, by one of my two bosses. But it would bring me to the issue that I'm going to discuss in a minute that isn't it time to move the center of gravity of the peace discussions from Doha to Darfur where the people are suffering on a daily basis, but I'll come to that in a minute.

But meanwhile I have again taken the initiative as Joint Special Representative to meet with the rebel leaders. I met with the Khalil Ibrahim who is the leader of JEM, militarily the most significant movement. Three times in Tripoli. I've met with [PH] Abdul Togenes several times in Doha, and Abuja to meet with Abdul Wahid who is leading the SLA Abdul Wahid. I chased him to France twice, I chased him to - where was the last, Kampala, because I feel that to be a neutral body, you know, it has to be close to the government, I have no choice but to be close to the government, I have no apologies for that, because if you have 31,000 people in somebody else's country, you have to be close to those whose primary responsibility it is to guarantee your security. But at the same time I reach out constantly to all the leaders of the movements.

Now, and this takes me to again how to transit from Doha to a Darfur-based political process which we call DPP. Now, let me say this to be very clear. Some of the critics of the Darfur-based political process they have two major criticisms, or three. One, they say this is part of a government strategy to divide and rule--continue to rule in Darfur. Well, they may have their own views about the strategy--it's their country--but the Darfur-based political process is not an extension of the government of Sudan, strategy is a strategy developed by the African Union and blessed by something called the Sudan Consultative Forum of Stakeholders who says UNAMID and the African Union High Level Panel chaired by President Mbeki should walk together to launch this Darfur-based political process. So it's not an extension of the government's agenda.

Second criticism that we often get is that, well, there's no liberal environment. How can you talk about Darfur-based political process, they argue, when, you know, people who have no freedom of speech, no freedom of assembly, arbitrary arrest, the emergency decrees are still going. No, that's legitimate observation, but the idea is, in fact, to them, work to create their liberal environment which would make the Darfur-based political process a credible one and the outcome to be legitimate.

The third criticism--and I'll come to that--is that aren't we going to have two parallel processes. And therefore encourage the armed movements to what I

call forum shopping. If they don't like Doha they come to Darfur, if they don't like Darfur. There's nothing further from the truth. The idea of the Darfur-based political process is to take whatever happens in Doha, whatever the outcome, and let DPP support for it internally, enrich the document, and that is essentially what the Darfur political process is about.

Nonetheless, I mustn't give the impression that all is well for to launch the Darfur political process. It's not. For us the challenge is the liberal environments to which I refer. The government's role is not to interfere in the Darfur political process, but to get the NGOs together, civil society, IDPs, women's group, even the dreaded Arab nomadic Janjaweed--everybody who has a role to play or has played a role positively or negatively should be involved in coming together to chat the future of their country, otherwise that's the only way you can sustain the peace. Not what is decided in Doha by itself, by the armed elements, important as they are. But the armed elements are not the only people in Darfur. So, but for this to be credible, then the government must immediately lift the state of emergency, they have to walk with us to create, to remove all restriction of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom from arbitrary arrest. And so that's a major challenge, and both the African Union High Level Panel and UNAMID, we are working together to try to address that.

Second major challenge is the fighting. Right now there's still no peace agreements. The only signature to the Darfur peace agreement, which I referred earlier, signed in Abuja, has walked out, declared himself a rebel, the government declared him a legitimate target to attack, and there's been renewed fighting--very severe in December--where between the forces of Minawi and the government where we have an estimated between--we have to be careful about figures--30,000 to 50,000 newly-displaced people. Also, in Jebel Marra, which is part of the... partly in the north, in the south, to the west, and when fighting that limited the access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. So my challenge or the challenge of UNAMID is to stop the fighting. Particularly in Jebel Marra, which has not been accessible for months, almost a year, and we're making some progress in that regard.

But the third major challenge is how the government can regain trust and confidence of its own people. And that means they have to do things to make... to promote the evidence of peace. You know, build roads, wells, you know, do things that will ingratiate them to the people. Address the issue of impunity, because many of the kidnapping attacks, even including the peacekeepers, go unpunished. The judicial system needs overhauling because the people of Darfur by and large don't have trust and confidence in the judicial system. And in this... therefore, UNAMID has been working closely with the international NGOs, UN country team, on programs of early recovery and development. They are in the lead. That's our primary responsibility, but we are supportive, we use within our assets what we can do to dig wells and to build access roads, to help people return to a state of normality.

Also, at the local level we are trying to work with communities to enhance traditional system of justice and reconciliation. Because there are those traditional systems they have broken down and we're trying our best to try to put that back together. Because the people will tend to have more confidence in traditional systems until the modern systems are fixed. Also at the local level we're planning a major international conference on water resources. Why water? Because water or the stresses of it on the poor, distribution of it is at the one of the core reasons for this conflict. And we think by adding to the quantity and improving the management of water that water can also become an instrument of peace.

Let me come to some conclusions so that we'll give a lot more time to discussion. I have just simply highlighted some of the key issues that we may wish to

discuss. So I have attempted in this presentation to provide an overview of the positive referendum political situation in Sudan and how this affects the prospect for a renewed Darfur peace process. As I said the prospect for advancing the peace process are encouraging. The government is expressing a renewed commitment towards doing so. And we're working to ensure that this translates into actions which address the root causes of the prolonged conflict.

The international community has also been very engaged in Sudan, and we need to remain so in order to ensure the maintenance of the momentum. The people of the region have known conflict, they have known insecurity, they have endured for too long and are looking for a renewed impetus in the peace process. Some armed movements are participating in the negotiations and demonstrating a willingness to reach an agreement. Others, particularly SLA Abdul Wahid and now the Minawi faction, are not part of the negotiation and are continuing to fight.

I am continuing, on behalf of UNAMID, my engagement with them, and strongly urge these groups who have not entered the peace process to do so. Okay. And those who have entered the peace process to be engaged in a lot more serious and time-bound manner. Now, you recall I mentioned earlier in my presentation that there was a time there were about 18 different armed movements. Now there are more or less three or four major ones. Now there's even an official united armed movements, Minni Minawi, JEM, LGM, and SLA Abdul Wahid. I happened, when I went to Jebel Marra about two weeks ago, I met with the commanders of these unified armed movement and I told them I'm in support of unity but please unite for peace and not for the continuation of war. Because your people are the ones that are suffering.

Now, having given my own view about the prospect for peace, I think it's only fair to say that there are many, many, many, many challenges that remain. This includes a need to maintain a suitable enabling environment for the Darfur-based political process and the belligerent parties to cease fighting. UNAMID is working to ensure these challenges are mitigated to the greatest extent possible.

And among the challenges to the referendum, there are three key actors in the referendum just concluded: the government of south Sudan, the government in Khartoum, and the international community. The prospects are good that the momentum created as a result of their collaboration led to peaceful outcome. But on the downside, we have to look at the challenges. For example, if the government in Khartoum were to conclude that they cannot afford another south Sudan, and therefore, no concessions, and repression is the answer, that will only set us back. If the government of south Sudan were to harbor armed elements because for whom--with whom they have historic ties, that's why they always call SLA or SLM, this and that--they have historic ties. If they were to try to maintain that, in order to support armed continuation, arms struggle in Darfur, it can only complicate, make a very bad security situation even worse.

I've had public declaration by Salva Kiir, who I met personally when I went to Juba, he assured me he was not going to allow his territory to use to de-stabilize Darfur or de-stabilize it further. And I told him as a brother to say, you see you don't need... you are going to have a new nation, you don't need to engage in destabilizing someone else. Because they can do the same and you will suffer more. And by the way the north has a lot more experience in the de-stabilization then you will have or even more capacity.

And then on the part of the armed movement, they can also conclude that, well, the way to go is not to negotiate now, but to wait until after the referendum when the government in Khartoum will be weak. And the international community needs to take account of what is happening in North Africa, because they could conclude that perhaps what they should be trying to get is not a peace in Darfur but a regime change in Khartoum. So there all these possibly very negative, but

I hope that the positive momentum and that is created by this successful referendum will gain the upper hand.

Then also I believe that it is very important that UNAMID meanwhile continues commanded protection of civilian population and have adopted a new robust approach to do so. I must confess to you again, in the spirit of transparency, in the past when we do our patrols to act for protection, to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, we inform the government, but we often had a self-censorship. In other words, we tell them we're going here and wait for them to give us permission. So now I've told my people, no more permission sought, no permission. We have a mandate, we have status of forces agreement, we're going to go. And if they stop us we have to try to force our way.

Now, I also made it clear to members of the Security Council that I'll be robust in the pursuit of our mandate, but I'll not be reckless, because we're a peacekeeping mission, chapter seven from the IMS and the African mission up to now we have lost 47 peacekeepers, 27 of them Nigerians, 17 of them Rwandans, 2 of them Egyptians. And there's one that's as late as June last year. We're not going to be reckless, but we're going to be robust, because we have to give people a sense of security so that some of them can begin to help create pockets of stability, people can begin to return to their home, because I've also submitted, and I get into trouble for saying this, that having 1.8 million people in IDP camps is an unnatural situation. We must not make the supernatural natural. We have to help create conditions for them to voluntarily return. But to do that they need security, because they are running away from insecurity, they need some social services, health and education, and then need a means of livelihood. So we hope that the international community will also help the government of Sudan for whom it's the primary responsibility to take those measures that will facilitate a voluntary return of the IDPs to their homes and also facilitate early recoveries and development.

In conclusion, peacekeeping in Darfur continues to present daunting challenges, but it is equally and extremely important undertaking, and I'm honored to serve as a head of this hybrid African Union mission. I also delight a great deal of pride for the many dedicated women and men who serve under me in Darfur who walk in what are often very dangerous and hazardous conditions, and continue to remain there. We have the case as an illustration of István Papp, the Hungarian member of our staff who was kidnapped for 61 days. I went to receive him when he was released and you know what he told me, I was so deeply upset. "Mr. GSR. I'm back, I'm ready to report to work and return to my duties." So I said well, thank you very much, but you go and see your family first and come back in about a month's time. But that kind of dedication from somebody who was held hostage, I saw clips of his captivity. It is horrendous, is awful, and the first thing he says is I'm ready to go back. So how can you not be proud of leading such a group of men and women who are risking their lives and paying the ultimate sacrifice constantly?

But we are encouraged because we know that the people of Darfur, of Sudan, of Africa and indeed of the whole world are relying on us to fulfill our responsibility to protect the people of Darfur. To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to improve the prospect for peace in a land that has experienced conflict and strife for too long. I shall continue to count, of course, on the continued engagement and support of the international community, represented by many of you who are here, in making UNAMID a very successful hybrid operation that fulfills a mandate.

And then ending with something also very controversial, and I hope that my people in DPKO will not chastise me for this. I believe that the future of international peacekeeping in Africa is in the hybrid mission, where the Africans and the United Nations are working together to create peace and security,

because if you leave it to the UN alone, well, then you take the African off the hook. You do it. We have no commitment or responsibility. It's your responsibility. But if we get the Africans committed to the success of operation jointly mounted by the UN, then you can at least hold them accountable for this. And then if they don't fulfill their part, they will be letting down their own people. But of course, that is just my own personal opinion. Let me end there. Thank you very much.

**Hoge:**

Thank you Ibrahim. That was very informative and helpful. I'm going to go for questions in a second, but I just have two or three of my own that I thought of as you were talking.

One of them you mentioned frequently NGOs and I wanted to ask you about the state of the NGO world in Sudan. Two years ago this month, the government said it was going to expel a dozen NGO groups. Did it--are these representative of those groups who were back there who stayed there, or are they different groups? That's one question.

A second question arises when you talked about the importance of water, and, in doing some of the research for today, Ibrahim, I ran across some figures that said that food insecurity was as high as 40% of the displaced population, and I just want to ask you if that's something also that you confront and can deal with. And then the third thing I wanted to ask you was about the reports we get from time to time about attacks on humanitarian workers. What's the status of that right now? Are you able to protect them more than you were able to before?

**Gambari:**

Thank you for those very easy questions. With friends like him... no, but let me try to respond to this, and then we'll take some more.

First, there was an unfortunate development before my time when several NGOs were expelled by the government of Sudan. Now don't forget that the Sudanese government never wanted any international presence at all. They rejected a Security Council resolution establishing a pure UN mission. They rejected it. So they accepted UNAMID because if they insisted it has to be African-led and most of the troops have to be Africans. So-- and this is very important because, again, speaking to you frankly, we in the UN, we are used to sending peacekeeping operations to countries that are... states that have collapsed or are collapsing. Where there are no strong state institutions, no police, no intelligence and security services, I mean, I'm talking about Liberia, Sierra Leone, to some extent even DRC.

Now, you may disagree with the policies of Sudan or with Bashir, but, or you might say ultimately it's a--it's not a strong step, but as we speak, they have an army, they have the national intelligence and security services. And they're very, very proud of their sovereignty. And so whenever they feel that their sovereignty is being compromised, you're going to get a push back. And one of the pushbacks was to expel the NGO, international NGO's operating again before my time.

I think it's unfortunate because I think NGOs should be seen as providing services for the people of Darfur. They may not... the armed movement may be against the government, but the people of Darfur need help and they should be allowed. But it also means an obligation on the part of INGOs to do nothing that will compromise their... why they're there.

We've set up a mechanism, myself as head of UNAMID, the UN country team and the government to say that we... if they were to decide to expel any NGO, the three of us should be present to discuss. Put the charges against them that you have on the table. Now that doesn't always work, but it's there, so when they do it contravening, what we have established, we're saying to them that, well,

look you're violating an agreement that we have reached. And we use that successfully, the CRS, Catholic Relief Service. They were expelled, but as I speak they are back because of the strong push. There's something called the MDM, they were expelled from, I believe, south Darfur. We're still working on that. Of course you try to cover the shortfall in the work of the NGO's that were expelled by saying why don't you use the national NGOs. Well, they are there, but often they don't have the capacity and they cannot--they don't have the resources to do whatever they need.

But about the water and food insecurity. Here is a problem, the scarcity of water. One of the root causes of conflict in Darfur was over water, over distribution, over the water management. Now whatever anybody can do to increase the quantity of water and a fairer distribution, I believe that we should do it. And that's why I've encouraged almost all the contingents that have the capability to bring their water drilling equipment. We have the Chinese engineering company they are doing that. Thailand, they're doing that. So as we increase the amount of water, because we have to remember, we're taking their water that is scarce. When you have 31,000 foreigners, you know, in Darfur, so the least you can do is at least replenish the water that you are taking, and to add more. And this also contributes to the food insecurity, to feed 1.8 million people on a daily basis. No wonder there's food insecurity, and I'm arguing--again I get criticized--this is not sustainable. For how long are we going to continue to count on the generosity of the international community to continue to feed 1.8 million people? We should support a program of voluntary return with all the condition that are mentioned because this is unnatural and will only contribute to the food insecurity.

Finally, on the attack on humanitarian community: it is real, and it's also potential. Because they are also attacking us, you know. I mentioned to you that we have lost 47 soldiers, but because of the robust approach that we are now pursuing the attacks on peacekeepers are less and the attacks on humanitarian community is much fewer. Because now we are saying we're not going to be sitting duck...we're not going to look for trouble, but as a Nigerian, we have an expression, if... we are not to look for trouble. If trouble troubles you, you must trouble trouble. So we're saying, if you attack us, we are going to respond. And when they kill three of our peacekeepers in June, Rwandans, we retaliated and inflicted an equal if no more damage. We're not going to look for trouble, but we think it's important to show that we can protect ourselves and protect the humanitarian community, otherwise the confidence of the people in us for protecting them will be greatly diminished.

**Hoge:** I have a question in the third row here.

**Erin McCandless:** Hi, thank you for your great presentation, very informative. I'm Erin McCandless. I'm with the new school and consulting with the PBSO. I have two questions. The first is related to the DPP and I'm hoping you can say a little bit more about it. The process, agenda, timeline of the Darfur political process and if you can say anything more about that and also its relationship specifically the Doha process. So will it go ahead even if the Doha process doesn't result in final agreements?

And secondly, I have a question about social services and security around the IDPs--that's very interesting that you mentioned a lot of agencies, in particular, looking at the relationship between social service and peace building. And this is actually within a peacekeeping context, so I'm interested if you could say a little bit more about that, what would be the peacekeeping mission's role in supporting social services in this respect and are you including it in benchmarking for example. Thank you.

**Hoge:** Ibrahim, I saw so many hands I'm going to take about three or four at once, so take notes. Ann Phillips is next.

**Ann Phillips:** Thank you. Thank you so much for your presentation Ibrahim, and it's so wonderful to have you back in New York. And I think you've been in Darfur long enough, I think we all want you back in New York permanently.

**Gambari:** Me too.

**Phillips:** My question really isn't about the substance--I'm curious, in view of what you've, your explanation about evicting the humanitarian organizations, the NGOs. For a couple of years it was an enormous amount of publicity and notoriety about Darfur. There were public figures speaking about it, celebrities on television all the time raising money and talking about Darfur. I'm interested to know: was that productive for you or did that also provoke Bashir and Khartoum, to do a little pushback also the way he reacted to the NGO's?

**Hoge:** Ann, if you'll pass the microphone to this gentleman.

**Tekeda Alemu:** Thank you. Thank you. I thought it was a wonderful presentation. I was not expecting any less. I have...

**Hoge:** Can I ask you to identify yourself just for the sake of the recording?

**Tekeda:** My name is Tekeda I'm the Ethiopian Ambassador here.

**Hoge:** Thank you.

**Tekeda:** Two comments and two questions. The comments are essentially commendations really. I agree fully with what you said in connection with how important it is that the north-south relationship is maintained. We believe the countries of the region, EGAT, the AU--we believe there is a symbiotic relation between the two. One cannot thrive by taking advantage of the other. Therefore I think you are absolutely right in indicating that.

Then the other comment I have is with respect to what you said about the relationship between the UN and the AU and about this hybrid experiment. I think there you are absolutely right as well. Now the other point where I agreed with you fully is with respect to what you said about the peace process coming back to Darfur. We have never understood why this process, the Doha process, has continued until now. There is just no reason why this should be extended, it should come back. This is the opinion of more or less the region and the sentiment within AU.

Now coming to the questions... but, by the way, apparently President Bashir has delayed his visit to Doha.

**Gambari:** So it's not...

**Tekeda:** That's what I heard. Perhaps he was supposed to go today. No, but he was supposed to be there yesterday. Apparently he's scheduled to be there tomorrow. I don't know whether this has to do with the--what you indicated and what I just said in connection with the Doha process.

The question I have is, what do you think might or will be the impact of the latest development in North Africa, in Libya, on the peace process in Doha? Have you seen any indication that this process might affect the process negatively, positively, or it hasn't had any impact? Thank you.

**Hoge:** We'll take a fourth question from my colleague Pim Valdre and then I have four more after that.

**Pim Valdre:**

Thank you. I'm Pim from International Peace Institute. Professor Gambari, you spoke about the post-referendum period now as a possibility to regain momentum and revitalize the peace process. One of the still outstanding issues before the proclamation of independence in July this year is the issue of Abyei and I'm wondering what impact you see on the peace process if this issue remains unresolved.

And secondly, you also mentioned that ultimately there is no military solution to the crisis in Darfur and that we need a political solution and a win-win atmosphere for all the parties to come to the negotiation table. Can you speak a little bit more about the incentives you see that could be brought in to the picture to make sure that we have a sustained process moving forward? Thank you.

**Hoge:**

By the way, I want to tell you, Ibrahim, since you are on our advisory council, we at IPI agree emphatically with you that the referendum vote is the beginning of a process, not the end. And so we have already held meetings and we're going to hold some more on different aspects of how that would be put into effect and we've had both the Ambassador of Sudan here, we've had representatives of the south Sudanese government from Washington here as well. Anyway, if you can take those four questions and answer them, and I've then got four more.

**Gambari:**

Well the first is three or more questions in one. The DPP, the Doha and also how we're going to conserve the primary responsibility of UNAMID for protection with involvement in early recovery and development. The DPP is the Darfur-based political process. It's become very controversial. And frankly speaking I am puzzled, because how can anybody argue against a process that has to be brought in beyond the armed elements, who are operating outside of the country. The leadership of their movement, Abdul Wahid, was in France until recently, Khalil Ibrahim in Tripoli and before that in Chad. So it is important not to replace Doha. This is not the competition between a Darfur-based political process and the negotiation between the government of Sudan and the armed movement. Because obviously they're the ones doing the fighting, so we have to if we want a cease-fire, you have to talk to the armed element.

But I am arguing that peace is far too important to be left to the armed movement and the government alone. The people of Darfur who are the ones ultimately suffering should be involved. So it's a complement to Doha. It is not a replacement for Doha. But you cannot--and this getting back to colleague, my brother, the Ambassador to Ethiopia--this Doha cannot continue indefinitely, it's two-and-a-half years now, you know, and every time they would say on one more month, then one more month, one more month, you know. So fortunately for me, as this hybrid Special Representative, I have a letter from my boss - two bosses signed. You see they are going to, very soon, make an objective assessment of Doha and conclude one way or the other. I'm waiting, and the DPKO people are here, so please tell... and the AU is here, too. I'm waiting for instructions because I, we cannot begin and this answers your question. We cannot begin the Doha political process until Doha is finished because otherwise it will be rival process, and then people can choose one or the other. They are complementary. But we cannot wait forever because it's suffering.

But at the same time we don't want to just do the Darfur-based political process for the sake of it. It has to be done properly, organized properly, the right people must participate. They must be free to express their opinion; they must not be arrested after leaving. So this is the position. So I just waited. The sequence will not be a parallel process, it is to be sequential, but, too, absolutely, when I say we, the people of Darfur. And actually when I say the people, I am one, I live in al-Fashir.

And thank you, Ann--I also want to come back. My family's here. But I cannot leave until at least we see some launching of the Darfur political process and the

launching of this water conference. Then this will be my home and then I can resume my job as a member of the advisory committee on--I mean advisory board--on IPI.

But similarly I don't think Terje Larsen actually - Terje doesn't always like me to come back because I recall when I was head of DPA I used to tell people I am twice the boss of Rød-Larsen. One as head of DPA I was his boss in his role as special envoy on Resolution 59, and secondly, as IPI board member. Don't repeat that. It's bad enough to say that anyone's my boss let alone to be a boss twice.

But seriously there is some important work to be done, and it's doable. And is similarly on the protection that's going to be the primary responsibility of... that will never change. But we think that part of protection in the larger sense is to create a climate that is conducive for people to lead to return to a normal life. We're beginning to see small window of opportunity where some people are leaving from south Darfur to west Darfur--trickle, about 2,000 at the moment and another 2,000 are getting ready, but at least it a sign that's something's happening, you know, if people are willing to at least consider moving rather than just... I want to stop the fighting so we don't add more to the ranks of internally displaced.

And on the celebrity, whether it's counterproductive or productive. I think the jury's still out on Darfur. I think they did a good job to draw attention to an otherwise forgotten strife. But I think they must know when to take the backseat and let the protagonists get on with it. If you notice that even on north-south in the end, it was President Bashir and Salva Kiir. In the end, it was the military of both sides who say enough to war. In the end, it was civil society in both. In the end, it was the international community, African Union, the UN, the United States, we have to give credit that helped to bring that. So I think we have reached a situation now whereby we don't need any more celebrities in Darfur, they've done their work. Now let the people who are fighting do their work to stop the fighting and let the African Union and others have a peace argument that is blessed by the domestic environment.

**Phillips:**

So you didn't get any pushback?

**Gambari:**

No I don't - I do not... certainly the behavior, or the perceived misbehavior of the INGOs that is responsible for, say, the expulsion, but even that we're trying to put mechanisms in place so that they cannot be falsely accused and wrongly expelled.

On the comments by the Ethiopian Ambassador, my friend and brother--very well noted. North Africa, the impacts on the peace process in Darfur--it's probably still a little bit early to tell, except that President Bashir said that... he's just been elected in April last year, and he said I'm not going to run for another term. So, I mean, something is registering. But in terms of the fighting capacity of the armed movement, the one that is most likely to be affected is Khalil Ibrahim because he's in the... you remember that he was expelled from Chad, and that country contributed to peace in west Sudan, now is at... we don't know where he is, exactly, in Tripoli. If he has to leave, that would be a second setback. And it may negatively affect the capacity of his troops.

But more significantly in my view is that the image of Africans and the government is alleging that it's Khalil Ibrahim forces, JEM, being used as mercenaries by the government of, Qaddafi's government, is not a good one because it endangers the life of Africans, ordinary Africans who are just doing their business in North Africa. But whether or not all of what was happening to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, how it would play out in Sudan--I'm afraid it's still a bit too early to tell. Finally the... but it may come sooner than any of us realizes. Who

thought this dramatic incident will happen in North Africa, in Egypt and in Libya so far?

On the unresolved issues, Abyei--well, insofar as it poisons the atmosphere between the north and the south, it's not good. Because they need the conclusion by the north is that you cannot trust the south and they're to be destabilized. If the conclusion from the south of Sudan is, to say you cannot trust the north they are trying to destabilize us, let's take an insurance policy by destabilizing them. In Darfur that's going to be very negative, but I think what we need to do is to get them to resolve their unresolved issues and try to divorce this, you know, from the problems of Darfur. Now, yes, there's going no military solution to the problem in Darfur because if they could have been, they should have been, and there would have been.

But the incentive to move is what I have briefly mentioned, that on the part of the government, they cannot afford another south Sudan. Because what would be left of the country? Also the money to continue war is not going to be there, not in the same amount. But I'm not yet so sure that incentive on the part of armed movement is as clear-cut, because some in fact say, well, there's now a precedent of leaving. But I hope that conclusion will not be drawn because I think there's room for, up until now, to decentralize for power sharing, for wealth sharing, for addressing the issue of marginalization and the root causes of the conflict to keep Darfur part of what is left of Sudan after July.

**Hoge:** I have a question in the second row and then Tête António after that.

**Sorosh Roshan:** Good afternoon and thank you. My name is Sorosh Roshan, I'm a medical doctor. And I was honored to be invited to go to Sudan to work on my signature mission, which is maternal health. I had the privilege of meeting with very many progressive and proactive women of Sudan. We were hosted in Union Women Sudanese place, and we also were invited to the office of the president, and we had a meeting with the Vice President. So to answer Warren's question, as a NGO, we were really treated regally. We followed the protocols although we had many invitations to go to different parts of Sudan, including Darfur which I'm still getting invitations but we were advised not to go. This was end of December, just last December and early January. My question is, Dr. Gambari, are you calling upon the energy and force of women of Sudan as mothers, daughters, sisters and use their effort to bring peace as it has happened in other countries? Thank you.

**Hoge:** Could you pass the mic to Tête António? No right in front of - there you go. And Tête António will you identify yourself please for the...

**Tête António:** My name is Tête António I'm the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the UN. Now, I would just like to - you understand, I may not ask a lot of questions of Professor Gambari, with whom we have been working very closely. I think I have to pay tribute to him and to his colleague for the work that they're doing in a very difficult environment, and I should be the testimony of how he handles his two, his particular status of a joint representative. He's very present in Addis Ababa and is very present in New York as well. I don't know how he managed but he-- I think he still has a lot of lessons to teach to others. Well, I see in Professor Gambari a vivid testimony for the qualitative change in the cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations in the field of peacekeeping operations. We went from the African peacekeepers in Burundi to the field hybrid meeting and mission, so I can see, Professor Gambari, we are not going to retire from your status as professor. We still have a lot to teach on what's a very qualitative change.

I would like to come back to a reference made by Professor Gambari on the need to direct the energy we had--well, we still need energy in south Sudan, but we

need to direct some of those energies to Darfur also. This has been an advantage of the south Sudan, you having a fragile environment while having a new set coming, it won't be in advantage of south Sudan as well. So I think with this session is very important.

Now, I do also would like to agree with him and to thank him for explaining very clearly the Darfur-based political process which has been misunderstood somehow in some parts of the world, but I think the explanation given by Professor Gambari is a very clear one.

Now, but I still would like to see Professor Gambari may be coming back to this question of this very unique experience of having peacemaking and peace operations in a separate way. Which lessons Professor Gambari would you like to... lessons learned on this approach, because we are not at the end of our journey, and conflicts may come again. We can really benefit from his experience or not. I think lessons learned are very important at this stage. Thank you.

**Hoge:** Ibrahim can you respond to those two questions now?

**Gambari:** Absolutely. Let me take the last set of questions first. The first, Ambassador Tété António, as many of you may know, he's the head of the African Union Mission here, and a part owner of this enterprise called UNAMID. The lessons learned. Lesson number one is never accept to be a junior partner. It is true that for the AU they... the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. That is clear in the charter. I forgot, Article 33, I'm not sure. Anybody has the charter here, that the Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and we must hold them accountable for that.

I was here as an ambassador of my own country, Nigeria, when Liberia first started as a country, and they didn't want to touch it because they said, this is an internal matter, remember this is just the post-cold war era, and I said to them--I said, I read my charter, and it didn't say the Security Council has primarily responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security except when it comes to Africa. If you tell me that is in there somewhere--okay fine. So you have that responsibility, and it's global, and of course this is only global intergovernmental body we have at UN.

But once the AU agrees to this hybrid mission it must be a full partner, both in terms of responsibility and in terms of privilege. Why do I say that, that it has to be a full partner? I'm summoned by the Security Council anytime to come and give reports, you know. But hardly am I by summoned by the African Union. So I have to summon myself. I said, whether you like it or not I'm coming because you're a partner of this enterprise. I'm coming to give you reports, you know. Also, the Security Council of the UN has come to visitors, the ACABQ, the Fifth Committee--there was a time I had four under-secretary-generals at once visit me in Darfur. I had peacekeeping, Valerie Amos, security...who was the fourth one... the Department of Field Supports. So I said to the AU, I want you to also keep coming, you know, at the high level so that to show your commitment. But even more importantly--and also, publish your own reports. Publish your own reports. Why is it that it's only the Security Council reports that is the subject of discussion? Publish your own report, this is how you see things.

And finally, but even more significantly, lessons learned. Don't ever separate peacemaking from peacekeeping. You know, it is very unusual. As I said, you saddle UNAMID with peacekeeping when there is no peace to be kept, there is no peace agreement and then you give the peace agreement making into somebody else, somewhere else. It just creates--fortunately I have good personal relationship with the chief mediator and we're both jointly appointed.

But still you can't base this on personal relationships. So that's lessons learned.

On the other question about your contribution to maternal health. First of all, come to Darfur, I will guarantee your safety and security. You can hold me accountable for that. And I think the more people come, the more they see that not all of Darfur is at war. The war is not over, but not all of Darfur is at war. And we have to encourage areas where there's peace, let's encourage with some visits, some assistance, some peace dividends to tell other guys that if you stop fighting these are the benefits you will get. So you will be very welcome.

On the role of the women, I cannot agree with you more, and UNAMID under my leadership--we've actually just inaugurated a women's parliamentary caucus. All the women legislators who've been elected in the national assembly and the state assemblies we inaugurated them in al-Fashir to tell the Darfurians we recognize the special role and importance of women. But not just in parliamentarians--all the women, NGO's, national NGO's, IDP's, we're in touch with them constantly. Because they suffer the most whenever there are conflicts like this, and they should also be encouraged with part of the peace process, because that's the only way that it can endure.

**Tiferet Unterman:** Thank you very much. I'm from the Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN, Tiferet. I'm curious if you could please give some more details about the water conference you mentioned. And also, what solutions they're exploring other than the drilling to address that issue, and how you foresee international community involvement?

**Hoge:** And then a question on the left here.

**Suliman Baldo:** Suliman Baldo, I'm with the International Center for Transition and Justice. My question to Ambassador Gambari is about the relationship between the Doha process and the Darfur political process. What is going to be the status of a peace agreement reached in Doha eventually--if one is concluded--and the Darfur peace process. Is it to be considered as a binding document to the parties until the international partners who will consign it as guarantors? Or is it going to be open for further enrichment or tweaking by the local consultations? It's very important to clarify this because there is lack of clarity on it. Thank you.

**Gambari:** Yes. The water conference, well it's going to be... we're hoping it will be in May or June, but no artificial deadline. Want it to be carefully prepared, the documents will be carefully prepared. What are the various elements--quantity, availability of water, maintenance of existing water, supply structure, distribution of water in a more... in a fairer manner, and then project documents that are bankable and that the international financial community will support. We got pledges from the Islamic Development Bank, we got pledges from the African Development Bank, we're not yet got pledges from the World Bank, although the Vice President for Africa, he's interested. It helps that she's a Nigerian by the way. Or it doesn't hurt that she's a Nigerian. She's visited, she's sees the need and we're pushing that the World Bank will get involved. And then you have the traditional donors, the western countries, but also some non-traditional donors, such as Turkey, such as--interestingly enough--Brazil, Venezuela, they've been interested. So those are the people that have been targeted.

But the government of Sudan is taking the lead. Because it's their country, so the minister for water resources is the one taking the lead. Each of the three states--just to demonstrate how important water is-- each of them have a minister for water, you know, so they are part of this, and UNAMID is just supporting this process, encouraging everybody, including in particular the UN country team--UNICEF, WHO are the two that are leading the process of the UN country team. So that's... and the amount of money that has been targeted is about one billion US dollars, which we think, if committed, will make tremendous difference to...

water has been one of the root causes of the conflict and therefore could be an instrument for peace in Darfur.

On the Doha and the DPP, you are right. There's still some discussion. As far as the mediators are concerned in Doha, they don't want anything to be touched by when the document is finished. Not even a comma. But we don't know what document will come out. Is it going to be a signed peace agreement between the government and the armed movements, or is it going to just be a framework agreement to say these are the areas in which there have been agreement because they are still areas where there are, up to now, no agreement. And probably not likely to be agreement. What are those two issues? The issue of whether Darfur should remain three states or one region. In fact, the government has pushed for that. They have created... the chance to create two additional states which is causing a lot of problems. So...

**Hoge:** Making five.

**Gambari:** Making five. But three or five or one region, the armed movement say one region. And historically it used to be one region anyway. So they're not likely to be an agreement. In fact, the government has taken one step closer to say according to the DPA signed in Abuja, one year after DPA, there is supposed to be a referendum for the people to choose whether there should be one region or three states. But some of us think that the timing of that referendum is probably not right because if we want to launch a Darfur-based political process, they should be one of the things they should discuss, not to do this in advance. But in any case that's not likely to be resolved.

And then there's a second issue of the vice president, which the armed movement are saying they want another vice president, but the government has been reluctant and the argument of the government is that if every region has a vice presidents, how many vice presidents are they going to have? And also to have just a vice president it should be vice president for the republic, not the vice president for Darfur. But, in any case, those are the two issues that... if they want to make the deadline of April 18th, I don't see how they can be resolved. And if they not resolved, then what is coming out of Darfur is unclear. Is it going to be a signed agreement on those areas there is agreement, or just a framework to say this is the framework and then you bring those... flexible enough to bring those who are outside the process, to be able to join it later. So, really, the clarity has to come from Doha itself.

But whatever it is, I want to assure you what the African Union and the UNAMID is saying--whatever it is, bring it, and then let us try to sell it and promote it and, yes, encourage support for it, among the women group, the INGO, I mean, the NGOs, the civil society, the IDP's, and all. Because then there will be buy-in internally, because, after all, this is still an agreement reached outside and principally between the government and the armed movements.

**Hoge:** Anybody else. Okay.

**Phillips:** I seem to remember, and perhaps my memory is faulty, but one of the root causes is not only water, but the fact that the nomadic tribes have... whose traditional access to the water has been somewhat blocked by the Darfur people who are there stationary life and has repeated their access to the water. Now is this part of the negotiations to, to provide access, not only the quantity of water, but the access to the water for the nomadic tribes. Those were the men on horseback, I don't remember their names.

**Gambari:** The Janjaweed.

**Phillips:** That's right, the Janjaweed.

**Gambari:**

No, I just use water, but water in more a broad sense is about access to resources for the occupation of the people in Khartoum and those who are doing the farming. It's about land, it's about water, it's about marginalization, it's about access all together, but we think water is such a critical element though, because that's where there's a great scarcity and the opportunity is to increase... the supply's limited unless there is international efforts in a big way, and I forgot to add, you asked me what beyond drilling... yes, there are building dams and some other alternatives to just simply drilling. I'm not an expert on this, but I think they are looking at all aspects of water production, water management, a more equitable distribution and access. These are the issues surrounding it. And it's not just about water but the whole... the means of production for farmers and for cattle owners.

**Hoge:**

There's also a global warming aspect to water supply. When I was in Chad in 2007 with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, we went to Lake Chad and I still remember Lake Chad was once the size of New Jersey. It is now the size of Manhattan. It's just drying up completely. And there are six African countries that take water from that sole lake.

Two observations before we stop here. The first is my boss Terje Rød-Larsen knew that he was risking Ibrahim Gambari saying that he had been his boss twice in life by not being here and he very much wanted to be here. He's overseas. But I will make sure that he knows that Ibrahim did not miss the chance to point out to the audience that he was once Terje's boss - twice Terje's boss.

The second thing is, you may have noticed in the middle of this gathering Ibrahim did something that no guest... I've been here nearly three years now, and there have been many guests I've been with, no one has ever done what he's done and it's typical of the sort of robust energetic way he goes about doing things. At one point he turned this process around and he was asking questions of members of the audience. We haven't got the answers yet, but I'll seek them afterwards.

Anyway, I began by saying that this is part of a series, the SRSG series. That series is aimed at bringing people who are out there in the field to this community to talk to you and it's been a very valuable series. Never been more valuable than today with the likes of Ibrahim Gambari and the kind of information he can bring to this audience. Ibrahim, thank you so much. It's great to have you back.